

JOURNAL OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS HISTORY | V13/N1

Veritas



This *Veritas* 'spectrum' issue with articles covering the ARSOF functional branches will be followed by another before returning to the 35th Anniversary Night Stalker special edition. A moratorium on current operations (ops) articles sourced from classified materials was imposed during an inquiry (October 2016-March 2017) into our 15-year old review protocol. The 'speed bump' caused a major 'shift of gears' to cover the gap. Henceforth, reviews by the unit commanders and staff section reviews at all levels will be 'by-name documented.' Despite the concerns about an article in the CJSOTF-Afghanistan volume, that issue was extremely well-received across the Force.

There is a 'first' for *Veritas*—an historical analysis to explain the dearth of operational missions given the 10th SFG from its arrival in Germany in late 1953 until the President John F. Kennedy era. A paucity of SF senior commanders with combat-experience as heavy warfighters in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during WWII hindered SF acceptance. However, proselytizing 1944-era doctrine and TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures adapted from the OSS) did little to get SF accepted by Pentomic Army generals. Outnumbered five to one by the Soviets, they were too engaged in reducing the odds with nuclear weapons.

Unanimously unsuccessful 'behind the lines' unconventional warfare (UW) operations in Korea became close-hold pyrrhic endeavors. Acknowledging that tight societal security was an inherent part of Communism was anathema. Forgotten was that Allied UW conducted 'behind the lines' in WWII occurred in enemy-occupied, formerly independent countries, not Communist nations. When President Kennedy adopted a 'flexible response' defense strategy, Special Forces were already countering insurgency (COIN) in Laos and South Vietnam, but as surrogates of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SF direct action at Hazar Qadam, PSYOP targeting of ISIS, and a biography of COL Charles R. Munske, the U.S. 'mayor' of P'yongyang, North Korea, in 1950 fill out the 'Spectrum.' Close examination of a 1960 SF Officer Course graduation photo from COL Sri Tesana, father of current Thai Special Warfare Center commander LTG Sirichai Tesana, revealed a class filled with SF notables. The SAF (Special Action Force) is best illustrated by that centered on 1st SFG on Okinawa. Vietnam service was honored with two pavers (281st Aviation Company [1965-1970] and the 2nd, 29th, and 41st CA Companies [1965-1971]) and the addition of three PSYOP soldiers killed in action (KIA) to the Memorial Wall.

We appreciate the veterans who have supported our research. A CA History Handbook (HHB) was distributed last fall to complement the PSYOP HHB. The Army Special Operations Aviation timeline and 160th SOAR HHB will 'test fly' our more stringent review process. CHB

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FRONT COVER: A Special Forces soldier from ODA 514, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group conducts a special reconnaissance (SR) mission in the mountains of Afghanistan in January 2002.



SPECIAL ACTION FORCE

ASIA

by Eugene Piasecki

On 7 May 1954, the Vietminh victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu was a major success for Communist-supported insurgencies and independence movements from imperial powers. The U. S. Army determined to educate its leaders about counter-guerrilla warfare and pacification and to develop strategies and tactics to counter insurgencies. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower favored a national security strategy of nuclear deterrence, General (GEN) John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces, realized an alternative had to be formalized. He tasked the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as early as 4 March 1954 to “assume responsibility for *all* matters concerning guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) as the ‘primary agency for the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques.’”¹ It was also to publish the training literature on guerrilla warfare to educate commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Known by the ‘umbrella’ term Special Warfare, the military and paramilitary measures, when consolidated, included unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare. This was reinforced by the Army Chief of Staff, GEN George H. Decker, in his ‘Strategic Army Study, 1970’ (STARS-70) in December 1960.² The purpose of this article is to explain how the 1st Special Forces Group (1SFG) (Airborne), addressed the Special Warfare counterinsurgency challenges in Southeast Asia (SEA).


After being inaugurated as the 35th President of the United States on 20 January 1961, President John F. Kennedy shifted America’s national security strategy from nuclear deterrence to flexible response.³ Flexible response called for America’s military to field forces that were task-organized to deal with conflict at any level. In STARS-70, GEN George H. Decker confidently stated that the U. S. Army was “uniquely capable of confronting the Communists face-to-face in the struggle for freedom in

the less developed countries.”⁴ To support the new strategy, the Army needed a unique and more adaptable Special Forces organization. The result was the formation of several regional Special Action Forces (SAFs).

Turning the fight against Communism into a Special Warfare national crusade, the Kennedy administration began codifying its intentions with a series of documents called National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM). Among the more significant of these, NSAM 182 Counterinsurgency Doctrine (August 1962), provided the following strategic policy guidance:

“The President has approved the document entitled ‘U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,’ (USOIDP) which sets forth a national counterinsurgency doctrine for the use of U. S. departments and agencies concerned with the internal defense of overseas areas threatened by subversive insurgency, and has directed its promulgation to serve as basic policy guidance to diplomatic missions, consular personnel, and military commands abroad; to government departments and agencies at home; and to the government educational system.”⁵


Acting on “the presumption that counter-insurgency programs (also known as ‘internal defense programs’) should not be limited to military measures but should also involve as necessary such additional dimensions as economic development, police control, and effective local government,” individual embassy Country Teams coordinated with host nations to prepare their respective Internal Defense Plans (IDPs).⁶ Unified Commands allocated personnel and materiel resources to support Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)-managed IDPs, as well as provided input to national military FID plans. To implement these plans and



President John F. Kennedy regarded U.S. Army Special Forces as the organization best suited to defeat worldwide Communist insurgencies.

This stone, located in the USASOC Memorial Plaza, is dedicated to the 1st Special Forces Group and their service in Southeast Asia from 1957 to the present.

Special Action Force Asia



The base SAFASIA unit was the 1st Special Forces Group. It was augmented by conventional Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, Army Security Agency, Engineer, and Medical detachments to train, advise, and assist host nation country forces in the full spectrum of FID activities.



Colonel Francis J. Kelly commanded the 1st SFG and SAFASIA between 1964 and 1966. He then commanded the 5th SFG in Vietnam from 1966-1967.

initiatives, the SAFs were assigned to their respective Army Component Commands and placed under the Operational Control (OPCON) of their overseas Unified Commands since Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) did not exist.⁷

Designed to meet the challenges presented by Communist-supported ‘wars of national liberation,’ the original direct action mission of the SAF was changed to foreign internal defense and development (FID) and focused on training, advisory support, and operational advice and assistance to host countries engaged in counterinsurgency operations.⁸ To accomplish this, the Army provisionally organized four SAFs, each centered on an active Special Forces Group that was already oriented toward a specific geographic area. The first SAF to be organized was SAF Latin America (SAFLA) in 1963 centered on the 8th SFG (A) at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. SAFLA was followed in 1964 by forming SAF Asia (SAFASIA) around the 1st SFG (A) on Okinawa; SAF Middle East (SAFMIDEAST) by the 3rd SFG (A); and SAF Africa (SAFAFRICA) using the 6th SFG (A) as its base. The 3rd and 6th SFGs were stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In SAFASIA’s case, its chain of command started at the Unified level with the Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii and ended on Okinawa with the Army Component of the Ryukyu Command (USARYIS). With the strategic guidance established by NSAM 182, SAFASIA’s doctrinal operational organization originated from the 12 December 1963 Army Field Manual 31-22, *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces*.⁹ As the Commander, 1st SFG (A), Colonel (COL) Francis J. Kelly, also became the Commander, SAFASIA when the 97th Civil Affairs (CA) Group, 156th Medical (Med) Detachment, 400th Army Security Agency (ASA) Detachment, 441st Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment, and 539th Engineer Detachment were attached to the 1st SFG.¹⁰ This task organization was not just unique to the requirements in Asia, but became a model for the other SAFs, reflected President Kennedy’s flexible response doctrine, and addressed the countermeasures against Communist insurgent warfare as well as a nation-building counterstrategy.¹¹

SAFASIA soon found itself rapidly task organizing and deploying its assets to assist other Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan.¹² Among the first units deployed from the 1st SFG (A) were SF ODAs on temporary duty (TDY) to South Vietnam to advise the Vietnamese Special Forces units involved in training the Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). These were followed by additional elements that were dispatched to Thailand to train units of the Royal Thai Army, Thai Border Police, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (The Black Panther Division) that eventually conducted combat operations in South Vietnam.¹³ One of the key elements of every SAF mission was to negotiate the mandated approval process required before being allowed to enter another country. Starting with an invitation from a host country to provide assistance, the SAF could neither

This is the 1st SFG Distinctive Unit Insignia worn between 1957 and 1960. The *Torii* gate recognizes its service on Okinawa. The three arrows colored pale blue, dark blue, and green denote SF's abilities to infiltrate by air, sea, or land. The crossed arrows reflect the unit's lineage with the First Special Service Force. The globe with rings represents the motto "Anywhere, Anytime, Anyplace"; and the Latin phrase "*Ubique sed Nusquam*" — "Everywhere, yet Nowhere."



Beret Flash for the 46th Company formerly stationed in Thailand.



Beret Flash for the 39th Special Forces Detachment stationed in South Korea.



Colonel Charles M. Simpson III commanded the 1st SFG and SAFASIA from 1969-1971. He authored the book *Inside the Green Berets, The First Thirty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* published in 1983.



accept nor begin to execute the mission it had been asked to perform until that nation's U. S. Ambassador and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) granted approval.¹⁴

This approval process for the 1st SFG to deploy teams soon became a formality as individual Southeast Asian countries began to realize the positive benefits they were receiving from SAFASIA security assistance and civic action missions. One example of this was the 'AUMEE' series of exercises between American and Nationalist Chinese Special Forces on the island of Taiwan that simulated conducting unconventional warfare on the Chinese mainland.¹⁵ As retired Sergeant Major (SGM) Gilbert R. Turcotte remembered, "After jumping onto Henry 7 Drop Zone on Taiwan we were required to establish communication with headquarters, 1st SFG on Okinawa once we had cleared the DZ."¹⁶ That ability to make long-distance communications shots was an important mission element. Also during the same period, COL Kelly and SAFASIA deployed a modified C/B Team to Lopburi, Thailand. As the forerunner to D Company, 1st SFG, and later the 46th Special Forces Company, many of the civic action projects undertaken by this task-organized element during the period were completed in conjunction with military training missions.¹⁷ Rounding out these early 1st SFG (A) efforts was the establishment of the Resident Detachment-Korea. Activated as a 'combat-deployable' element of Combined Forces Command, the Detachment's orientation and mission changed when it was assigned to Korea as a training unit with a Foreign Internal Defense Mission and eventually redesignated as the 39th SF Detachment.¹⁸

Even though the 1st SFG continued to send ODAs to Vietnam during the 1960s to support the 5th SFG (A), it also deployed SAF teams throughout the rest of Asia to confront the noncombat elements of counterinsurgency. This was especially true in Thailand. Troops from the SAFASIA 539th Engineer and 156th Medical Detachments under U. S. AID direction trained numerous Thai elements to build roads, operate and maintain heavy equipment, and institute public health, sanitation, and medical care procedures.¹⁹ These FID missions continued to be performed until American policy toward Southeast Asia changed during the Nixon administration. The shift toward 'Vietnamization' and the official U. S. - Hanoi peace talks in Paris, France, caused SAFASIA to reduce its military training across Southeast Asia.

The impacts of these initiatives soon became apparent to all SAFASIA elements especially after COL Charles M. Simpson III assumed command of the 1st SFG (A) on 14 June 1969.²⁰ Drawing upon the civic action experience he had gained as an SF company commander with the 10th SFG (A) at Bad Toelz, Germany, COL Simpson emphasized 'nation-building' skills, and formed Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (DART) for use throughout eastern Asia. The DARTs were created from existing SAFASIA assets and consisted of a twelve-man ODA augmented by two,

“Teams from the 1st Special Forces Group were literally lifesavers during both calamities. ... The DARTs saved lives and salvaged livelihoods, and earned America many friends.” – MSG Jake Jacobson



The Philippine Presidential Unit citation was awarded to the 1st SFG for its disaster relief efforts on Central Luzon in July and August 1972.

1st SFG surgeons and four to six medical NCOs from the 156th Medical Detachment.²¹ Shortly after their creation, DARTs went into action and proved their value. Two examples particularly stand out. The first was the response to the floods in Pakistan in 1971, and the other was to assist Filipinos on Luzon after a typhoon flooded most of that island in 1972. As MSG Jake Jacobson recalls: “teams from the 1st Special Forces Group were literally lifesavers during both calamities. Operating rescue boats, inoculating civilians, distributing food, and directing rebuilding efforts, the DARTs saved lives and salvaged livelihoods, and earned America many friends.”²² In recognition for this latter effort, the 1st SFG (A) was awarded the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation.²³

Throughout his command tour, COL Simpson balanced SAFASIA's civic action and tactical training requirements. One thing that COL Simpson absolutely insisted on was that all 1st SFG (A) deploying elements ensure that these opportunities inspired the credibility of those being assisted and “any after action photographs had better show only brown faces in the front rows and white faces in the rearmost row.”²⁴ This guidance was incorporated by SF ODA 112 during its participation in the joint Republic of Korea (ROK) - U.S. Special Forces Exercise, FOAL WING I, and culminated with elements of the Group Headquarters participating in Command Post Exercise FOAL EAGLE 70. Both of these exercises integrated American and South Korean personnel in performing the necessary command and staff responsibilities to successfully execute combined unconventional warfare (UW) operations.²⁵ Closer to home in the three Ryukuan Island Groups, SAFASIA's engineers and medical/dental teams became familiar visitors. They repaired or replaced existing water systems to improve hygiene and sanitary conditions, and conducted sick calls. Additionally, SAF veterinarian teams treated 700 animals for various diseases and ailments, and suggested American animal husbandry techniques to local animal owners and farmers.²⁶

SAFASIA Special Forces elements that were not deployed off Okinawa between December 1969 and March 1971 maintained their training readiness by participating in Exercise SAGE WARRIOR at Camp Hardy, Okinawa. Consisting of three phases, the purpose of SAGE WARRIOR

was to determine each ODA's operational readiness level. Phase I consisted of detachment-conducted military occupational specialty (MOS) training and cross training. That culminated with all detachment members taking a series of written tests on their cross-trained SF skills. Phase II tested individual confidence and physical conditioning. It included a 100-meter swim and five-mile run. Phase III tested the detachment's collective performance. This involved the SF Company infiltrating an ODA into an Unconventional Warfare Operations Area (UWOA) from the sea, contacting a guerrilla band, training that organization in the skills necessary to strike a simulated missile site, and exfiltration by helicopter.²⁷


To what extent the results of Exercise SAGE WARRIOR determined whether an individual or ODA deployed on a mission is unknown. The program was discontinued in March 1971. This did not mean that SAFASIA Special Forces individual and operational element capabilities were not assessed. Starting in the summer of 1971, two new programs were implemented. The first determined individual deployability and lasted three-weeks. A series of tests evaluated the primary MOS and cross-trained skill levels of each Special Forces soldier newly assigned to the 1st SFG (A). Building on the individual skill assessments, a collective unit evaluation was used [Operational Readiness Test (ORT)]. Unlike SAGE WARRIOR which evaluated only two ODAs per month, this improved ORT could simultaneously evaluate an Operational Detachment B (ODB) and three ODAs during a fifteen-day field training exercise (FTX).²⁸

Added to these military tasks was COL Simpson's additional requirement that all SAFASIA ODAs attend a special school that taught them basic construction skills: brick-laying; simple carpentry; and how to mix and pour concrete. These skills began paying huge dividends after the first training cycle. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos requested American assistance to complete his ambitious school construction program. Using this as a dual-1st SFG and SAFASIA training opportunity, a tailored force package was selected and deployed to the Philippines for six months. Comprising this element was an ODB for command and control, six ODAs to perform on-site work supervision duties, and several engineer officers from the

539th Engineer Detachment for technical expertise. Besides providing the SF ODAs the chance to live and work with foreigners to achieve specific tasks and goals in a strange environment, radio operators were able to practice their long-range communications capabilities from ODA to ODB and from ODB to Manila and Okinawa.²⁹

In spite of all the positive military and Civic Action contributions that the 1st SFG (A) and SAFASIA had made in the Far East, under the command of U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands and under the operational control of U.S. Army Pacific they were a political target because of its theater

wartime mission.³⁰ As a result, on 17 June 1971, when the Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Island Agreement was signed in Washington and Tokyo, the future of 1st SFG (A) and SAFASIA was sealed.³¹ Inactivated at Fort Bragg, NC on 27 June 1974 (28 June 1974 on Okinawa), it happened at a time that the only U.S. Special Forces presence in Asia was reduced to the small detachment of Special Forces-qualified soldiers in Korea. This absence of a permanent Special Forces presence in Asia was short-lived. The international political and military situation caused the United States to reevaluate its strategy, reactivate



the 1st SFG (A) in 1984, and forward-base the 1st Battalion back on Okinawa. Unfortunately, the 1960's SAF concept became a casualty of the post-Vietnam force reductions, and while retained as a 'Security Action Force' in FM 31-20 *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (April 1990), this concept never became reality. ▲

EUGENE G. PIASECKI

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Endnotes

- 1 Michael McClintock, "Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare," *Instruments of Statecraft: U. S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990*, 18. Accessed on 11 December 2012, http://www.statecraft.org/chapter_2.html. Army Field Forces was the WWII fore-runner to the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and today's U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
- 2 Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007), 198.
- 3 Elliot V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), 596. President Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy and strategy stressed nuclear weapons, along with the deployment of the first operational guided missiles to provide security and make it possible to reduce military spending (vi). On the other hand, 'flexible response,' which had been articulated as early as 1956 by General Maxwell D. Taylor, represented a 'balanced' military capability that included strong conventional forces (596).
- 4 Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, 165. This quote is from: Presentation, General Decker to General Staff Council, 25 Nov 60, subject: The U.S. Army and National Security, 1960-1970, 11, DCSOPS, 1960, RG 319, NARA.
- 5 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 105, 24 August 1962, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d105>. Accessed on 24 February 2017.
- 6 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Volume XXIV, Africa, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/actionstatement>. Accessed on 24 February 2017.
- 7 Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and Eugene G. Piasecki, Information Paper to CG, USASOC, "U.S. Army Special Action Forces (SAF)," 17 July 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 8 *Field Manual 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1963), 20.
- 9 Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow), 12 March 1964, Department of State, Records Group 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Archives and Records Administration.
- 10 John P. Foster, "Headquarters Special Action Force Asia, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, History 1969-1971," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 6. COL Francis J. Kelly was also the commander of the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa.
- 11 Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, 225.
- 12 Master Sergeant (R) Harold 'Jake' Jacobson, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 24 February 2017, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Foster, *Headquarters Special Action Force Asia*, 7.
- 14 Charles H. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets, The First Thirty Years A History of the U. S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 70.
- 15 "1st Special Forces Group History, 1956 – 1974," DVD, 2 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 34-35.
- 16 SGM (retired) Gilbert R. Turcotte, C Company, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 25 June 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. SGM Turcotte, a radio operator himself, also stated that although each radio operator was required to be able to send and receive 15 words per minute (WPM) to graduate from SF Training Group, once he reported to the 1st SFG, he had to demonstrate the capability to send/receive 18 WPM to be assigned to an ODA.
- 17 "1st Special Forces Group History, 1956-1974," 33.
- 18 1st Special Forces Group History, 35. The 39th Special Forces Detachment was originally activated in Berlin, Germany on 1 September 1965. It remained there to perform an unconventional warfare mission until it was inactivated on 1 October 1984. Special Forces Detachment-Korea (SFD – K) was inactivated and reflagged as the 39th Special Forces Detachment in Korea on 16 October 2005. The 39th SF Detachment has remained the longest standing deployed Special Forces Operational Detachment (SFOD) in Army Special Forces history, and assumed the training and other missions previously performed by SFD-K.
- 19 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 93.
- 20 Foster, *Headquarters Special Action Force Asia*, 8.
- 21 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 187.
- 22 Jacobson e-mail, 24 February 2017.
- 23 Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders No. 11, Washington, DC, 23 April 1973. The Philippine Republic Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to the United States Army Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) for meritorious participation in disaster relief operations in flood-stricken provinces of Central Luzon in July and August 1972.
- 24 COL (retired) Allan W. Keener, former 1st SFG (A) adjutant, e-mail to Eugene G. Piasecki, 14 July 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 25 Foster, *Headquarters Special Action Force Asia*, 9-10.
- 26 Foster, *Headquarters Special Action Force Asia*, 10.
- 27 Foster, *Headquarters, Special Action Force Asia*, 19.
- 28 Foster, *Headquarters, Special Action Force Asia*, 20-21.
- 29 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 194.
- 30 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 218.
- 31 "Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands Agreement Signed at Washington and Tokyo June 17, 1971. *Treaties and Other International Acts*, no. 7314 (1972): 446. The terms and conditions that established the basis for this treaty are explained in Department of State Bulletin 15 December 1969. At that time President Richard M. Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato determined the fate of the 1st SFG when they mutually agreed that "the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries." (555).



ARSOF in Vietnam

Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations Honored in USASOC Memorial Plaza

by Jared M. Tracy and Troy J. Sacquety

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is committed to honoring its legacy. Recently, it added two memorial stones for units that served in Vietnam, and added the names of three PSYOP soldiers who were killed in that war. The addition of John A. Blanco, Jr., John E. Lynch, and Darel L. Sills to the Memorial Wall along with the installation of the Vietnam Civil Affairs and 281st Assault Helicopter Company stones in the Memorial Plaza underscore the USASOC commitment to honor, preserve, and build on the ARSOF legacy. They highlight Vietnam War service. Although that war ended more than forty years ago, these memorials will educate, remind, and inspire today's ARSOF soldiers.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

On 7 October 2016, a stone paver dedicated to the 281st Assault Helicopter Company (AHC), the 'Intruders,' became the latest addition to the USASOC Memorial Plaza. Activated on 7 October 1965, the 281st served in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970. Based in Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam, operational control (OPCON) of 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), its primary mission was to support Army Special Operations Forces. Units supported included the 5th SFG, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Studies and Observations Group (SOG), the MACV Recondo School, and other 5th SFG 'Greek' projects like Delta, Omega, and Sigma. Later, the company provided combat helicopter support throughout II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ).

The 281st AHC was organized into lift, attack, maintenance, and service elements. The 1st Platoon (nicknamed 'Rat Pack') and the 2nd Platoon ('Bandits') provided lift support

with UH-1B Iroquois 'Huey' helicopters. The third platoon ('Wolf Pack') supported ground operations with armed UH-1C 'Huey' gunships. The 483rd Transportation and 499th Signal Detachments provided logistical and communications support.¹

The 281st AHC was inactivated in Vietnam on 14 December 1970 after five years of dedicated combat service. The 'Intruders' participated in twelve Vietnam campaigns and received a Valorous Unit Award, a Meritorious Unit Commendation, four awards of the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and a Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star. It was later activated in the Army Reserve on 15 April 1971 and based in Saint Louis, MO. It was inactivated on 30 September 1987 at Scott Air Force Base, IL.²

CIVIL AFFAIRS

On 3 June 2016, veterans of the three Civil Affairs (CA) Companies that served in Vietnam, the 41st, 2nd, and 29th, dedicated a memorial stone in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Memorial Plaza. These active-duty U.S. Army CA Companies promoted rural pacification in the Republic of Vietnam from 1965 to 1971. They now join other Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) lineage and legacy units on the plaza. Thus, they help USASOC remember its predecessor elements and draw inspiration from them.

FM 41-10 *Civil Affairs Operations* (May 1962) assigned CA a key role in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. They were to "engender stable conditions which are unfavorable to guerrilla activities through the relief of local destitution, restoration of law and order, resumption of agricultural production, reestablishment of local government, and measures to enlist the active support and sympathy of the local population."³ As such, CA served as a force multiplier in Vietnam and regularly worked with Special Forces in the field.

Organized as individual companies, the three CA units essentially functioned as separate battalions. Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, each CA Company served at the Corps level in Vietnam. The 29th was assigned to the I CTZ, the 41st to the II CTZ, and the 2nd to the III CTZ. Initially

part of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the CA Companies were transferred to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program at the end of 1967. The civilian-led, three-star equivalent command, CORDS, controlled all civilian and military rural pacification programs from the military, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under CORDS, CA personnel coordinated and supervised village stability projects that included roads and bridge construction, well digging and water purification, animal husbandry, basic education, and medical clinics. The local Vietnamese-driven projects were designed to stimulate the regional economies and earn respect for the Saigon government.

The 41st CA Company arrived in 1965 and the 2nd and 29th followed in 1966.⁴ With Vietnamization and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces (a pre-condition for peace negotiations with Hanoi), the 41st CA Company was disbanded in 1970, followed by the 2nd and 29th in 1971. All three Vietnam-era CA companies are in the lineage of current active-duty CA battalions. The 81st and 83rd CA Battalions, 85th CA Brigade, perpetuate the lineages of the 29th and 41st Companies, respectively.⁵ The 92nd CA Battalion, 95th CA Brigade, continues the lineage of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company.

Memorial Stone of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company.



Memorial Stone dedicated to the three active duty Army CA companies that served in Vietnam (1965-1971).



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

USASOC memorialized three Psychological Operations (PSYOP) soldiers who died in Vietnam. These are: First Lieutenant (1LT) John A. Blanco, Jr., Sergeant (SGT) John E. Lynch, and Specialist Four (SP4) Darel L. Sills. Their names will be forever enshrined on the USASOC Memorial Wall. 🇺🇸

1LT John A. Blanco, Jr.



1LT John A. Blanco, Jr., killed in Vietnam on 17 December 1968 while assigned to the 7th PSYOP Battalion, 4th POG.

John A. Blanco, Jr., was born in Evanston, IL, on 10 May 1943. Earning a B.A. in Psychology in 1966 from Lewis College (now University), Romeoville, IL, he served as an enlisted Infantryman from 13 May 1966 to 27 April 1967. Successfully completing Infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, GA, Blanco was commissioned as an Infantry second lieutenant (2LT). His first assignment after OCS was Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 13th PSYOP Battalion (POB), Fort Bragg, NC. In July 1967 he began the PSYOP Officers' Course at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. Two months later he was awarded the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of Psywar/PSYOP Officer.

On 24 April 1968, Blanco began his tour of duty in Vietnam. Promoted to 1LT, he was assigned as a Coordination Officer in the Propaganda Development Center (PDC), 7th POB, a subordinate unit of the new 4th PSYOP Group (POG). Over the next several months, his assignments in 7th POB included Audio-Visual Field Team Leader; Detachment Commander; and Assistant Development Officer in the PDC. On 17 December 1968, 25-year-old 1LT Blanco was killed in a military aircraft crash in Quang Tin, I CTZ.⁶

SGT John E. Lynch



SGT John E. Lynch, killed in Vietnam on 15 June 1969 while assigned to the 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th POG.

John E. Lynch was born on 19 July 1948 in Kingston, PA. While a senior at Wyoming Valley West High School, he enlisted as a private via the U.S. Army Reserve Delayed Entry Program. After high school graduation on 6 June 1968, he entered the Regular Army in Wilkes-Barre, PA, for an active-duty term of 3 years. He chose Intelligence Analyst as his MOS and did Basic Combat Training at Fort Gordon, GA.

On 24 September 1968, Lynch began the Intelligence Analyst Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAINTS) at Fort Holabird, MD, earning a promotion to Private First Class. He completed USAINTS on 27 November 1968 and was promoted to Specialist Four (SP4). After graduation, Lynch received orders to U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV). Arriving in January 1969, he was assigned to B Company, 6th POB, 4th POG, as a Section Leader. He conducted numerous aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions, and was awarded the Air Medal on 29 April for the period of 18 January to 1 March 1969.

Lynch was conducting a leaflet drop/loudspeaker mission on 15 June 1969, in III CTZ aboard a UH-1 'Huey' Iroquois belonging to B Company, 229th Aviation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Around 1430 hours, the helicopter hit high voltage wires, crashed, and burned. Lynch was killed, along with Warrant Officer 1 (WO1) Kish L. Green (pilot), SP4 Larry D. Lemaster (gunner), and RVN interpreter My Vu Tan. Amazingly, WO1 William K. Geloneck (pilot) and SP4 Larry M. Pollitt (crew chief) survived with serious burns. Lynch was posthumously promoted to Sergeant and awarded the Military Merit Medal by the Republic of Vietnam.⁷

SP4 Darel L. Sills



SP4 Darel L. Sills, killed in Vietnam on 27 June 1966 while assigned to the 246th PSYOP Company, 6th PSYOP Battalion.

Darel L. Sills was born in Shattuck, OK, on 1 September 1941. After graduating high school in 1959, Sills attended Portland (OR) State University, 1962-1963, before joining the Army as a Private (E-2) on 31 December 1964 to become a Still Photographic Specialist. After MOS training, Sills was promoted to SP4 in November 1965.

On 27 June 1966, Sills arrived in Vietnam assigned to the 246th PSYOP Company, 6th POB, USARV. While supporting the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), SP4 Sills "planned and participated in numerous psychological warfare operations against the Viet Cong, and often accompanied airborne speaker and leaflet drop missions over hostile territory. Entering insecure hamlets with his team, the PSYOP team leader would attempt to persuade the villagers to sever ties with the Viet Cong and support the Vietnamese government." On 13 October 1966, 25-year-old SP4 Sills was killed when the military vehicle in which he was riding hit an explosive mine. Sills' skill badges and decorations included the Aircraft Crewman Badge, the Air Medal, the Purple Heart, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Republic of Vietnam Military Merit Medal, and Gallantry Cross with Palm.⁸



Two Civil Affairs veterans, CSM (Ret) Jimmie Gonzalez of the 41st Civil Affairs Company, and Wesley E. Speers, 29th CA Company, lay a wreath on 3 June 2016 to dedicate the memorial stone to the CA Companies that served in Vietnam.

JARED M. TRACY, PhD

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became a historian at USASOC in December 2010. He earned an MA in History from Virginia Commonwealth University and a PhD in History from Kansas State University. His research is focused on the history of U.S. Army Psychological Operations.

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Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

Endnotes

- 1 All information on the 281st taken from the 281st AHC Memorial Stone Dedication Ceremony pamphlet, 7 October 2016, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 U.S. Army, Center of Military History, “Statement of Service: 281st Aviation Company (Intruders),” copy provided in email from Edward N. Bedessem to Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, “281st Assault Helicopter Company,” 7 March 2017, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 41-10: *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC, 1962), 145.
- 4 **No Reserve CA units served in Vietnam. All of them were active-duty.**
- 5 **For more on the 41st Civil Affairs Company, see** “Battle Without Bullets: The 41st Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam-Part I: 1965-1967,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 5 (3: 2009): 1-15 and “This is not Kansas Anymore: the 41st Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam Part II,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 10 (1: 2014).
- 6 Information obtained from Personnel Record for First Lieutenant (1LT) John A. Blanco, Jr., National Personnel Records Center (NPRC)/National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), St. Louis, MO.
- 7 Information obtained from Personnel Record for Sergeant (SGT) John E. Lynch, NPRC/NARA, St. Louis, MO.
- 8 Information obtained from Personnel Record for Specialist Four (SP4) Darel L. Sills, NPRC/NARA, St. Louis, MO.

MISTF-C

In Operation

INHERENT RESOLVE



by Jared M. Tracy

Shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) established a Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Task Force (JPOTF) (initially based at Fort Bragg, NC) to provide audio, visual, and printed product support to upcoming operations in Afghanistan. The JPOTF mission grew with the 2003 expansion of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) into Iraq. Two years later, the task force had elements operating at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, and in Baghdad, Iraq.¹ By 2005, the JPOTF had re-positioned and consolidated at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, to better enable it to provide PSYOP support throughout the entire USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). In 2010, the JPOTF was re-designated the Joint Military Information Support Task Force (Special Operations) (JISTF [SO]) and again in 2015 as the Military Information Support Task Force – Central (MISTF-C).² As of 2015, MISTF-C has been headquartered at Al Udeid Airbase (AUAB), Qatar.³

MISTF-C has thus been providing steadfast PSYOP/Military Information Support Operations (MISO) support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and joint, interagency, and combined partners since late 2001. It developed, produced, printed, and disseminated millions of printed products and several thousand audio-visual products in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) in Afghanistan and Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and NEW DAWN (OND) in Iraq. Since 2014 it has contributed to international efforts in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) against violent extremist organizations in Iraq and Syria, namely the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁴ MISTF-C earned six Joint Meritorious Unit Awards between 2008 and 2015 for its MISO efforts in USCENTCOM.⁵

MISO products may originate in a myriad of ways. For example, a forward MISO 'outstation' (such as another task force or a Military Information Support Team) lacking enough time, equipment, or resources might request product design and/or printing support from the MISTF-C. Or, the MISTF-C staff might develop and obtain pre-approval for an original product series so that 'outstations' can later create products without pursuing higher approval each time. Regardless who initiates the product concept or what the nature of the support request is, the MISTF-C is committed to its in-theater 'customers.' These may be other MISO elements or a supported headquarters like the Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR (SOJTF-OIR) or the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR (CJTF-OIR).⁶

In the following pages, the reader will get a first-hand view of the caliber of MISO products targeting violent extremism in the USCENTCOM AOR. Each entry includes an English translation, the product's objective, and the target audience for whom it was intended. Behind every product is an extensive research, design, staffing, and approval process. This process generally includes a thorough internal legal review; in-depth translations and cultural analyses by vetted experts; and product design and output by U.S. Army PSYOP and Signal personnel. After receiving local command endorsement, products are staffed and approved by supported and higher joint headquarters. Finally, they are delivered to the appropriate personnel or aircraft for dissemination. ▲



U.S. Army and Air Force personnel load a 750-pound M129 E2 bomb canister with MISTF-C leaflets to be dropped by B-52 Stratofortress aircraft. After the M129 is dropped, a time fuse detonates the primer cord between the bomb's two sections, blowing it open and releasing its contents on target audiences within the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA).⁷



These two Kodak NexPress S3000 Digital Production Color Presses are owned and operated by the MISTF-C. Each is capable of printing 3,000 A3 sheets (11.7 x 16.5 inches) per hour, or 72,000 per day. Larger sheets containing multiple leaflets are then cut using the Polar 78 cutter (rear center-right). Depending on the number of leaflets per page (and without consideration of downtime for press maintenance and repairs), each press can handle 250,000 to 400,000 leaflets a day.



MISTF-C contract specialists evaluate the linguistic and cultural accuracy of printed, audio, and visual MISO products beforehand to insure best results with target audiences. This contractor records a script in an insulated sound booth which will be incorporated into a product.



A



B



C

- A** MISTF-C Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) worn on right shoulder of assigned U.S. Air Force (USAF) personnel.
- B** U.S. Army Special Operations Command SSI worn on left shoulder of U.S. Army personnel assigned to the MISTF-C.
- C** Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) SSI worn on right shoulder as the combat patch for U.S. Army personnel and on the left shoulder of USAF personnel assigned to the MISTF-C.

Leaflets

Front



Back



Translation Both Sides | “[ISIS] robs your boys of their childhood ... and turns them into murderers.”

Target Audience | Iraqi and Syrian citizens in ISIS-controlled areas.

Objectives | Decrease public support for ISIS.

Translation |


“The time that you’ve been waiting for has arrived, it is now the time to leave [your location].”

Target Audience |

Iraqi and Syrian citizens in ISIS-controlled areas.

Objectives |

Protect civilian lives and increase public compliance with Coalition directives.



Translation Front | “Stop letting [ISIS] beat your women.”

Translation Back | “This is your country. Stop [ISIS] from ruining your country.”

Target Audience | Iraqi citizens in ISIS-controlled areas.

Objectives | Decrease public acceptance of ISIS.



Front



Back

Front



Back



Translation Front | “Coalition pilots prowl the skies. Listen for their roar and look for the fire and smoke that signifies another [ISIS] has been sent back to *Barzakh*.”

In Islamic theology, *Barzakh* is believed to be an intermediate location between the physical and the spiritual worlds where deceased individuals have time to contemplate their worldly actions before final Judgment Day and entry into eternity.

Translation Back | “Committing atrocities against innocent citizens is cowardly and unforgiveable. [ISIS] have corrupt souls and will see *Jahannam*. Abandon your illegitimate cause.”

In Islamic theology, *Jahannam* signifies Hell.


Target Audience | ISIS members.

Objectives | Encourage desertion to weaken ISIS.

Front



Back



Translation Front | Top “ISF [Iraqi Security Force] is Advancing!” Bottom “Quick, just like we did in Fallujah!”

Target Audience | 18-25 year-old, non-ISIS males living in Mosul, Iraq.

Objectives | Discourage public support for ISIS.



Translation |
“For any oppressor,
there is an end.”

Target Audience | Newly
recruited ISIS fighters.

Objectives | Encourage
desertion to weaken ISIS.

Translation |
“The Invisible Sheikh with
the expansion of his false
caliphate ... will soon
have none to help him
achieve his illusions.”

This is a reference to the leader of ISIS
and self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi. He is called ‘invisible’
because his exact location remains
uncertain and he hides among civilian
populations in ISIS-controlled areas
rather than anywhere in the open or
near immediate danger.

Target Audience |
ISIS members.

Objectives | Encourage
desertion to weaken ISIS.



JARED M. TRACY, PhD

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became a historian at USASOC in December 2010. He earned a MA in History from Virginia Commonwealth University and a PhD in History from Kansas State University. His research is focused on the history of U.S. Army Psychological Operations.

Endnotes

- 1 Christopher J. Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005), 45-51.
- 2 MISTF-C, “MISTF-C History” (draft), attached to email from CPT Devon E. Wilson* (pseudonym) to Jared M. Tracy, “SUBJECT: Help with MISTF-C History,” 28 April 2016, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft. Bragg, NC.
- 3 JISTF (SO), “CAS to AUAB Relocation,” 15 May 2015, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft. Bragg, NC.
- 4 ISIS is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and *Da’esh*.
- 5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), “Citation to Accompany the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to Headquarters, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force,” 21 April 2008 (and accompanying staffing documents); CJCS, “Citation to Accompany the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to Headquarters, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force,” 13 July 2009; CJCS, “Citation to Accompany the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to Headquarters, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force-Qatar,” 13 September 2010; CJCS, “Citation to Accompany the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to Headquarters, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force-Qatar,” 20 January 2012; The Joint Staff, “Joint Staff Permanent Order Number J-ISO-00240-14: Announcement of the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award,” 28 October 2014; and The Joint Staff, “Joint Staff Permanent Order Number J-ISO-0263-15: Announcement of the Award of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award,” 30 November 2015, copies of all in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft. Bragg, NC.
- 6 MISTF-C Command Briefing to Jared M. Tracy, AUAB, Qatar, 15 September 2016; miscellaneous MISTF-C interviews with Jared M. Tracy, 16-21 September 2016, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft. Bragg, NC.
- 7 “M129E1/E2 Psychological Operations Leaflet Bomb,” www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/m129.htm (accessed 29 December 2016).

THE GOOD 'OLE' DAYS OF SPECIAL FORCES



Marginalized Before JFK

by Charles H. Briscoe

The purpose of this analytical historical commentary is to provide sufficient background and context before explaining the personnel recovery mission done in Iran by 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) in May 1962. That is the subject of the following article, “10th SFG Mountain Recovery Operation – Iran 1962.” So, why was this significant? It was the first operational mission assigned to 10th SFG by U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

Because the era spanning 1952 into the early 1960s was a very conflicted period in American history, it is important to review the world situation, the growing Cold War, the internal challenges facing America, and the state of the Army at home and overseas after the Korean and Second World Wars. Factoring these elements with the WWII combat experiences of our Army special operations (ARSOF) leaders during that period will explain why Special Forces (SF) was marginalized by the conventional Army before John F. Kennedy became president. The mythology about the ‘good ole’ days of SF will be debunked. But, we have to start at the beginning in 1952.

The concept of ‘special forces’ was developed and approved by the Army Staff based on the persistent efforts of Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psychological Warfare (CPW), our “Father of Special Warfare.” His primary action officer was Colonel (COL) Russell W. Volckmann, the Philippine guerrilla commander who authored Field Manual (FM) 31-21: *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, October 1951. Organization, training, and

fielding of Special Forces (SF) would be accomplished by the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center.

Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA, was called to the Pentagon in May 1952 to receive guidance from BG McClure. COL Karlstad had been selected to command the Army Psywar Center being activated at Fort Bragg, NC, in accordance with General Orders No. 37, Section IV. Lieutenant Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., the former Director of Psywar at the Army General School, Fort Riley, KS, was to be the first Director of the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Department effective 29 May 1952. Colonel (COL) Aaron Bank, an OSS veteran on McClure’s staff, was the first Director of the Special Forces (SF) Department.¹

The manpower slots to create the Psywar Center headquarters and SF were ‘harvested’ from Ranger infantry companies deactivated during the Korean War. Special Forces were to be organized, trained, and deployed overseas early in the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1952-1960). In late 1953, ninety-nine SF-trained officers and sergeants had been assigned to Korea and the 10th SF Group (SFG) shipped out to Germany. These two SF overseas movements coincided with an exponential growth of the Cold War triggered by nuclear weapons.

America’s postwar dominance of the world as the nuclear superpower ended four years to the month after the atomic bombing (A-bombs) of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945. A Soviet A-bomb in 1949 created



L The U.S. Army Special Operations Command headquarters building at Fort Bragg, NC, was named for Major General (MG) Robert A. McClure, “the Father of Special Warfare.”

R Infantry Colonel (COL) Russell W. Volckmann, USMA '34, refused to surrender and escaped capture to command U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAFIP-NL) until August 1945.



The M-28/29 *Davy Crockett* Weapon System (with .50 cal spotting rifle) was a tactical nuclear recoilless gun (smoothbore) that fired an M-388 nuclear projectile 2-4 kilometers. The system was often mounted on an M-38 Jeep or the M-274 ½ ton *Mule*.

nuclear parity and brought superpower status. Atomic parity ended in November 1952 when the US exploded a hydrogen bomb (H-bomb). Parity was regained three years later when the Soviets got their H-bomb. The Cold War arms race escalated with long range nuclear-warhead missiles. Multiple nuclear weapon delivery systems were vital to avoid a one-shot knockout blow from the enemy as Communism spread further in Asia.

America became enraptured in a second Red Scare (the first occurred after WWI when the Communist Reds wrested control of Russia from the Whites) and after Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists drove the Nationalists from the mainland in 1949. To add fuel to the Red Scare the Chinese intervened in Korea in late November 1950. It had already taken several years to push the Russians out of the Axis-occupied countries of Western Europe and end Communist-supported upheaval in Greece. With U.S. ground forces a small fraction of WWII levels (more than ninety divisions) President Eisenhower reinforced bipartisan anti-Communism as national policy by making Nuclear Deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction U.S. defense strategy.

In the center of the Arms Race with the Soviets delivery of nuclear weapons became the top priority for research and development. Guided ballistic missiles, medium and long-range jet bombers [the U.S. Air Force (USAF) became a separate service in 1947] that could be refueled in the air, and nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped

ballistic missiles capable of hiding under polar ice for months were the goals. The USAF Strategic Air (SAC) and Missile Commands dominated American defense spending after post-Korean War military reductions. Munitions for medium and heavy artillery and engineer cratering demolitions were enhanced with nuclear warheads. In Europe the Army fielded the M-65 280mm atomic cannon that could fire a 550-pound projectile 20 miles.² Offensive and defensive tactics changed markedly as the nuclear enhanced munitions were adapted to fit all environments of warfare—air, sea, and land. Defense-oriented electronic warfare was still in its infancy.

Military force reductions after WWII and Korea left battlefields (defense of Western Europe primarily) to a much smaller Army adapting its tactics to nuclear weaponry. Combat power in the 900,000 soldier Army was contained in fifteen ‘Pentomic’ [pentagon (5 battle groups) + atomic] divisions. Infantry and armored battle groups [strengths similar to the regimental combat teams (RCTs) in the Korean War or today’s light infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs)] formed the core of the fighting divisions.

This discussion focuses on Europe where five ‘Pentomic’ armored and mechanized infantry divisions and one Special Forces group were stationed. They were to delay massive Soviet armored attacks launched after nuclear artillery, rocket, and missile preparations. All ‘Pentomic’ divisions had tactical guided nuclear warhead rockets (the jeep-mounted *Davy Crockett* rocket systems with 2.5 mile ranges) and truck-mobile *Honest John* missiles – 14 miles). U.S. armored

and mechanized infantry divisions had nuclear warheads for medium artillery as well as atomic demolitions. West European allies also furnished combat divisions.

Similarly-armed West German, British, and French divisions reinforced America's five 'Pentomics' in the first line of defense against a Soviet attack into Europe. The two 'Pentomic' airborne divisions were in strategic reserve in the States. Annually, an airborne infantry battle group (alternated between the 82nd and 11th Airborne Divisions) deployed ('gyro-scoped') to Germany for a year to demonstrate Army strategic readiness. The reality was that the Allied forces were outnumbered five to one by the Russian and Eastern Bloc militaries. The Army and Air Force also had roles in the second line of defense.

Air defense and medium range ballistic missiles formed the second defense line. Army *Nike Hercules* and *Hawk* air defense missile systems guarded American skies as well as those of allies worldwide. Air Force strategic medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), *Jupiters*, having a 1,500 mile range, were statically positioned as far as Turkey as well as on Taiwan (Nationalist China) and in South Korea. Three long-range strategic nuclear weapons systems reinforced the first two lines of defense.

SAC bombers carried nuclear bombs and Air Force intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) stood ready in underground silos across America at the same time nuclear-powered Navy submarines with atomic weapons prowled underwater off Soviet seacoasts. The strategic forces progressed to airborne, ground, and underwater 24/7 alert to counter Soviet ICBMs and long-range bomber attacks. The SAC jet tanker fleet stayed airborne with the bombers. At the same time strategic high altitude photo reconnaissance aircraft overflew Soviet missile sites and military bases to provide early warning.

After a high-altitude U-2 *Dragon Lady* reconnaissance plane was shot down on 1 May 1960, a very bellicose Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev had hard evidence of American 'spy' missions that regularly 'invaded Soviet airspace.' Photos of the contract pilot, Francis G. 'Gary' Powers, and his crashed aircraft, made newspaper front pages around the world. The U-2 shoot down was sufficient to cancel summit talks in Vienna, Austria, with President Eisenhower. That the Soviets possessed an air defense missile that could reach U-2 operational altitudes came as a big surprise and segues into how the 34th U.S. President dealt with 'brushfire' wars that affected American interests.

President Eisenhower relied on Allen W. Dulles and the CIA to resolve these problems. Special Forces became CIA surrogate advisor trainers to friendly indigenous elements, initially in Laos, and then also in South Vietnam. SF operational detachments alpha and bravo (ODAs and ODB command & control elements) were sent overseas on temporary duty (TDY) from 1st SFG on Okinawa and 77th SFG (which became 7th SFG) at Fort Bragg, NC, up to 180 days. The SF teams had little contact with U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Groups (MAAGs) overseas. Meanwhile, the Russians were imposing discipline in the Eastern Bloc countries.

US-sponsored *Radio Free Europe* broadcasts that encouraged uprisings behind the Iron Curtain ended shortly after Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Washington simply watched and then embarrassedly granted asylum to the 'patriots.'³ Ironically, this was a time when there were three airborne battle groups, one in Augsburg and two in Mainz, and the 10th SFG in Bad Toelz.⁴ That same year President Eisenhower appealed to the United Nations (UN) to force the withdrawal of Israeli, French, and British forces from the Suez after Egypt's Abdel



Former Air Force Captain Francis G. 'Gary' Powers was a CIA civilian pilot flying U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance missions from Incirlik, Turkey, when shot down over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. The Lockheed U-2 *Dragon Lady* was a single-jet engine, ultra-high altitude reconnaissance aircraft operated by the U.S. Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency. It did day and night, high-altitude (70,000 feet), all-weather intelligence gathering from 1955-1989.

Gamal Nasser nationalized the canal. Postwar colonial independence movements spread from Palestine to north and central Africa and into the Middle East.

Knowing the situational dynamics that impacted on Special Forces in its first decade of existence, one can better understand why it was marginalized by conventional Army commands in Europe during 'the good ole' days of SF.' First, ground defense of Western Europe had been the Army's top priority since WWII. Second, based on the Soviet armor threat that mission was assigned to conventional combat heavy forces, especially in the postwar nuclear environment in which the Air Force and Navy were key to strategic defense and nuclear retaliation. Third, with ground defense tied to armor and mechanized divisions Army veterans of the European Theater Operations (ETO) in WWII were most familiar with that type of warfare. Few Army SOF icons possessed those credentials.

Only Colonel Charles H. Karlstad, the first U.S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center commander, had that pedigree. The WWI combat infantryman rose from major (MAJ) to brigadier general (BG) fighting *Panzer* forces across Europe in the 14th Armored Division. While BG Robert A. McClure was another WWII and ETO veteran, he was General Eisenhower's Chief of Psywar. COL Aaron Bank, the 'Father of SF' and the first 10th SFG commander, served short tours in Europe and Asia while detailed to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). COL Edson D. Raff, who succeeded Karlstad at the Psywar Center, like the majority of those commanders following him and COL Bank well past the 1960s, were WWII paratroopers and infantrymen.

Throughout WWII and the Korean War, airborne divisions and regimental combat teams and Ranger units were regarded as strategic theater assets. They were committed to specific key, short duration missions. They were withdrawn to rear areas to reconstitute and prepare for future 'spearhead' missions. Like the airborne the OSS operational elements in Europe performed short term combat missions. Conventional Army senior leaders resented the OSS, the airborne, and the Rangers because they had a high priority for personnel and constantly recruited the best officers and soldiers who were the 'backbone' of wartime fighting forces.

Conventional line units slugged it out day and night in all weather, year after year with determined, combat-hardened German, Italian, Japanese, North Korean, and then, Communist Chinese defenders. Strategic forces, the *prima donas*, did not. Naturally, attitudes developed and became prevalent among senior Army leaders which created a lasting schism. The SF reaction to 'Big Army' USAREUR was to adopt a super elitist posture and align with the airborne. But, the biggest hurdle to acceptance by Army leaders in USAREUR was that the SF planned 'to fight the last war' in a nuclear age after the Communist countries had 'locked down' their societies.

To compound disparities with 'heavy' Army in Europe, SF operated using OSS doctrine, tactics, and techniques of 1944.⁵ The guerrilla advisory role performed in Korea



Infantry Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad, the first Commandant of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) School, Fort Bragg, NC, was the Commander of Combat Command Alpha (CCA), 14th Armored Division, as a Brigadier General (BG).



Colonel (COL) Aaron Bank, the "Father of Special Forces," enlisted in the Army on 19 August 1942, three months before his fortieth birthday. Despite his unusual fitness, Bank was classified 'too old for combat' in Officer Candidate School (OCS) and was commissioned Transportation Corps. He transferred to Infantry while assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

(1953-1954) by almost a hundred SF officers and sergeants was never inculcated in SF training. The fact that all cross-border operations into North Korea were failures was likewise ignored.⁶ **Note: SF did not get its Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) mission until 1962.⁷

COL Bank proselytized that 10th SFG would launch airborne OSS-like 'behind the lines' missions into the Soviet Union from France. Painfully aware that the Soviet Bloc ground and air forces outnumbered them five to one, American armor and mechanized infantry leaders thought Special Forces would contribute nothing to a short-lived fight involving nuclear weapons. They anticipated that theirs would probably be a two-week delaying action. To them SF was ignoring the realities of modern war and the capability of Americans to survive 'behind the Iron Curtain.'⁸ Contrastingly, Psywar units sent to Germany, the 5th Loudspeaker & Leaflet (L&L) Company and US Army Reserve 301st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet (RB&L) Group, were well received. Psywarriors had fought alongside ETO conventional forces to win the war in Europe.


So, what 'value added' could 800 Special Forces soldiers provide USAREUR? Much smaller than a battle group with negligible fire power, they proved to be a godsend after post-Korean War reductions-in-force (RIFs) eroded operational readiness in Europe. The sudden influx of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who reverted from reserve officer ranks of 10th SFG, fixed key USAREUR personnel



On the left, Colonel (COL) Michael 'Iron Mike' Paulick, USMA '40, the highly decorated third commander of 10th SFG.

Above right, newly-promoted Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul D. Adams, the V Corps commanding general, got very upset when COL Michael Paulick put a Green Beret on his head. MG Adams was commanding general, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (Task Force 201) in Beirut in 1958.

Unable to stop the exodus of people to the West via the Russian Zone in Berlin, the East German government in mid-August 1961 established a temporary concertina barbed wire fence guarded by police along the border. Family visits to East Berlin were denied.



shortages. But, the RIF also gutted the SF of combat experience, cut strength 30 percent, and reduced 10th SFG to two companies.⁹ By then COL Bank was long gone from his succeeding assignment as the USAREUR G-3 Plans Officer.

His successor twice removed, the highly decorated COL Michael 'Iron Mike' Paulick, did not improve the image of SF among the European senior officers. His practice of 'button holing' USAREUR generals after Seventh Army NCO Academy graduations came to an end with Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul D. Adams. When a green beret bearing three stars was placed on the head of the unsuspecting V Corps commander (former executive officer of the WWII First Special Service Force [FSSF]), LTG Adams angrily ripped it off, flung the beret at COL Paulick, and stormed out.¹⁰ To compound SF integration problems in USAREUR G-3 Plans, that paid parachute position was regularly filled by airborne officers knowing little about Special Forces.

Thus, special warfare annexes to the USAREUR war plans read like vague contingency plans (CONPLANS). SF employment in field exercises was consistently notional.

Typically the 10th SFG furnished aggressors for corps and division maneuvers. SF teams regularly 'infiltrated' command posts to upset senior commanders.¹¹ Consistent with WWII OSS TTPs, SF conducted elaborate escape and evasion 'rat line' exercises for NATO pilots and aircrews. Personnel with problems were usually shipped to Berlin.¹² The heavy Army ruled Europe. While regularly put 'on alert' in Flint Kaserne few SF operational deployments occurred.

The 10th SFG was put on alert with USAREUR during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising as well as the Suez Crisis and during those in Berlin and Beirut in 1958. However, SF never went beyond that stage. It was the 'gyro-scoped' 11th Airborne Division battle group from Augsburg, Germany, that joined two U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) battalion landing teams (BLTs) in Beirut. The paratroopers opened the airport and restored a semblance of peace in Lebanon (July-October 1958). During the Congo Crisis in 1960, three 10th SFG soldiers clandestinely coordinated air evacuation of 3,000 European refugees. This very successful operation was not publicized.¹³

It was President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, who expanded national security strategy to cover the broader spectrum of conflict. Kennedy's 'flexible response' covered the gamut from nuclear war to countering insurgency and assisting new countries combat Communist-inspired 'wars of national liberation.' America's armed forces were to be reshaped to accommodate special warfare. The Army's Special Forces were to have key roles.¹⁴ Premier Kruschchev became a 'constant thorn' to President Kennedy after the CIA-contrived Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion turned into a fiasco in April 1961.

Denying access to the Western zones in August 1961 proved to be an escalation of earlier Soviet-instigated challenges in occupied Berlin. A week after the East Germans began erecting barbed wire barriers to block egress from the Russian sector, President Kennedy dispatched his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson, to the divided city to emphasize White House concerns. On Saturday, 19 August 1961 Vice President Johnson's arrival at Tempelhof Airport was greeted by an American military honor guard. He was to give two reassuring speeches to a large crowd of Berliners outside the City Hall and the House of Representatives inside. The Vice President had already spent the previous afternoon and evening with West German officials in Bonn.¹⁵

At 10:30 AM on Sunday, 20 August, Vice President Johnson was waiting at the border of the Western Sector to welcome Colonel (COL) Glover S. Johns, Jr. who was leading the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry [8th Infantry Division (8th ID)] from Mannheim, West Germany. For two days the mechanized infantry (1,600 men) had convoyed 500 vehicles and rolling stock on the *autobahn*. Berliners watching their arrival were disappointed by the small number of tanks that accompanied them; 'Pentomic' divisions had a single armor battalion; the 1st Battle

Group got a tank company. The 8th ID mechanized battle group demonstrated U.S. resolve. All convoy serials went unchallenged by the Soviet check points. After talking with COL Johns for a few minutes the vice president mingled with the soldiers, welcoming them to Berlin.¹⁶

Accompanied by retired General Lucius D. Clay, the respected former military governor, Vice President Johnson was briefed by British, French, and American commanders in Berlin.¹⁷ Allegedly, when the 10th SFG detachment explained that their mission was to organize resistance in Soviet bloc countries, the vice president suggested that SF might better be oriented towards the Middle East. Regardless of the source, this became the justification to reorganize the 10th SFG in Germany.¹⁸

The understrength Tenth, two companies since the mid-1950s, internally reorganized to stand up a third company focused on North Africa and the Middle East. The task fell to Major (MAJ) Charles M. Simpson III, the Group S-3. MAJ Simpson had been the Middle East history professor at West Point after a summer of graduate studies at the American University in Beirut. Though Simpson had just commanded an SF company, he volunteered to form the new unit.¹⁹ Captain (CPT) Herbert Y. Schandler, a Military Academy colleague, was an ODA commander. Previously oriented towards Poland, ODA 33 was refocused on Iran, and two men were sent off to learn Farsi.²⁰ Back in the States, President John F. Kennedy was directing his military service chiefs to inculcate special warfare into their mission sets.

The first sidebar explains what happened after President Kennedy did this and the impact on Special Forces. The second sidebar details the measures taken by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to keep the Shah of Iran from declaring his country 'non-aligned'—the critical opening for Soviet assistance. Alliances were crucial to halt the spread of Communist influence.



President John F. Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to demonstrate White House concern about the Soviets creating barbed wire barricades and posting East German police to deny access to East Berlin. Vice President Johnson welcomed soldiers of the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, sent from Mannheim to reinforce Berlin.

JFK, the Army & Special Warfare

The Army took the new president's vision most seriously. Two directives were issued to evaluate special warfare capabilities, doctrine, and training and to make organization, equipment, and employment recommendations. Secretary of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., tasked Brigadier General (BG) Richard G. Stilwell, the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army (SACSA), General (GEN) Earle G. Wheeler, to visit and report on the "Counter Insurgency Operations Course and Related Matters" presented at the Special Warfare Center (SWC) and in the Army's three Unified Commands; and to explain "Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War." The entire Army, not just Special Forces, was to be surveyed. "Special warfare was to be complementary rather than an alternate means."²¹

The Army Chief of Staff sent the second requirement to Continental Army Command (CONARC), the precursor to today's Forces Command and Training and Doctrine Command (FORSCOM and TRADOC). Lieutenant General (LTG) Hamilton L. Howze, the Commanding General (CG), XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC, was directed to chair a Special Warfare Board for CONARC from 8 25 January 1962. Officers from the SWC and the corps staffs were to evaluate courses of instruction, doctrine, organizational structures, SF employment, PSYOP and Civic Action (CA) capabilities as well as individual and unit equipment from uniforms to vehicles, aircraft, and radios. SF groups (SFG) would have flight platoons with helicopters and airplanes. Special warfare capabilities were to be expanded Army wide as well as the SF, CA, and PSYOP units. The Stilwell Reports (personnel recommendations) were included in this first Howze Board Report. Ongoing SF operations and experiences in Laos and South Vietnam served as examples.²²

Advisory duty in Southeast Asia (SEA) was the top priority for 77th SFG (which became 7th SFG) at Fort Bragg and 1st SFG on Okinawa. Communist supported insurgency in north Laos threatened national stability. It was beyond the capabilities of the U.S. Army advisors supporting the Royal Lao military. South Vietnam first wanted Ranger training advisors before expanding to SF advisors. ODAs were sent overseas temporary duty (TDY) to satisfy these CIA generated requirements. One Ranger qualified SF officer proved insufficient to organize and advise newly forming Vietnamese Ranger companies.²³ In the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin crisis the Cold War stabilized somewhat in Europe as the Middle East moved into the limelight.

Middle East Tensions and Iran

Three months after Egypt leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Israeli armed forces invaded (29 October 1956). Two days later French and British paratroopers joined them. They seized key operating facilities. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened to rain nuclear missiles down on Europe unless the invaders withdrew. President Eisenhower, wanting to avoid European colonialism issues after the Russian intervention in Hungary, acquiesced and arranged a United Nations (UN) ceasefire to prompt withdrawals. America's refusal to fund the Aswan Dam provided a way for the Soviets to gain a foothold in the Middle East. The Egyptians accepted Russian financing and engineering assistance for their project.²⁴ U.S. intervention in Beirut in 1958 calmed the Mediterranean turmoil, but President Eisenhower wanted alliances with Middle East countries that bordered the Soviet Union. Those agreeing to accept the U.S. operated *Jupiter* MRBM missiles received more military aid.

Despite a 1956 mutual non-aggression pact that provided a Topographic Training Team ('Triple T') from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Shah (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) of Iran demurred in 1961 on stationing U.S. missiles.²⁵ He was trying to improve Soviet relations because his army was antiquated. President John F. Kennedy was frustrated by the dilemma—the Shah wanted modern weapons, aircraft, and combat vehicles despite having a largely untrained military and police force. The armed forces needed to be organized and well-trained in the basics before being provided modern American arms, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft. To facilitate the reorganization and training of the Iranian armed forces the U.S. military missions were combined [Army Mission Headquarters (ARMISH) to the Iranian Army, the GENMISH organizing a rural constabulary, and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)].

The resultant ARMISH-MAAG became the largest U.S. military mission in the world. Before the American Embassy was seized in 1977, fifty thousand U.S. citizens were working in Iran not including the 1,500 U.S. Government personnel in the embassy. Contract employees accompanied new military technology and weapons purchases.²⁶ As the head of the fourth largest oil producing country, the Shah was a major U.S. customer for armaments. The military engineers of both countries benefitted greatly from the non-intrusive topographic and survey training and mapping done by U.S. Army Map Service 'Triple T' teams since 1957.²⁷

In Summary

Demonstrating the relevance of Special Warfare, Special Forces, and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) to the Army and their evolving national security roles is a continual challenge. That responsibility rests on the credibility of ARSOF leaders at all levels working with the vast majority of conventional Army leaders who dominate the Officer Corps. SF has always promulgated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and doctrine intimately tied to the WWII OSS.

In 1962, seventeen years after the U.S. military embraced nuclear weapons to defend Europe, SF got its only nuclear weapon. The Special Atomic Demolition Munitions (SADM) was a one-way, soldier delivery mission.²⁸ Interdependence, interoperability, and integration, practiced overseas today, were absent from SF vocabulary until the late 1970s. True integration requires flexibility, agility to adjust from supported to supporting, and a solid understanding of conventional Army doctrine, tactics and operational readiness standards. This is what is required to demonstrate 'value added' to conventional warfighters.

SF credibility in the 1950s and early 1960s was hurt by leaders short on conventional Army combat experience.

Promulgating WWII-era unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine and TTPs as its combat role in nuclear age warfighting did not help. Disregarding societal controls (homeland security) inherent with paranoid Communism, SF cultural and situational awareness became locked into a 1944 world of enemy-occupied 'free' countries. Ironically, these same conclusions were articulated in 1983 by retired SF Colonels Robert B. Rheault and Charles M. Simpson III and LTG William P. Yarborough, a major ARSOF icon, in his foreword to *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years: A History of U.S. Army Special Forces*. Notwithstanding, this historical analysis commentary should place the significance of the 10th SFG mission to Iran in May 1962 in perspective.

The 10th SFG grabbed the 1962 operational mission detailed in the following article. It was a significant task that afforded an orientation to Iran. Though the assignment was not an exciting 'blood and guts,' highly classified, combat mission 'behind enemy lines,' the Tenth leadership realized that it could be a 'door opener' to a key Middle Eastern country that was critical to the United States in the Cold War against Communism. †



In 1962, Special Forces was assigned to deliver and detonate the B-54 Special Atomic Demolition Muniton (SADM) shown rigged for airdrop.



MAJ Charles M. Simpson III, author, and Middle East history professor at West Point, was the Group S-3 for the 10th SFG during LBJ's visit to Berlin. He later commanded the 1st Special Forces Group



Key ARSOF icon LTG William P. Yarborough.

CHARLES H. BRISCOE, PhD

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations Latin America, the Congo, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Commanding Officer, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, (COL C.H. Karlstad) letter to Chief, Psychological Warfare, Washington 29, DC, SUBJ: Activation of the Psychological Warfare School dated 12 September 1952. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 "M-65 Atomic Cannon" at <http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m65.htm> accessed 3/28/2017. The M-65 'atomic cannon' was the Army's largest artillery gun. 'Atomic Annie' was based on the German K5 Railroad Gun of WWII that was used against American landings in Italy. This 'Anzio Annie' dated to 280mm howitzers used by the Japanese to capture Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905. Sadly, the M-65 atomic cannon was obsolete before it was fully fielded in Europe. But, it did not leave the inventory until 1963.
- 3 Former Sergeant (SGT) Rudolf G. Horvath, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 June 2008, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. SGT Horvath, a Lodge Act soldier from Hungary, helped to conduct the 10th SFG escape and evasion course for the NATO pilots in Europe. Having fulfilled his five year commitment to the Army, he became a U.S. citizen in February 1957. While working and applying to colleges Horvath heard about the Hungarian 'revolutionaries' given sanctuary in the U.S. Since these 'revolutionaries' were being housed at nearby Fort Dix, he volunteered to assist. After a few days Horvath left disgusted. Most of the Hungarian 'revolutionaries' only wanted an 'unfettered' ticket to the U.S.'
- 4 Retired CSM Michael N. Martin, interview by Briscoe, 20 April 2017, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 5 Retired Major Caesar J. Civatella, interview by Briscoe, 14 February 2017, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. "COL Aaron Bank showed up at Fort Bragg with his car trunk loaded with still classified OSS manuals and pamphlets. That's what we used to prepare our lesson plans for Special Forces training," remembered then First Lieutenant (1LT) Civatella.
- 6 Retired Colonel Richard M. Ripley, interview by Briscoe, 20 October 2008, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 7 Colin Schultz, "For 25 Years, U.S. Special Forces Carried Miniature Nukes on Their Backs" at <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/25-years-us-special-forces-carried-miniature-nukes-their-backs-180949700> accessed 3/08/2017.
- 8 Special Forces would not be assigned a nuclear warfare mission until 1962. Following the two-man rule of nuclear surety SF Operational Detachments Alpha (ODA) were to deliver (ground, air, and water) the B-54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) that contained a *Davy Crockett* nuclear war head. Then, they had to physically confirm its detonation. Explosive yield could be adjusted from 10 tons to 1 kiloton. Escape from the explosive effects was possible but the radiative fallout was not. Schultz, "For 25 Years, U.S. Special Forces Carried Miniature Nukes on Their Backs."
- 9 Retired COL Carl M. Bergstrom, interview by Briscoe, 4 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 10 Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 49.
- 11 Retired COL William J. Richardson, Jr., interview by Briscoe, 9 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Martin interview, 20 April 2017.
- 12 Retired LTC Glenn W. Metcalf, Jr., interview by Briscoe, 3 February 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; retired COL George Maracek, interview by Briscoe, 11 February 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Retired COL Sully de Fontaine, interviews by Briscoe, 23 April and 22 September 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. Shortly after the Hungarian Revolt began in 1956, CPT de Fontaine 'visited' his cousin, the French military attaché in Budapest. As a dual-national de Fontaine maintained a current French passport. His post-mission assessment that the 'freedom fighters' were not 'patriots' was sufficient for COL Aaron Bank, Special Warfare Branch chief, G-3 U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg, Germany, to recommend that Special Forces not be inserted as advisors. De Fontaine interview, 23 April 2009; The senior State Department official in the Congo in 1960 was Ambassador Clare H. 'Charlie' Timberlake. Assisting him was Frank C. Carlucci III. CPT de Fontaine briefed these two daily on the rescue mission. Ambassador Frank C. Carlucci III, interview by Briscoe, 28 July 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 14 Charles R. Shrader, *History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Vol. II: 1961-1973* (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research, 2008): 265.
- 15 "The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago" at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB354/index.htm> accessed 1/30/2017; Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice Presidential Papers. Daily Diary, 18-23 August 1961 (Berlin Trip), Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum.
- 16 "The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago"; Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice Presidential Papers. Daily Diary, 18-23 August 1961 (Berlin Trip).
- 17 "The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago"; Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice Presidential Papers. Daily Diary, 18-23 August 1961 (Berlin Trip).
- 18 Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was sent on behest of President John F. Kennedy on 20 August 1961, a week after the East Germans began constructing a barbed wire fence to deny access to East Berlin. Johnson greeted the 1600-man 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division that convoyed from Mannheim, Germany. Colonel Glover S. Johns, Jr. was the commander. The SF team would have been the Berlin Detachment, 10th SFG. This differs from retired COL Herbert Y. Schandler memories, who said it was President Kennedy. It will be 26 May 1963 before Kennedy declares that "all free men...are citizens of Berlin *Ich bin ein Berliner*." Schandler, *Memoirs*, 36; "Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson Delivers Remarks to the Press upon His Return from West Germany" at <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-KN-C18601.aspx> accessed 1/30/2017; "The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago"; Donald A. Carter, "The U.S. Military Response to the 1960-1962 Berlin Crisis" at <https://www.archives.gov/files> accessed 1/30/2017.
- 19 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 70. The last time 10th SFG was a robust unit dated to its arrival in Germany in 1953. Post-Korean War officer reductions-in-force (RIFs) improved non-commissioned officer (NCO) strengths in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) while simultaneously severely depleting SF ranks at Bad Toelz.
- 20 Schandler, *Memoirs*, 39. A medic was sent to Defense Language School in Monterey, CA, for Farsi while the team sergeant went to the Berlitz School in Munich for a month.
- 21 Christopher K. Ives, *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-1963* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 60; Shrader, *History of Operations Research in the United States Army, II*, 254.
- 22 Shrader, *History of Operations Research in the U.S. Army, Vol. II*, 255. The second Howze Board specifically addressed air mobility in support of conventional Army conducting special warfare missions.
- 23 Retired LTC Reuben L. Mooradian, interviews by Dr. Briscoe, 20 and 30 May 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; "Army Marks 50 Years Since First Vietnam Casualty" at <https://www.army.mil/article/5692/army-marks-50-years-since-first-vietnam-casualty> accessed 3/21/2017. CPT Mooradian, an 8240th AV veteran in the Korean War, was the first officer to attend Vietnamese language school at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, CA in 1957 enroute to becoming the first Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) Special Forces Advisor in the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG), Vietnam. An SF and Ranger-qualified officer, CPT Harry G. 'Hank' Cramer, Jr., the ARVN Ranger Advisor working in the South Vietnamese Military Academy in Dalat, welcomed Mooradian. This officer's family had accompanied him to South Vietnam. The West Point '46 Korean War veteran was the first Special Forces soldier killed in Vietnam on 21 October 1957. CPT Mooradian extended for a two-year assignment because it took eight months for President Ngo Dinh Diem's brother, Nhu, to hand select *Lực Lượng Đặc Biệt (LLDB)* personnel.
- 24 Department of State. Office of the Historian. "Milestones: 1953-1960: The Suez Crisis, 1956" at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez> accessed 3/21/2017.
- 25 Richard F. Nyrop (editor), Department of Army Pamphlet 550-68: *Iran: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: The American University, January 1978), xvi, xviii, 232; Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. *The Army Map Service: Its Mission, History and Organization: Fifty Years of Progressive Military Mapping 1910-1960* (Washington, DC: Army Map Service, 1960); C.B. Colby, *Mapping the World: A Global Project of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1959); *Cold War Mapping Mission: The 329th Geodetic Detachment and the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion, 1956-1970* (Bennington, VT: Merriam Press, 2014), 90. The 1956 mutual aggression agreement between Iran and the U.S. allowed a Topographic Training Team (TTT/'Triple T') of survey and mapping technicians to train the Imperial Iranian National Geographic Organization (NGO) in mapping. The TTT provided equipment and training and were active in the survey work.
- 26 *Iran: A Country Study*, 415.
- 27 *The Army Map Service*; Colby, *Mapping the World*; *Cold War Mapping Mission*, 90.
- 28 Schultz, "For 25 Years, U.S. Special Forces Carried Miniature Nukes on Their Backs."

10th SFG

Mountain Recovery Operation

🔗 **Iran 1962** 🔗



by Charles H. Briscoe

On Saturday, 27 January 1962, a 64th Engineer Battalion Topographic Training Team (TTT) single-engine, high-wing, short takeoff/landing (STOL) U-1A *Otter* (SN 55-3317) airplane took off from Qualeh Morgeh Field, Tehran, Iran, at 0754 hours bound for Vahdati Air Force Base [Iranian Air Force Base (AFB)] near Dezful, some 300 miles to the southwest. Just before noon Captain (CPT) Daniel L. Knotts, the pilot, encountered a severe snowstorm over the Zagros Mountains. While descending, presumably headed towards the Dezful radio beacon, the *Otter* crashed into a heavily snowclad mountain ridge at 32°, 20 minutes North latitude and 50°, 04 minutes East longitude. The deep snow and gentle slope at 12,500 feet cushioned two impacts: in the first, the aircraft lost one wing; in the second, the aircraft nose-flipped onto its back with the cockpit breaking away from the fuselage. Amazingly, all five American soldiers aboard (pilot, co-pilot, crew chief, and two passengers) survived the crash.¹

Inside the overturned U-1A *Otter*, Specialist Five (SP5) John T. Porter, the crew chief, untangled the snow-covered passengers, Colonel (COL) Walter M. Vann and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Walter R. Johnson, from the plywood cargo and twisted aircraft frame. While doing this the pilot, CPT Knotts, and the co-pilot, Major (MAJ) Donald A. Carder, climbed into the fuselage through the open cargo doorway. SP5 Porter got the first aid kit from the survival chest and began treating the injured. He put a tourniquet on the left arm of the pilot, CPT Knotts, securing it with a screw driver, and then applied bandages to MAJ Carder. LTC Johnson, blue all over, complained of the extreme cold. Hypoxic from extended flying without oxygen (more than an hour), the smell and leaking of fuel prompted an immediate evacuation “to reach a lower altitude to prevent freezing.”² Thinking impaired by hypoxia, the sub-zero cold, and suffering from various stages of shock, each man robotically went to the survival chest to grab a sleeping bag and some C-rations. The pilot took flares. Then, like a ‘stick’ of paratroopers with the pilot and co-pilot leading, they stumbled out the gaping cargo door opening,

abandoning their most viable shelter...for thigh-deep snow in a raging blizzard. Unable to move in the deep snow, the men quickly crawled into their sleeping bags to separately glissade away to safety. As they did, the five disappeared in the raging snowstorm.³ Shortly after noon, Vahdati AFB tower near Dezful reported the aircraft overdue, which triggered rescue alerts.⁴ It would be six months later that a team from the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), Bad Toelz, Germany, found the bodies of three missing Americans, finally bringing closure to the accident.⁵

The primary purpose of this article is to document the first operational mission given to the 10th SFG by U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) since its arrival in late 1953. Its success paved the way for almost fifteen years of training in Iran and built professional relationships in the Middle East.⁶ The secondary reason is to reveal the herculean rescue efforts orchestrated by the U.S. Army Mission to the Imperial Iranian Army (ARMISH) in 1962 in one the harshest winters in the region in recent history. Using primary sources and period newspaper reports, this article debunks the mythology and folklore associated with this 10th SFG recovery mission, corrects misinformation about SF Captain (CPT) Larry A. Thorne, and as radio newsman Paul Harvey used to say, provides “the rest of the story.”⁷

The analytical historical commentary immediately preceding, “Marginalized before JFK: The Good ‘Ole’ Days of SF,” chronologically presents background (international, national, nuclear defense strategy, and the state of the U.S. Army, Psywar, and Special Warfare) to give vital context and improve understanding of conditions in 1962. The promulgation of dated WWII Office of Strategic Service (OSS) missions, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by SF leaders to ‘heavy’ warfighters of a grossly outnumbered Army in Europe was poorly received. Focused on improving ‘odds’ with nuclear weapons conventional Army generals marginalized Special Forces. This attitude did not change until President John F. Kennedy initiated a ‘Flexible Response’ defense strategy.

1 | U-1A *Otter* with Army Map Service (AMS) color scheme.

2 | AMS *Otter* (SN55-3317) upside down on Zagros Mountain ridge in Iran.





IRAN 1962*

*Area Handbook for Iran (1st edition research & writing completed 15 March 1963)

- **Southwest Asia:** 2nd largest country in Middle East.
- **Land area:** 636,000 square miles (slightly larger than Alaska).
- **Topography:** High desert plateau surrounded on three sides by rugged mountains (6,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level).
- **Mountain Climate:** Winters often exceed six months; temperatures down to -18° F.⁸
- **Population:** 22 million: 1/3 urban & 2/3 rural—almost all illiterate: Persians (63%); Azerbaijanis (24%); Kurds; Lurs, Bakhtiari (near crash site), Qashqais, Baluchis, and Arabs (13%).
- **Language:** Farsi is the official language; native tongue used by more than 50% of the population.
- **Wealth:** 4th biggest oil producer & 2nd largest exporter; revenues building industrial base.
- **Roads:** 17,000 miles: 1,300 mi asphalt; 10,000 mi surfaced; 11,000 mi improved dirt.
- **Airports, Weather & Navigation:** one international [Tehran (Mehrabad – opened 1956)]; 100 field landing strips (43 near roads); WWII-era forecasting and minimal navigation aids.⁹

By placing this humanitarian mission in historical context—the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe during the Cold War, the situation in America, and major world events—readers can see how these factors impacted Special Forces in Germany in 1962. The conclusion contains a summary of key points. Actions taken after the 27 January 1962 U-1A *Otter* crash have to be considered in light of the conditions in Iran and the state of U.S. Army aviation and military air rescue capabilities at the time (see sidebars).

An unusually bad winter in 1961-62 thwarted rescue efforts by the U.S. Army Mission to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (ARMISH). The crashed U-1A *Otter* was first spotted by an Imperial Iranian Air Force four-engine C-54 *Skymaster* at 0845 hours on Sunday, 28 January.

The *Skymaster* dropped parachute bundles containing supplies and blankets. MAJ Carder got to them and was reported to have started a fire. Army Map Service (AMS) planes circled the crash site in shifts all day searching for survivors. A platoon of Imperial Iranian Army mountain troops was flown to Isfahan. After being trucked to Shahrkurd, the Iranian soldiers donned skis to begin a torturous overland approach from the east side of the mountains. The U.S. Air Force 58th Air Rescue Squadron, Wheelus Airbase, Tunisia, flew two paramedics to Tehran.¹² That night, another storm blanketed the crash site with several more feet of snow.

Aircraft were 'socked in' by visibility on 29 January, but a second rescue team had left Tehran for Dezful on the

Army Aviation & Special Warfare - 1962



President John F. Kennedy challenged his military service chiefs to inculcate special warfare into their missions. The Army took the president most seriously. General (GEN) Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, Army, directed Continental Army Command (CONARC) to create a Special Warfare Board to evaluate courses of instruction, doctrine, organizational structure, and employment of Special Forces (SF), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Assistance (CA) forces as well as individual and unit equipment from uniforms to aircraft, vehicles, and radios. Lieutenant General (LTG) Hamilton L. Howze, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC, chaired the board from 8-25 January 1962. This 'first' Howze Board recommended that all SF groups get organic flight detachments. Two Special Warfare Aviation Detachments [the 22nd (rotary and fixed wing) and 23rd SWADs (OV-1 *Mohawk*)] were to be organized in April 1962 to evaluate rotary wing and Short Take Off/Landing (STOL) aircraft for armed reconnaissance and light/medium lift capabilities. The helicopters tested were the OH-23 *Raven* and UH-1 *Iroquois* (*Huey*). The STOL airplanes evaluated were the U-6 *Beaver*, U-1 *Otter*, U-10 *Heliocourier*, CV-2 *Caribou*, and OV-1 armed *Mohawk*.¹⁰ The *Beaver* and *Otter* were already supporting the Corps of Engineers (COE) Army Map Service missions in remote areas of Liberia, Ethiopia, and Iran.¹¹

LTG Hamilton L. Howze, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.

Examples of Helicopters and Fixed Wing Aircraft Evaluated



UH 1 *Iroquois*




U 6 *Beaver*

1 | The *Aérospatiale Alouette* was a high-altitude helicopter that had performed numerous rescues in the European Alps.

2 | LTC Richard F. Barquist, director of the U.S. Army Hospital in Tehran, Iran, received the Soldier's Medal in conjunction with an L-23 *Seminole* crash in 1961.

4 | 1LT Zane K. 'Kyle' Rector was the Aide-de-Camp to MG John C. Hayden, the ARMISH/MAAG Chief.

5 | COL Walter M. Vann was the ARMISH Chief of Logistics.



western side of the Zagros Mountains. Fortunately, the Oil Consortium of Iran had a French *Aérospatiale Alouette* helicopter whose service ceiling had been 'pushed' well above 13,000 feet doing rescues in the European Alps. The *Alouette* could carry three passengers.¹³ But, before it could arrive the weather worsened.¹⁴

Late Monday afternoon, 30 January, it cleared sufficiently for the *Alouette* to drop off two ARMISH medics, Sergeants First Class (SFC) Eugene F. Peck and Harold C. Stagers, below COL Vann and above SP5 Porter, the crew chief. The two survivors were separated by almost 100 meters. The medics brought food, dry clothing, provided first aid, and would spend the night with the survivors. SP5 Porter was so bad that SFC Peck got into the crew chief's sleeping bag to keep him warm during the night.¹⁵ Unbeknownst to them, the two Air Force paramedics from Wheelus Airbase parachuted onto the mountain shortly before their arrival.

Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Anthony R. Gorgano and Airman Second Class (A2C) Howard E. Hadley had jumped high above the mountain ridge. High winds blew them far apart and the two missed their intended landing site. Both airmen spent nights perched precariously on windswept mountain ledges. Hadley was stuck for a night before being rope-lifted to safety by the *Alouette*. Gorgano endured two nights alone before the second Dezful ground party found him; the airman spent a third night on the mountain with his rescuers.¹⁶ Darkness cancelled helicopter flights on Monday, 30 January. Shortly after each of the four rescue parties started into the mountains radio communications became dependent on aircraft radio relays.¹⁷

When First Lieutenant (1LT) Zane K. Rector, a field artillery fixed-wing aviator serving as Aide-de-Camp to Major General (MG) John C. Hayden, the ARMISH chief, got to Dezful on Tuesday morning, 31 January, there were three ground rescue parties already moving on both sides of the mountain towards the crash site: 1. LTC Richard F. Barquist, director of the U.S. Army Hospital in Tehran, and Mr. Kazem Guilampour, noted Iranian skier and mountain climber working for U.S. Information Service (USIS), and their small party had left Dezful on Monday morning; 2. A platoon of Iranian mountain troops was slogging through deep snow on the eastern side; 3. A third group of Iranian USIS employees had gone to rescue SSgt Anthony Gorgano, the Air Force paramedic. LT Rector quickly discovered that the *Alouette* rescue effort was undirected and that there was only sporadic communications with rescue elements.¹⁸

Sent down by MG Hayden to find out what was happening, Rector decided to check on the two ARMISH medics and the two survivors near the crash site. The West Point '58 officer told the AMS U-6 *Beaver* pilot who had flown him to Dezful what he was going to do and asked him to be his overhead communications link. The field jacket clad non-skier then grabbed skis, poles, and a radio before boarding the helicopter.¹⁹

After snowplowing down to SP5 Porter and SFC Peck, the artillery lieutenant realized that the medic was also suffering from high altitude exposure. With his radio Rector explained the situation to the pilot of the AMS *Beaver* circling overhead. He and the two medics were too exhausted to move the survivors to the helipad. While

Route & Deviation


The ill-fated U-1A Otter took off from Qualeh Morgeh Field, Tehran, Iran, at 0754 hours bound for Dezful, some 300 miles to the southwest. Just before noon they encountered a severe snowstorm over the Zagros Mountains. While descending, presumably headed towards the Dezful radio beacon, the Otter crashed into a heavily snowclad mountain ridge at 12,500 feet.

The 1/150,000 map shown here is typical of the type used in 1962 and has overlays of the various mission routes.

● Shown in green is the most probable air route based on the USAREUR Preliminary Accident Investigation.

● The brown shows the land route used by the 10th SFG troops.

● And in red is the assumed route deviation caused by heavy cross winds and snow that preceded the crash in the Zagros Mountains.



waiting for the *Alouette* to return, Rector, having been told another victim was nearby, began probing around with his ski poles. He uncovered enough of MAJ Donald A. Carder (co-pilot and ARMISH Aviation Branch chief) to identify him before switching his attention to the crew chief.²⁰

“The two Iranian sergeants chanted, ‘Iran, America! Iran, America!’ as they carried the ski litter to the waiting helicopter. Those two were the true heroes.” — 1LT Zane K. Rector

Having been told that COL Vann was in better shape, Rector triaged the situation. The two men started dragging the semi-conscious SP5 Porter in his sleeping bag towards the rock outcropping where the helicopter landed. They had only gotten halfway when the *Alouette* returned with help. Two tough Iranian Army mountain school instructors jumped out, donned skis, and quickly moved down to them. The Iranians lashed Porter onto a makeshift ski litter and shouldered it to carry the crew chief to the waiting helicopter as the exhausted Rector and Peck trailed behind. “The two Iranian sergeants chanted, ‘Iran, America! Iran, America!’ as they carried the ski litter to the waiting helicopter. Those two were the true heroes,” said retired LTC Rector. “SFC Peck and I were too exhausted by the altitude to help. The Iranian sergeants realized this and pushed us into the helicopter to reduce their problems.”²¹

After the helicopter lifted off the two Iranians went to assist COL Vann and SFC Stagers to the landing site. When Vann and Stagers departed, the Iranian soldiers marked the site of MAJ Carder’s body with vertically-crossed skis. Then, they were helicoptered back to Dezful.²² All U.S. personnel, suffering from varying stages of frostbite and exposure, were shuttled to the clinic at Masjid-i-Sulaiman before being evacuated to the ARMISH hospital in Tehran.²³ More help was on the way to Iran before the first rescue effort concluded.

Though the winter of 1961-62 proved to be one of the harshest on record, the American community still demanded action. Incessant pressure from the distraught wives of the missing; negative press in the English newspapers, the *Kayhan International* and *Tehran Journal*; and a Congressional inquiry pushed Ambassador Julius C. Holmes and MG Hayden to seek help from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. The coast artillery general, a WWII and Korean War veteran, requested a team of high-

altitude mountaineers and a U.S. military helicopter to support the ARMISH Search & Recovery Plan.²⁴

Since the missing were U.S. military, help came quickly. An elite German Army rescue platoon [1st Mountain Division (*Gebirgstruppe*)] and a USAREUR medical evacuation UH-1B *Iroquois* (*Huey*) helicopter with aircrew and maintenance personnel from Landstuhl, Germany, loaded aboard an Air Force C-124 *Globemaster*. The group got to Tehran on 1 February with their dismantled *Huey*.²⁵ Five days had passed since the U-1A *Otter* crashed. ARMISH efforts had recovered two survivors and five rescuers. ‘All stops had been pulled out.’

While the helicopter was reassembled and flight tested, the German team leader made an aerial reconnaissance of the crash site to identify avenues of approach. There were more airstrips to the southeast (Isfahan) of the site. The accumulated snow surrounding the crashed U-1A *Otter* ranged from six to forty feet. Evidence of recent avalanches in the area was discernible as heavy wind shears buffeted the U-6 *Beaver* airplane circling the ridge line.²⁶

The helicopter was vital to getting the team close to the crash site, but the accumulated snow would make probing for bodies difficult and very tedious. The medevac *Huey* was heavier than the troop carrier model which reduced a service ceiling already tied to temperatures, winds at altitude, and aircraft load. Despite three more days of bad weather, the German *Gebirgstruppe*, supported by the medevac *Huey*, launched from Isfahan and got nine Alpine soldiers onto Zard Duh near the crash site.²⁷

Two more days of heavy snow precluded any recovery operations and the nine Germans fought to stay alive. When the *Gebirgstruppe* soldiers were evacuated from the crash site on 8 February, the mission was aborted. While it would become the ‘workhorse’ of the Vietnam War, the *Huey* lacked the power to safely fly in the thin air of high

1 | MG John C. Hayden, ARMISH/MAAG Iran.

2 | This was the shoulder sleeve insignia worn by U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. Army Mission to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (ARMISH).



CPT Herbert Y. Schandler,
USMA '52, commanded
ODA 33, 10th SFG in 1962.
(Shown here as LTC.)



altitudes and survive the severe gusts and abrupt wind shears. The *Huey* virtually floated while its single main rotor blade slowly oscillated. The risk associated with recovering bodies was too great. Two Air Force paramedics and two ARMISH medics and an officer were rescued along with the two survivors. The danger involved in continuing to search for three missing, presumed dead American soldiers (pilot CPT Knotts, co-pilot MAJ Carder, and passenger LTC Johnson) was too great. MG Hayden ended the search on 9 February 1962. Further efforts were put on hold.²⁸

A subsequent search effort in early spring, organized by another aviator 1LT Robert F. Molinelli, the aide-de-camp to the Army MAAG chief, Brigadier General (BG) William M. Rogers, was supported by the Oil Consortium *Alouette* from 11-23 April. The rescue party found only equipment lost by previous searchers before a severe snow storm forced them to make a dangerous ground descent.²⁹ That propitious ending was providential for Company C, 10th SFG in Germany.

As you will recall from the preceding article, the understrength 10th SFG had reorganized to form a third company after Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Berlin in August 1961.³⁰ Company C would focus on North Africa and the Middle East. The Group S-3 operations officer, Major (MAJ) Charles M. Simpson III, had been a Middle East history professor at West Point and did graduate work at the American University in Beirut. Though he had already commanded an SF company, Simpson volunteered to organize the unit.³¹ CPT Herbert Y. Schandler, a friend and colleague at the U.S. Military Academy, had no reservations about shifting his Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 33 from Poland to Iran. Two sergeants were dispatched to schools to learn Farsi.³² Since the U.S. Army had yet to publish an *Area Handbook for Iran*, the soldiers of ODA 33 personnel relied heavily on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports to prepare their country study.³³

Because there were three very large U.S. missions in Iran: the U.S. Military Mission to the Imperial Iranian Army (ARMISH); the Military Advisory and Assistance

Group (MAAG); and the U.S. Military Mission to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH); a much smaller fourth mission was probably overlooked by the ODA 33 soldiers. The Army Corps of Engineers had the Special Foreign Activities Division of AMS; the 329th Geodetic Detachment; the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion [Topographic Training Team (TTT)]; and personnel from their Gulf District working in Iran.³⁴ The first three had been helping the Iranians map their country and create topographic maps.³⁵

The Shah of Iran (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) and the Royal Iranian Army engineers had enjoyed topographic and survey training and the combined mapping work done with the AMS TTT (Triple T') since 1957. That effort was relatively non-intrusive and mutually beneficial. When the successful three-year collaborative geodetic survey, charting, and mapping of the vast Libyan deserts neared completion in late 1961, those elements moved to complement the 'Triple T' mission in Iran.³⁶ In the southwest, map work along the Persian Gulf included the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, the southern avenues to the Suez Canal.³⁷ An attempt to supply a remote AMS site at the base of the Zagros Mountains near Dezful ended in calamity in January 1962.

When the AMS U-1A *Otter* took off from Qualeh Morgeh Field (3,750 feet), Tehran, Saturday morning, 27 January 1962, the pilot and co-pilot were following visual flight rules (VFR) for convenience though an occluded front (cold front overtaking a warm one) was reported to be covering Vahdati AFB (Dezful), their destination. But, forecasts were typically unreliable in winter.³⁸ An embassy handbook described winters in Tehran as similar to those in Salt Lake City, Utah.³⁹

“We usually took off knowing only the weather at our destination and followed the roads... The environment in Iran made it a tough flying assignment.” — 1LT Zane K. Rector

“We usually took off knowing only the weather at our destination and followed the roads, so we could make an emergency landing. Cross-country flights were forbidden. One hundred and ten knots was the typical airspeed for our STOL ‘tail draggers.’ Fierce headwinds and surprise dust storms required oxygen-aided escapes to higher altitudes. The environment in Iran made it a tough flying assignment,” recalled LTC Rector.⁴⁰ The U-1A *Otter* was a

'one-ton version' of the U-6 *Beaver* 'pick-up truck.' Cargo for that weekend 'milk run' flight was fourteen sheets of plywood.⁴¹ After the crash and subsequent rescue and recovery missions one can only speculate on how 10th SFG got the recovery mission from USAREUR.

MAJ Robert A. Kingston, a Korean War conventional (7th Infantry Division) and CIA [Joint Activities Commission, Korea (JACK)] special operations veteran was assigned as the Special Warfare Plans Officer, G-3 Plans, USAREUR in 1962. While detailed to JACK in Korea, 1LT Kingston regularly coordinated with the SF-trained officers and sergeants who advised guerrilla units from 1953 to 1954.⁴² The ARMISH crash, rescue, and recovery efforts had to be reported to Washington and EUCOM; military casualties have always been treated seriously by the United States.

On 2 May 1962, USAREUR G-3 Operations Division alerted 10th SFG for a personnel recovery mission in Iran. None of the aforementioned details on ARMISH rescue and recovery attempts had been provided before CPT Schandler (Company C), CPT Thorne (Company A), and Master Sergeant (MSG) Charles F. Rhodes (Company B) boarded Pan American Flight 2 for Tehran on Saturday afternoon, 19 May. They were met at the Mehgareb Airport by LTC Richard A. Barquist, the recovery project officer. Over a late dinner, the ARMISH hospital commander, who had a role in all rescue and recovery attempts, updated the SF men.⁴³

The next morning CPT Blair, the chief of the ARMISH Aviation Section (who had replaced the missing, presumed dead MAJ Carder), flew the three SF soldiers and LTC Barquist down to Kurang to reconnoiter the valley and crash site on Zardeh-Kur. With the snow melting rapidly, it was felt that the best ground approach would be up an exposed rocky ridgeline. CPT Thorne and MSG Rhodes agreed that there was no difficult mountain climbing, only some very tough mountain walking.⁴⁴ Since MG Hayden, the ARMISH chief, was anxious to proceed, two days of non-stop coordination followed.

Early Wednesday morning, 23 May, after CPT Thorne and MSG Rhodes had left for Bad Toelz to select the Group's best mountaineers. CPT Schandler, LTC Barquist, and their USIS guide, Mr. Guilampour, "Iran's finest skier and mountain climber," were driven to Isfahan and then over to Kurang to do a thorough ground reconnaissance.⁴⁵ "The best maps available were 1/250,000 aerials. I concluded that military trucks could easily traverse the gravel roads and tracks in the Kurang Valley. But, the U-1A *Otter* crash site was another sixteen miles (straight line) beyond the village of Kurang where the base camp would be established. Mules and drivers would be hired to carry supplies and bodies," recounted Schandler.⁴⁶ The SF captain agreed to the ARMISH mission stipulations.

These requirements went beyond MG Hayden being very sensitive about controlling all U.S. military in Iran. The American command was embarrassed that the bodies of friends were still on the mountain five months after the U-1A *Otter* crashed, and that previous attempts had failed to account for three U.S. Army officers. Publicity was to

be avoided. The arrival and departure of the SF soldiers would be discreetly handled and precautions were to be taken to cover their presence in Iran.⁴⁷

Therefore, the U.S. Air Force C-130 *Hercules* with the SF team and their equipment would be unloaded on the Imperial Iranian Air Force side of Mehgareb Airport. The military term 'Special Forces' was not to be used; those involved would not be identified as SF troops; shoulder sleeve insignias (SSI) were to be removed from uniforms and the wear of Green Berets was prohibited.⁴⁸ Troops would only stay in Tehran overnight after arriving and before departure. Iranian weapons permits were required. U.S. military personnel were not to drive in Iran. 24-hour radio communications were mandatory. The U-1A *Otter* would be explosively destroyed after photographs of the instrument panel were taken and the radios were removed. MG Hayden expected a daily radio situation report (SITREP).⁴⁹

"They want us to come in as soon as possible with as few people as possible and do the job as quickly as possible with as little publicity as possible and without bothering them too much." — CPT Herbert Y. Schandler

CPT Schandler summed it up: "They want us to come in as soon as possible with as few people as possible and do the job as quickly as possible with as little publicity as possible and without bothering them too much."⁵⁰ A firm commitment from 10th SFG was deemed vital and Schandler was prepared. He submitted his already prepared Operations Plan, Task Organization, Administrative & Logistics Instructions, and a Signal Annex for MG Hayden's approval.⁵¹ With that accomplished, the SF mission commander returned to Germany to prepare his team to return 'as soon as possible.'⁵²

The 10th SFG recovery team consisted of ODA 33 reinforced with the best mountain climbers in the Group. CPT Schandler and his Team Sergeant, Master Sergeant (MSG) Donald L. Petersen, were in charge of A and B company augmentees. Schandler asked that his radiomen in the long-range Communications Exercise (COMMEX) FIERY CROSS in Iran remain behind to support his mission. Reducing the SF radiomen had pleased the ARMISH. But, getting back to Iran by military air (MILAIR) was not simple.⁵³

'Displaced Persons' On The Iran Mission

DPs (Displaced Persons)

DP was a post WWII social category for persons displaced as a result of war. Original plans to repatriate the displaced peoples to their countries of origin became obsolete when the Soviets occupied the countries of Eastern Europe and imposed Communist governments. This prompted the United Nations (UN) to facilitate voluntary resettlement of DPs worldwide.

DP was the demeaning label that U.S. born Army Special Forces soldiers 'applied' to both immigrant and alien (Lodge Act) enlisted soldiers who volunteered to join their ranks in the early 1950s. Eligibility criteria for naturalized citizenship was quite different for immigrants than for the 'stateless' aliens who joined U.S. Army under the Lodge Act to get American citizenship. Lodge Act soldiers could not apply for citizenship until they had served their five year obligation honorably. Getting a security clearance for an alien enlistee was much more difficult.

Staff Sergeant (SSG) Jan Novy, 10th SFG, an alien enlistee (29 January 1953) under the Lodge Act, did not get his U.S. citizenship until 1959, after honorably serving five years. Major (MAJ) Larry A. Thorne, made an immigrant by U.S. Public Law 168 (12 August 1953), enlisted for six years, but became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 26 July 1955 as a corporal (CPL) in 77th SFG at Fort Bragg, NC. The experience of these two like aged SF soldiers emphasize differences in service benefits accorded alien and immigrant enlistees.⁵³



SSG Jan Novy

- DOB: 11 February 1919
- POB: Volyu, Czechoslovakia
- Occupation: Forester
- BPED: 29 January 1953 Lodge Act Enlistee, Bremen, Germany
- BCT & AIT, Fort Dix, NJ
- Graduate, Basic Abn Tng, 8 May 1954
- SP2, FB 5, 77th SFG, Ft Bragg, NC, 1954 55
- SSG & SFC, A & B Company, 10th SFG, Germany, 1955 64 (U.S. Citizen 1959)
- USASWCS & 7th SFG, Ft Bragg, NC, 1964 65
- SFC, 5th SFG, RVN, Jan 66 Jun 67
- SFC, 10th SFG, Germany, Aug 67 Oct 69
- SFC, 5th SFG, RVN, Nov 69 Nov 70
- SFC, HHC, 10th SFG, Ft Devens, MA, Jan 71 Feb 73
- Retired 28 Feb 73
- Deceased, 22 Feb 94
- 2 BSM, ARCOM, PH, CIB, Master Parachutist.⁵²



CPT Larry A. Thorne

- DOB; 28 May 1919
- POB: Vyborg, Finland
- Basic Infantry Training, PVT-SGT, 4th Jaeger Infantry Battalion, 1938 40
- Finish Reserve Officer Course, Provisional Ensign, Platoon Leader & Tng Officer, 1940 1941, Finnish Freedom Medals, 1st & 2nd Class
- *Waffen* SS Foreign Officers School, Stralsund, Germany, 1941
- Platoon leader, Light Unit 8, 1st Finnish Division, 1941 42, WIA, Freedom Cross 3rd & 4th Class for Valor
- Recon platoon leader, 56th Infantry Regt, 1st Finnish Division & independent Jaeger Company commander, 1942 1943, second WIA
- 1LT to CPT, Commander, volunteer long range Jaeger Company (Törni Unit), 3rd WIA, Knight of the Mannerheim Cross (Finland's highest valor award), German Iron Cross Second Class, 1943 44
- Discharged 11 Nov 44
- *Waffen* SS Guerrilla Warfare & Sabotage Course, Neustrelitz, Germany
- Jan Mar 45, *Wehrmacht* CPT surrenders German Marine force to U.S. 17th Abn Div, 11 May 45 to become 'Separated Enemy Personnel' (SEPs)
- Escape-Prison-Escape Prison Pardoned, 1945 49
- Merchant seaman to Venezuela & U.S., 1950 53
- Retired MG William J. Donovan, former OSS WWII director, gets a special private bill (HR 6312 - LEX TÖRNI granting Finnish immigrant status) through the 83rd Congress. It was signed into law by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 12 August 1953 (Public Law 168)
- BPED: 1 February 1954, 35 year old immigrant enlistee
- BCT, Ft Dix, NJ, Feb May 1954
- Mountain & Cold Weather Training Course, Ft Carson, CO, May Sep 1954
- Airborne School, Sep 1954
- PFC-SSG, Enlisted SF Course & 77th SFG, Ft Bragg, NC, 1954 1956 (U.S. Citizen 26 July 1955)
- Commissioned 1LT after graduating Signal Corps OCS, Signal Corps Officers Basic Course, Ft Gordon, GA, 1956 57
- 1LT, Platoon leader, 511th Signal Battalion, 11th Airborne Division, Ft Campbell, KY & Augsburg, Germany (Operation GYROSCOPE), 1955-58
- 1LT CPT, ODA commander, A Company, 10th SFG, German, Italian Alpine Mountaineering School, 1958 Oct 1962
- CPT, Associated Infantry Officers Course 2, Oct 62 Mar 63
- CPT, USASWCS SF Course instructor & 7th SFG, ODA-743 Cdr for TDY RVN (6 months - Nov 63 Apr 64), 1962 64
- CPT, 5th SFG, RVN & MACV-SOG 'SHINING BRASS' (1964 65)
- MIA 18 Oct 65, posthumous promotion to Major, LOM, DFC, BSM, 3 PH, AM, ARCOM, CIB, Master Parachutist.
- On 26 June 2003, remains of MAJ Larry A. Thorne and his South Vietnamese Air Force comrades, located by Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF FA), were laid to rest with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery, Washington, DC.⁵¹

10th SFG

Search & Recovery Mission IRAN 1962

CPT Herbert Y. Schandler, Co C		Commander ODA 33 & Mission Commander
CPT Larry A. Thorne, Co A		Second in Command
1LT Stephen McIntyre, Co C		Executive Officer ODA 33/ ARMISH LNO
MSG Donald E. Petersen, Co C*		ODA 33 Team Sergeant
MSG Charles F. Rhodes, Co B		
SFC J.P. Lisi, Co C		COMMEX FIERY CROSS
SFC Clemmie Brown, Co C*		
SFC James G. Strong, Co C*		
SFC Coy Melton, Co C		
SFC Henry T. Belton, Co B		
SSG David A. Smith, Co C		
SSG M. Kalisiak, Co C*		COMMEX FIERY CROSS
SSG Clarence W. Thomason, Co C*		
SSG James M. Johnston, Co C		
SSG Lawrence R. Sherman, Co B		
SSG Jan Novy, Co B		
SGT J.C. Bowan, Co C*		COMMEX FIERY CROSS
SGT Willis A. Blair, Co B		
SGT Sario J. Carvalho, Co B		

*Asterisk indicates different surname spellings on 10th SFG orders vice AAR, Recovery Mission to Iran, 5 July 1962 (Classified Files, USASOC History Office, Ft Bragg, NC)

Since the MILAIR departure request was ‘inside’ the normal Air Force scheduling cycle, the 10th SFG team was traveling ‘Priority-Space Available.’ Thus, a Sunday afternoon diversion of a C-130 *Hercules* (1 June) to carry the recovery team and its equipment to Evreux Airbase in France, meant a surprise weekend arrival. Transport to remove equipment and men, overnight billets, and meals had not been arranged. However, a C-130 *Hercules* was

departing for Tehran the next afternoon, but was stopping overnight in Athens, Greece. The Air Force duty sergeant found vacant offices in a storage hangar to accommodate the soldiers, equipment, and explosives overnight. Sleeping bags, air mattresses, and C-rations would suffice. Meals and transport were arranged for the next day. There was little to do but wait while Bad Toelz advised Tehran about the delay. Having endured the feverish ARMISH non-stop gamut of coordination in mid-May, CPT Schandler knew what had to be done if they were to be successful.⁵⁷

Despite LTC Barquist, the ARMISH hospital commander, being anxious to leave for the interior the day after they arrived (evening of 3 June), common sense prevailed. CPT Schandler insisted on acclimating and resting his men (2,159’ AGL Bad Toelz compared to 3,900’ AGL in Tehran). They had to organize equipment and supplies based on anticipated needs in the base camp and recovery camp. An SF liaison office (ODA 33 Executive Officer [XO], 1LT Stephen McIntyre) had to be set up in the ARMISH headquarters. Radios (PRC-10, AN/GRC 109, and ARMISH-AN/VRC 34) had to be checked. Funds had to be drawn to rent mules and pay the handlers and laborers in Kurang. And, coordination with the GENMISH for base camp security from the district headquarters at Shahr Kord had to be effected.⁵⁸ Schandler knew that it was important to get as much done before leaving Tehran; Kurang was a very ‘long way from the flag pole.’⁵⁹

The village where the road ended in the Kurang Valley was in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, 300 miles (straight line distance) from Tehran. The mountainous and desert terrain dictated where roads, railroads, and airfields were built and the WWII-era air navigation aids (NAVAIDs) were situated. Wednesday, 4 June, the combined recovery party (21 SF and 8 ARMISH personnel) left Tehran in a six-vehicle convoy of four ¾ ton Dodge M-37 4X4 trucks, a ¾ ton Dodge M-43 4X4 ambulance, and a single 2 ½ ton M-35 truck (gasoline). It took all day to reach Isfahan on an asphalt highway, 270 miles away. That was their last comfortable night until the mission ended.⁶⁰

About mid-afternoon Thursday, Wednesday, 6 June, the convoy reached Kurang village at the end of a dirt road. The local Gendarmerie had not been alerted so the Bakhtiari chieftain took charge. He happily guided them to a camp site next to a large mountain spring. By the time the snows had begun melting in the late spring, the Kurang Valley had been repopulated by goat and sheep herders and families planting crops. Contrary to CPT Schandler’s original assessment, vehicles would stay at the base camp, which consisted of a dozen hexagonal Army tents.⁶¹

Transportation beyond Kurang would be on foot or by mule. Having erected a doublet antenna the ARMISH radio operator established communications with Tehran on the AN/VRC-34 radio. With the help of the Bakhtiari chief CPT Schandler and Mr. Guilampour negotiated for laborers, mules, and handlers to carry equipment and supplies to the advance camp early in the morning. With the meager ARMISH funds allocated they could afford five

mules; water carried was reduced based on LTC Barquist's assurances that there was ample snow.⁶²

The Special Forces soldiers, after spending hours carefully assembling and staging mule loads in the dark for an efficient pack-out the next morning, were quite chagrined when neither laborers, mules, nor herders arrived at 0500 hours. The exceedingly poor, illiterate, but deeply religious Moslem Bakhtiari, lived simple lives under primitive conditions, unlike the Americans and urban Iranians whose daily lives revolved around time. Basic subsistence dominated the lives of these indigenous people. Only twice-daily prayers interrupted critical things...forget a lack of watches and a town clock.⁶³ Adjustment to Bakhtiari rhythms was critical to getting the camps established and the search and recovery underway.

Stage One:

The move to establish the advance camp got off to a late start on Friday, 7 June 1962. The group consisted of the high camp element (CPT Thorne's mountaineers) of eight, and a carrying party of eleven (CPT Schandler's group), and the tribal chief as guide. Carrying 25 cases of C-rations, water purification equipment, explosives, oxygen, and radios, it took all day for the caravan of men and mules to reach the advance camp locations. Left behind to guard the base camp were two SF radio operators as well as the ARMISH radioman and some Iranian truck drivers. They were told to request more money from Tehran and current Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) from Bad Toelz. After the mules and handlers were released (no forage above the freeze line), the exhausted men slept fitfully that night at 10,000 feet.⁶⁴ The next day's climb would be even tougher without pack animals.

Stage Two:

Leaving their individual rucksacks guarded by MSG Petersen, the ODA 33 team sergeant, the carrying party

loaded up with six days of C-rations, water purification and mountaineering equipment, a radio, and explosives. The high camp party carried their individual rucksacks, tents, and specialized search gear. It took the group seven hours to climb the last 4,000 feet along the rocky ridge to the high camp site. After a short break, the very tired carrying party began the return to the advanced camp. They arrived just before dark on 8 June.⁶⁵

Stage Three:

The recovery began shortly after CPT Schandler had led the carrying party away. Several tribesmen were picking up equipment around the crash site on the far side of the bowl below the 14,500 foot ridgeline. The tribal chief and MSG Rhodes, accompanied by a few SF soldiers, went down to talk with them to prevent further looting. When CPT Thorne climbed down to them, he realized that everyone was standing around a rather wizened body. His papers and valuables were long gone but it appeared to be MAJ Carder. After putting the body inside a sleeping bag it was buried in the snow to prevent further deterioration. A quick sweep of the area led to the discovery of another body in a gully about 300 meters away. Despite being exposed for several days LTC Barquist believed it to be CPT Knotts. He was put in a sleeping bag and buried alongside the presumed MAJ Carder. The group then climbed up to the overturned aircraft in the snow. "It had been stripped by earlier rescue parties or by tribesmen. The glide slope control box had been removed and its wires cut. The front part of the aircraft was smashed almost completely and we wondered how the pilots ever got out of the cockpit," reported CPT Thorne.⁶⁶

On Saturday morning, 9 June, while CPT Schandler and the carrying party were returning to Kurang, Thorne radioed the base camp to report finding two bodies and to request that water be airdropped. "Clouds of millions of locusts (grasshoppers) had descended on the area and died,

1 | The Base Camp was guarded by two SF radio operators, the ARMISH radioman, and the Iranian truck drivers.



2 | High Camp set up by CPT Thorne's seven mountaineers.





After being stripped of radios and remaining flight instruments, the U-1A *Otter* was blown to smithereens. It had been rigged with TNT, factored at 'P for plenty.'

"It [the plane wreckage] had been stripped by earlier rescue parties or by tribesmen. ...The front part of the aircraft was smashed almost completely and we wondered how the pilots ever got out of the cockpit."

— Reported CPT Larry A. Thorne

contaminating the snow and water supply points. In some places, the dead locusts covered the ground so thickly it was like walking in deep mud," said CPT Thorne.⁶⁷ Shortly afterwards like magic an Iranian Air Force C-47 *Skytrain* circled the high camp and airdropped two bundles. It was too high when the parachutes opened and strong wind currents carried them far across the ridgeline. It took three men until noon to recover the bundles and drag their contents to the high camp. There was no water, only the heavy mountaineering equipment purposefully left behind in Tehran. They just had more equipment to haul back down the mountain.⁶⁸

The probing for a third body continued, but only several pairs of skis and some sleeping bags and C-rations were found. Two sleds were fashioned from the skis to carry the bodies. At 1745 hours LTC Barquist, Mr. Guilampour, the tribal chief, SSG Willis A. Blair, and SGT Sario J. Carvalho left for the base camp. Unfortunately, the handset to the PRC-10 had quit working, so CPT Schandler was 'left in the dark' concerning this decision.⁶⁹

Since the snow had frozen hard overnight, CPT Thorne and the remaining high camp team members put off probing until afternoon on 10 June. They spent the morning stripping the U-1A *Otter* of its radios and remaining flight instruments, carefully cataloging them. After their attempts to burn the aircraft with thermite grenades failed, the SF soldiers rigged the airplane for demolition with TNT. Factoring 'P for plenty,' all explosives were used and the *Otter* was blown to smithereens in a massive roar that echoed successively. SSG Blair and SGT Carvalho, on the return climb to the high camp, heard the explosion but missed the excitement. After reaching the snow line of the advance camp in the dark, the two bodies had been buried

again. In the morning LTC Barquist, Mr. Guilampour, and the tribal chief left for the base camp. SSG Blair and SGT Carvalho returned to the high camp.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, at the base camp in Kurang on Sunday, 10 June, CPT Schandler, having no communications with the high camp and Bad Toelz (wrong keypads delivered), was handling administrative issues. SFCs Coy Melton and Joseph P. Lisi (Farsi speaker) and SSG David A. Smith, the team medics, were alerted to prepare to conduct 'sick call' for the local Bakhtiari in the morning. The ARMISH ambulance would serve as the private 'examining room.' At 1500 hours when the local chieftain appeared with LTC Barquist and Mr. Guilampour, the mission commander was brought up to date through 9 June when they left Thorne's group. Schandler learned that the location of the two bodies had been marked but they had been left unguarded. However, Barquist, Guilampour, and the chief had used the ravine route. It was very passable and significantly faster. While the chief alerted his people about the SF-conducted 'sick call' arranged for the next day, CPT Schandler rented two mules and a driver for the return to the advance and high camps in the morning. CPT Thorne, concerned that the bodies had been left unguarded, sent SFC Henry T. Belton, SSGs Jan Novy and Blair, and SGT Carvalho to the advance camp with "all of the excess gear, radio equipment, and instruments from the plane."⁷¹ They were to stay overnight. Thorne and MSG Rhodes, alone at 14,500 feet, experienced the first signs of oncoming altitude sickness. Unable to get enough oxygen in the prone, the two soldiers spent the night sitting up, side by side, gasping to fill their lungs.⁷²

In the morning of 11 June, the two SF mountaineers were distracted from their breathing problems by the

appearance of an Imperial Iranian Air Force C-47 *Skytrain*. The parachute on the first airdropped bundle did not open and it smashed into the ground. While the parachute on the second bundle opened, its hard impact burst three 5-gallon cans; two with water and one full of gasoline. Two cans of water were salvaged. The appearance of Sergeants Blair, Novy, and Carvalho prompted Thorne to direct the assembly of all equipment and supplies for movement down to the lower altitude of the bowl below the remnants of the destroyed airplane. The men's spirits were lifted when after discovering some ski tips protruding from the snow, two meters of frantic shoveling uncovered a bloody field jacket, a case of C-rations, and climbing ropes. But, the third body was not there.⁷³

The late evening surprise arrival of CPT Schandler, LTC Barquist, Mr. Guilampour, and SFC Belton leading two mules raised morale. They had a PRC-10 handset, some D-handle shovels, more probes, and body bags. The mules were reloaded with all unnecessary equipment and SSG Novy took them down to the advance camp. That night oxygen distress affected everyone at the high camp. The rapid movements to high altitude and extending living in the rarified air without proper acclimatization had started causing problems.⁷⁴

Searching and probing around the high camp for the next two days (12-15 June) proved fruitless. Unfortunately, the ARMISH had not given CPT Schandler access to the preliminary accident investigation which contained information as to the disposition of the five survivors on the mountainside below the crash. Only personal equipment and climbing gear were found. Despite 8 to 10 inches of

snow melt each day, snow and ice was still more than 6 meters deep around the high camp. Concerned about altitude sickness, CPT Thorne decided to keep just three men at the high camp to observe "the area for possible objects appearing on the surface."⁷⁵ He would rotate them in three days. All other personnel and equipment would go down to the base camp. The bodies buried at the advanced camp would be evacuated. MSG Rhodes, SSG Blair, and SGT Carvalho were left behind when CPT Thorne and the remainder of his team departed Friday afternoon, 15 June, dragging ski sleds loaded with equipment. Radio communications with the base camp were good.⁷⁶

At the advanced camp a frustrated and discouraged CPT Thorne and group loaded the two bodies inside snow-filled metal containers, lashed them onto mules and continued the night march to the base camp in Kurang, arriving at 0100 hours, Saturday morning. The exhausted SF soldiers were jarred awake by the Bakhtiari eagerly awaiting treatment by the military 'doctors.' LTC Barquist had already left for Isfahan with the bodies of the two U.S. officers.⁷⁷

Then, about mid-morning, the high camp radioed that they had found a third body. SGT Carvalho, the lowest man on a parallel linear walking sweep of the area, had spotted clothing protruding from the snow. A closer examination revealed a human knee. He called MSG Rhodes and SSG Blair over to help clear the snow and ice away. Glum SF soldier faces in the base camp radiated smiles when the news was passed. The Tenth Group team had fulfilled its mission and brought closure to the three bereaved families. While SF medics continued 'sick call' in the base camp, CPT Schandler arranged for mules and

Mules from the Base Camp would be used to carry the recovered remains of MAJ Carder and CPT Knotts.





CPT Larry A. Thorne (R) with the Detachement A-2 'High Camp Mountaineers.'

handlers to carry the last body and remaining gear down from the high camp. All of Sunday, 17 June, was spent in that endeavor. Monday morning, 18 June 1962, the SF team loaded their equipment on trucks for Isfahan. Late Tuesday afternoon, 19 June, equipment was turned in to the ARMISH.⁷⁸

The next morning CPT Schandler and LTC Barquist briefed the Chief of Staff, COL Tarkenton, and MG Hayden, the ARMISH chief, got partial pays for his soldiers, and left with the SF team on the ALS flight to Athens at 1500 hours. "They didn't have much to say to me. I was thanked, but wasn't overwhelmed with the warmth or gratitude. The troops were somewhat disappointed that no representative from ARMISH ever expressed a word of thanks to them or came to see them off," wrote CPT Schandler.⁷⁹ But, having accomplished their mission in Iran without attracting any attention, the Special Forces would be welcomed back in the future.

The SF soldiers did get a reward from the 10th SFG command group. CPT Schandler was authorized to administratively delay their return to Bad Toelz. The 10th SFG was undergoing its annual USAREUR Inspector General (IG) inspection and a returning team with dirty equipment was unwelcome. CPT Schandler took his 'holiday' in Vienna, while the rest of the team chose to extend their stays in Athens.⁸⁰ "I suggested that the men in the High Camp receive the Soldier's Medal and the rest of the team get the Joint Service Commendation Medal.

But, nothing came of it," recounted retired COL Schandler. "The commander, COL S. H. Matheson, was told to keep the mission very quiet."⁸¹ The 10th SFG soldiers did receive a Letter of Commendation from GEN Paul L. Freeman, Jr., the Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR on 30 July 1962.⁸² So, what can be concluded and what resulted from the success achieved by 10th SFG in 1962?

Despite the 'ups and downs,' the 10th SFG soldiers adjusted well, stayed focused on the mission, and persevered to succeed. This recovery mission, executed very low key, opened the way for fifteen years of annual SF training in the Middle East and led to productive exchanges with the Imperial Iranian Army Special Forces and airborne troops. They were done by 10th SFG until the 5th SFG returned from South Vietnam. Exchanges and training teams (MTTs) satisfied President Kennedy's wish to properly train the Shah's military to insure that advanced U.S. arms and equipment would be truly beneficial. SF was not the first 'weapon of choice' for USAREUR or the ARMISH because they were still a relatively unknown quantity to Army commanders in Europe in 1962. It was the civic action medical capabilities (MEDCAP) part that were touted by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General (LTG) Harold K. Freeman, during his message to the Association of the U.S. Army in Washington in 1963.⁸³ And, it should not be overlooked that ARMISH took risks 'above and beyond' during an extremely hard winter to rescue and recover their five U.S. military personnel. ▲

Special thanks goes to retirees, LTC Zane K. 'Kyle' Rector, COL Sandy Vann-Olejasz, the granddaughter of MG Walter M. Vann, deceased, and MAJ Sario J. Carvalho, the archival staffs of the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries and Museums, and the longtime supportive staff of the National Personnel Records Center.

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Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations Latin America, the Congo, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation undated, 1, 2, Major General Walter M. Vann personal papers, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation; "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search, *Kayhan International* (Tehran, Iran), Vol III: No. 802, Saturday, 3 February 1962, 1, 5.
- 2 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 3.
- 3 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 3, 4; United States Army Board for Aviation Accident Research, "Crash Sense: Wrong!" *U.S. Army Aviation Digest*, March 1962, 47-48, hereafter cited by short title *Aviation Digest*. "Colonel Walter M. Vann, the senior officer aboard the aircraft, became the senior ground commander, when the airplane touched ground. These were Army Aviation flight rules. However, everyone on board was so hypoxic that general consensus ruled," said retired LTC Zane K. Rector, a fixed-wing Army aviator who was the Aide-de-Camp to MG John C. Hayden, the ARMISH/MAAG chief. Retired LTC Zane K. 'Kyle' Rector, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 3 and 10 May and 21 June 2017, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 4 "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5.
- 5 Retired COL Herbert Y. Schandler, interview by Briscoe, 6 October 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Company C, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, APO 106, U.S. Forces, SUBJECT: After Action Report, Recovery Mission to Iran, 5 July 1962, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962.
- 6 Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 74.
- 7 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 74. Retired Colonel Simpson stated that the crash killed 'four crew members and passengers' and Iranian mountain climbers attempted to scale the mountains to retrieve the bodies, but the deep snow was too much for them. Actually, there were three crewmen and two passengers aboard the U-1A *Otter* when it crashed on 27 January 1962. The enlisted crewchief, Specialist Five (SP5) John T. Porter and one passenger, Colonel (COL) Vann, were rescued by combined ARMISH and Iranian military efforts. Rector interviews, 3 and 10 May and 21 June 2017; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; COL Herbert Y. Schandler Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as COL Schandler Papers; Lieutenant General (LTG) Harold K. Johnson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Keeping the Bottle Corked," *Army* (December 1963), Vol. 14, No. 5, 36. In his address to the annual Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) meeting, LTG Johnson reported that the *Otter* crashed killing all five personnel. Severe weather conditions, inaccessibility of the region, and the torturous nature of the terrain limited initial recovery to just two bodies. A 10th SFG team found the other three. Somewhere the rescue of two survivors got lost. Two were cited in "Crash Sense-Wrong!" *Aviation Digest* (May 1962), 46-48.
- 8 U.S. State Department, *Welcome to Tehran: A Handbook of Facts and Information Prepared by the Embassy of the United States of America* (Tehran, June 1977), 3.
- 9 U.S. Army, *Area Handbook for Iran* (Washington, DC: American University, Special Operations Research Office [SORO], May 1963), 66, 67; "100 Years of Flight - Keep Them Flying - Avionics" at <http://machinedesign.com/technologies/100-years-flight-keep-them-flying-avionics>, accessed on 12 April 2017.
- 10 Richard P. Weinert, Jr., *A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962* (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), 149, 278, 279; Charles R. Schrader, *History of Operations Research in the U.S. Army* (Washington: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research, 2008), Vol. II, 255. The second LTG Hamilton L. Howze Board specifically addressed air mobility in support of the conventional Army conducting special warfare missions.
- 11 The History Team, *Cold War Mapping Mission: The 329th Geodetic Detachment and the 64th Engineer Topographic Battalion 1956-1970* (Bennington, VT: Merriam Press, 2014), 13, 54, 76, hereafter cited as *Cold War Mapping Mission*.
- 12 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 4; "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5.
- 13 Rector interviews, 3 and 10 May and 21 June 2017; "SE 3130 Alouette II - History and Technical Description" at <http://www.heli-archive.ch/en/helicopters/in-depth-articles/se-3130-alouette-2>, accessed on 4 May 2017; "Aerospatiale Alouette II Light Utility Helicopter" at http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=699, accessed on 4 May 2017.
- 14 "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5.
- 15 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 4; Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders No. 55, 25 September 1962, paragraph VII, "Soldier's Medal" awarded to SFC Eugene F. Peck, 1LT Zane K. Rector, and SFC Harold C. Stagers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 16 "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5.
- 17 Rector interviews, 3 May and 21 June 2017.
- 18 "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5. Mr. Kazem Guilampour, the noted Iranian skier and mountain climber working in USIS, had been awarded the U.S. Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal for his outstanding bravery during the recovery of two U.S. Army servicemen killed in an L-23 *Seminole* crash on 26 January 1961, just miles from the 1962 U-1A *Otter* crash site. LTC, then MAJ Richard F. Barquist, Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran, was awarded a Soldier's Medal for his courageous role in the 4-6 February 1961 recovery mission. "Valor Awards for Richard F. Barquist" at <http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipientid=140211>, accessed on 9 June 2017.
- 19 Rector interviews, 3 and 10 May 2017.
- 20 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 4; Rector interview, 3 May 2017; Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders No. 26, 14 June 1962, paragraph III, "Soldier's Medal" awarded to Imperial Iranian Army Sergeants Atoah Noorii and Amir Shahghadami, Mountain Training Center; "Crash Sense: Wrong!" *Aviation Digest*, March 1962, 47-48; Award of the Soldier's Medal to SFC Harold C. Stagers, MAAG, Iran. Hall of Valor. Military Times at <http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipient=140300>, accessed on 13 April 2017.
- 21 Rector interview, 3 May 2017; HQ, DA, GO No. 26, 14 June 1962, paragraph III, "Soldier's Medal" awarded to Imperial Iranian Army Sergeants Atoah Noorii and Amir Shahghadami, Mountain Training Center; "Crash Sense: Wrong!" *Aviation Digest*, March 1962, 47-48; Award of the Soldier's Medal to SFC Harold C. Stagers, MAAG, Iran. Hall of Valor. Military Times at <http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipient=140300>, accessed on 13 April 2017.
- 22 Rector interview, 3 May 2017; COL Schandler Papers.
- 23 Rector interview, 3 May 2017; HQ, DA, GO No. 26, 14 June 1962, paragraph III, "Soldier's Medal" awarded to Imperial Iranian Army Sergeants Atoah Noorii and Amir Shahghadami, Mountain Training Center; "Crash Sense: Wrong!" *Aviation Digest*, March 1962, 47-48; Award of the Soldier's Medal to SFC Harold C. Stagers, MAAG, Iran. Hall of Valor. Military Times at <http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipient=140300>, accessed on 13 April 2017; "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5; Frostbite on the feet of SP5 John T. Porter was so severe, that parts of several toes were removed. He was medically evacuated to Landstuhl Army Hospital in Germany for surgery. USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Investigation, 4, 9; Rector interview, 21 June 2017.
- 24 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; U.S. ARMISH Search and Recovery Plan dated 20 February 1962, Annex 1to Inclosure A - Proposed Operational Plan, 10th SFG After-Action Report, Advance Party to Iran undated, COL Schandler Papers, hereafter cited as 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; "John C. Hayden 1930" at <http://apps.westpoint.org/Memorials/Article/8940/>, accessed on 7 December 2016.; "West German Mountain Rescue Team Arrived in Iran," *Syracuse (NY) Post-Standard*, 2 February 1962, 1.
- 25 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; "German Ski Troops Join Zagros Search," 1, 5.
- 26 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; Schandler, unpublished "Special Forces in Iran," undated, 3, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Schandler, "Special Forces in Iran."
- 27 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 5; Schandler interview; Schandler, "Special Forces in Iran," 3.
- 28 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 5; "Search for 3 Airmen in Iran is Abandoned," *Chicago Tribune*, 10 February 1962, 8 at <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1962/02/10/page/8/article/search-for-3-airmen-in-iran-i-4/>, accessed on 13 April 2017; *The Alexandria Times* (Indiana), 2 February 1962, 2; .
- 29 Rector interviews, 10 May and 21 June 2017; 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran. Armor 1LT Robert F. Molinelli later commanded the 114th Aviation Company and the 2nd Battalion, 17th Cavalry during his two tours in Vietnam. COL Molinelli commanded the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) and was Chief of Staff, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood TX before becoming the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) as a Brigadier General (BG). He was a serving Major General (MG) at his death in 1985. MG Molinelli was posthumously inducted into the Army Aviation Hall of Fame in 1989. "Maj.Gen. Robert F. Molinelli, Decorated War Aviator, Dies" at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/187/05/08/maj-gen-robert-f-molinelli-dec>, accessed on 22 June 2017; "MG Robert F. Molinelli" at <http://www.quad-a.org/index.php/soldier/37-recognition/awardees/148-major-general-robe>, accessed on 22 June 2017.
- 30 Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was sent to Berlin on behest of President John F. Kennedy on 20 August 1961, a week after the East Germans began constructing a barbed wire fence to restrict access to Western zones. Johnson greeted the 1600-man 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division that convoyed from Mannheim, Germany. Colonel Glover S. Johns, Jr. was the commander. The SF team would have been the Berlin Detachment, 10th SFG. This differs from Schandler *Memoirs*, 39, wherein he said that it was President Kennedy. It will be 26 May 1963 before Kennedy declares that "all free men...are citizens of Berlin

- Ich bin ein Berliner*,” Schandler *Memoirs*, 36; “Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson Delivers Remarks to the Press upon His Return from West Germany” at <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-KN-C18601.aspx>, accessed on 30 January 2017; “The Berlin Wall, Fifty Years Ago” at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB354/index.htm> accessed 1/30/2017; Donald A. Carter, “The U.S. Military Response to the 1960-1962 Berlin Crisis” at <https://www.archives.gov/files>, accessed on 30 January 2017.
- 31 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 70. The last time 10th SFG was a robust unit dated to its arrival in Germany in 1953. Post-Korean War officer reductions-in-force (RIFs) improved non-commissioned officer (NCO) strengths in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) while simultaneously severely depleting SF ranks at Bad Toelz.
- 32 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; Schandler, *Memoirs*, 39. A medic was sent to Defense Language School in Monterey, CA, for Farsi while the team sergeant went to the Berlitz School in Munich for a month.
- 33 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; Schandler *Memoirs*, 39; *Area Handbook for Iran*, 617; retired MG James A. Guest, 20 June 2017 interview by Briscoe, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date..
- 34 *Area Handbook for Iran*, 618.
- 35 *Cold War Mapping Mission*, 3.
- 36 *Cold War Mapping Mission*, 3. The U.S. Army Map Service began geodetic surveys and topographic mapping in Ethiopia in 1963 and Liberia in the mid-1960s.
- 37 *Cold War Mapping Mission*, 3.
- 38 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 2, 6; “Crash Sense: Wrong!” *Aviation Digest*, 48. Historical records for the Tehran, Iran weather station reflect one common theme: “This station did not reliably report...temperature, clouds, precipitation, snow, humidity, dew point, wind, visibility, or cloud ceiling” in 1962. “Historical Weather for 1962 in Tehran, Iran,” at <https://weatherspark.com/history/32810/1962/Tehran-Iran>, accessed on 15 December 2016; Rector interview, 10 May 2017.
- 39 *Welcome to Iran*, 41.
- 40 Rector interview, 10 May 2017.
- 41 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation , 6; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; Schandler, “Special Forces in Iran,” 3.
- 42 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; Schandler *Memoirs*, 44, Retired COL Aaron Bank, Official Military Records, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO, hereafter cited as NPRC.
- 43 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010; However, LTC Richard F. Barquist did not share the USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation results with them. It had the U-1A aircraft exit order of the five personnel aboard, the fact that MAJ Donald A. Carder, the co-pilot, had moved down to the airdropped bundles, and that SP5 John T. Porter, the crew chief, had slid past CPT Daniel L. Knotts, the pilot, and was close to MAJ Carder’s body. This information would have helped the 10th SFG High Camp team better organize their search.
- 44-47 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 48 Retired MAJ Herbert Brucker, interview by Briscoe, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 49-52 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 53 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 54 H.A. Gill III, *Soldier Under Three Flags: The Exploits of Special Forces Captain Larry A. Thorne* (Ventura, CA: Pathfinder Publishing, 1998); J. Michael Cleverley, *Born a Soldier: The Time and Life of Larry Thorne* (booksurge.com, 2008); Kari Kallonen and Petri Sarjanen, *Lauri Törni-Legenda-Larry Thorne* (Tallinn, Finland: Grenader Grupp, 2004).
- 55 Retired SFC Jan Novy, Official Military Records, NPRC.
- 56 Former SGT Rudolf G. Horvath (Lodge Act enlistee) interview by Briscoe, 10 June 2008; retired Colonel George Maracek (immigrant enlistee) interview by Briscoe, 11 February 2009; both interviews in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Ft Bragg, NC.
- 57-60 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 61 10th SFG AAR-ADVON to Iran; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 62-65 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 66 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010. CPT Thorne does not mention that the cockpit was completely separated from the fuselage. USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 3.
- 67-72 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 73 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010. The bloody field jacket belonged to the pilot, CPT Daniel L. Knotts, whose left arm arterial bleeding had been stopped with a tourniquet. USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation, 3, 4.
- 74 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 75 USAREUR Preliminary Aircraft Crash Investigation ; C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 76-79 C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 80 Schandler *Memoirs*, 43; Schandler interview, 6 October 2010.
- 81 Schandler interview, 6 October 2010. The 10th SFG commander, COL Salve H. Matheson, jumped into Normandy, France, on D-Day, 6 June 1944, as 1st platoon leader, E Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Stephen E. Ambrose’s Easy Company in *Band of Brothers*). He served with the 506th PIR through the liberation of Holland, Battle of Bastogne, and seizure of Hitler’s ‘Eagle’s Nest.’ He was the X Corps G-3 Plans Officer for the Inchon and Wonsan landings in the Korean War. As a Brigadier General (BG) Matheson was an Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (ABD) and commanded 1st Brigade (Separate), 101st ABD in Vietnam. He later commanded the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea before retiring in 1975. “MG Salve H. Matheson, Deceased” at <https://army.togetherweserved.com/army/servvlet/tws.webapp.WebApp?cmd=ShadowBoxP>, accessed on 22 June 2017; “In Honor of Major General Salve Matheson,” *Congressional Record—Extension of Remarks*, January 25, 2005, E70.
- 82 HQ, USAREUR, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, APO 403, US Forces. Letter of Commendation dated 30 July 1962. C Co 10th SFG AAR 5 July 1962.
- 83 Freeman, “Keeping the Bottle Corked,” *Army*, December 1963, 36.



Special Forces soldier from ODA 511 conducting Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) of Objective BRIGID. Photographs were taken of the text found on chalkboards for subsequent analysis.



The Raid at **Hazar Qadam**

Reprinted in part from
*Weapon of Choice:
ARSOF in Afghanistan¹*

Updated text by Michael E. Krivdo



A member of Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODA) 515, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) hones his sniper skills on a range in Kandahar, Afghanistan.



Assaulters in A/1/5 SFG practice room-clearing techniques.

This article incorporates new material into an early account initially published in *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan*. That book was the first official Army history of that conflict to be published and it established procedures for ‘sanitizing’ combat accounts of classified articles. This updated text and accompanying photos and maps support the USASOC commander’s desire to emphasize early Special Forces experiences conducting counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. There remains a wealth of information to learn from those operations.

As the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership continued in Afghanistan through the winter of 2001-2002, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

directed a discrete intelligence-gathering mission that required the long-range reconnaissance and surveillance and urban warfare close-quarters battle skills of Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) (A/1/5).² This mission was referred to as a sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and it called for the focused search and recovery of enemy personnel, documents, manuals, monies, computers, communications equipment, explosives, weaponry, and related materials that might be of intelligence value.³

Commanded by Major (MAJ) Jon West* (pseudonym), A/1/5 was specifically organized, trained, and equipped for this type of mission. The company supported USCENTCOM on particularly complex long-range reconnaissance and

IAW USSOCOM Sanitization Protocol for Historical Articles on Classified Current Operations, pseudonyms are used for majors and below who are still on active duty, unless names have been publicly released for awards/decorations or DoD news release. Pseudonyms are identified with an asterisk (). The eyes of active ARSOF personnel in photos are blocked out when not covered with dark visors or sunglasses, except when the photos were publicly released by a service or DoD. Source references (end notes) utilize the assigned pseudonym.*

surveillance and direct action (DA) missions—raids and surgical strikes—predominantly in urban or built-up areas. All unit members were highly trained in the skills of close-quarters, room-to-room fighting; long-range surveillance; and sniping.⁴

Since December 2001, A/1/5 had conducted three SSE missions with marked success. Surprise was so complete and execution so rapid that only two shots had been fired in all three missions—both warning shots prompting immediate surrenders. The company captured nine al Qaeda suspects (detainees); destroyed several tons of weapons and ammunition; and made valuable intelligence finds, including satellite telephones, tape recordings, and encrypted electronic records.⁵

On 9 January 2002, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) of USCENTCOM issued another SSE order to U.S. Navy Captain Robert S. Harward, commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–South (CJSOTF-South), then based at Kandahar Airport.⁶ CFLCC tasked CJSOTF-South to conduct an SSE of two suspected al Qaeda compounds at Hazar Qadam near the town of Oruzgan, 166 km northeast of Kandahar in mountainous Oruzgan Province. The mission, designated “AQ-048,” was to kill or capture any Taliban or al Qaeda personnel and collect material for intelligence analysis.⁷

The intelligence staff at CENTCOM disclosed two target sites to CFLCC. Each walled compound contained a collection of various-sized buildings. The compounds were surrounded by orchards and farm fields, and the two sites were 1.5 km apart. When the photo interpreters suggested that there might be women and children in the compounds, planners ruled out a ‘kinetic strike’ (aerial bombardment) and directed a ground raid. Because of

the size and complexity of the two sites, Captain Harward selected A/1/5 for the SSE mission and attached a New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) unit.⁸


MAJ West* decided he would seize both sites simultaneously and divided his company into two assault forces. New Zealand SAS troops were designated as a quick-reaction force (QRF) in the event more combat power was needed. West* would lead Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs) 512, 513, and 514 in an assault of the westernmost site, named Objective KELLY. The eastern compound, designated Objective BRIGID, became the target for ODAs 511 and 516, led by the company operations officer, Chief Warrant Three (CW3) Dwight Ashford.⁹

Each force would have sufficient radio operators, explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) experts, interpreters, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents attached. The FBI agents would select those detainees they wanted for questioning and also assume ‘chain of custody’ responsibility for all evidence collected to ensure admissibility in any subsequent legal proceedings. If necessary, they would also serve as government witnesses in the event of suspects being charged with crimes in a U.S. court.¹⁰ At this early stage in the conflict that was still a consideration.

To avoid establishing predictable operational patterns in executing their mission, MAJ West* arranged for helicopters to infiltrate the assault forces at night into separate remote landing zones (LZs) several kilometers (km) away from the objectives. The high-altitude mountain valley LZs were hidden from Hazar Qadam by intervening ridges. Those features also masked the sound of the helicopters as they flew nap-of-the-earth (NOE) routes that skimmed along the bottom of valleys and popped over passes. After landing, Ashford’s mobile force, wearing night-vision goggles (NVGs),


Soldiers from ODA 513 practice breaching compound walls with live explosive charges at a demolition range near Kandahar, Afghanistan.






Above | Sketch map of Objective KELLY, showing terrain and buildings. Some buildings are marked with enemy or equipment encountered and the purpose for the structure. The general scheme of maneuver for the assault on Objective Kelly was: Following infiltration by helicopter about five kilometers to the east, the assault force approached KELLY in three groups and moved to designated breach points (BP1, BP2, BP3). Simultaneous with the assault on Obj BRIGID 1.5 kilometers to the south, all three ODAs breached and then cleared their respective sector. ODA 512 breached BP1 and cleared Sector A, ODA 514 breached BP3 and cleared Sector B, and ODA 513 breached BP2 and cleared Sector C. On order, the assault elements conducted sensitive site exploitation of their respective areas. Fires from an AC-130 were ready to isolate the objective area. The individual buildings were assigned numbers to assist in command and control of the assault forces during the attack and to aid in delivery of supporting fires if needed.


Below | Sketch map showing the relationship of both objectives (KELLY and BRIGID) to each other, about 1.5 kilometers apart.
 *Note: The semi-improved road ran in front of both sites.





Above | Sketch map of Objective BRIGID, showing terrain and buildings. Although the original plan was to enter the compound in vehicles, the presence of obstacles at point A caused the force to dismount and move east to breach the compound wall at point B. After breaching the wall, the assault force (ODAs 511 and 516) attacked under fire from buildings 1 and 3. The assault force breached building 1, eliminating the immediate threat while still taking fire. Meanwhile, the support vehicles bypassed the obstacles at point A and entered the compound at point E, where they provided supporting fires. Some enemy escaped to some ruins east of the objective while the assault force seized buildings 1 and 3. Sensitive site exploitation followed.

Objectives KELLY and BRIGID



An SF Engineer Sergeant from ODA 512 constructs demolition charges for use in breaching mud and brick compound walls.



would drive 6 km on a dirt road to Objective BRIGID in two heavily-armed high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), or ground mobility vehicles (GMVs).¹¹ West's* three Special Forces teams, also wearing NVGs, would walk 5 km around a mountain peak to approach their target, Objective KELLY.¹²

The CFLCC commander wanted surveillance teams to have 'eyes on target' of AQ-048 well ahead of the raids, in part to confirm the presence of noncombatants (women and children) at the two sites. But three attempts by Marine Corps CH-46 'Sea Knight' helicopters to infiltrate a long-range reconnaissance element failed: the first terminated because of aircraft mechanical problems; the second failed because of heavy icing on the helicopter; and the third aborted on landing when blowing snow 'whited-out' the LZ. During a 17 January video teleconference (VTC), the CENTCOM J3 restated his desire to execute SSE mission AQ-048. Soon after, CFLCC ordered the mission to proceed without the desired preliminary surveillance of the target sites.¹³

Continuous changes because of helicopter availability and priorities delayed the mission for five days until the night of 22 January. The KELLY force launched from Kandahar around 2130 hours local time and landed at its offset LZ. In the meantime, while flying to Kandahar to pick up the BRIGID force, the Bagram-based helicopter pilots reported marginal weather near Hazar Qadam that was becoming worse. Based on their estimate, Captain Harward, the commander of CJSOTF-South, decided to postpone the AQ-048 mission for 24 hours. Thus, under a bright moon with broken clouds and Fahrenheit temperatures in the low teens, the KELLY force marched back to its initial LZ for extraction, and the AC-130 'Spectre' gunship already en route to support the raid returned to Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman.¹⁴

The next night, 23 January 2002, the weather had cleared and the mission was launched again. This time, two

Marine Corps CH-53s carried West's* 45-man dismantled KELLY force to its insertion LZ.¹⁵ Three MH-47Es from the 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, transported Ashford's* mobile force. Two 'Chinooks' carried GMVs and drivers while the third ferried the 26 soldiers who would ride the trucks to Objective BRIGID.¹⁶

After a quiet tactical march at 17 degrees Fahrenheit and a slow drive under NVGs across terrain 7,000 feet above sea level, the two assault forces arrived at their pre-assault positions right on schedule. Maintaining close communications, the two forces simultaneously moved their security elements into position. However, a deep irrigation ditch just outside the wall of BRIGID forced the assaulters to dismount and approach their entry points on foot. The vehicle drivers and mounted gun teams began hastily searching for a way to bypass or cross the deep ditch. To execute both 'hits' simultaneously, CW3 Ashford* would have to assault the target without the backup heavy weapons from his GMVs.¹⁷ Understanding the situation, MAJ West* concurred.

Having received an 'up' from all elements, signifying their readiness to attack, both assault leaders initiated their attacks according to a well-rehearsed sequence of commands: "Stand by . . . I have control. Five, four, three, two, one—Execute!"¹⁸ The three breaching charges on the three entry points were detonated simultaneously on "Execute," and the assault elements positioned to the side of each entry point stormed into the compound. Within minutes, the assault teams at KELLY had physically overpowered two dozen enemy fighters in the 10 buildings on the compound. One enemy fighter, firing his weapon from a doorway, wounded Staff Sergeant (SSG) Jesse Wilcox* in the right foot. As the enemy fighter backed out of the building spraying bullets into the darkness, a security team member killed him with a well-placed shot. Another enemy sentry was killed when he fired on the assaulters


from outside the compound. These were the only two enemy fatalities at Objective KELLY.¹⁹

At Objective BRIGID, a guard opened fire when he spotted Ashford's* assault teams as they ran through the main gate of the compound to their breach points. His alarm shots prompted several firefights as the assaulters fought their way across the courtyard and into the main building. Once inside, it was close-quarters combat from room to room, and the resistance was stout. Having initially stunned the enemy fighters in the room with flash-bang grenades, the assaulters killed five enemy fighters as two others escaped out windows. When Master Sergeant (MSG) Albert Payle* and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jon Hsu* burst into another room, an enemy fighter ran out between them. Hsu* spun about and pursued him, shooting him down before he could escape. Alone and wearing NVGs, MSG Payle* faced three enemy fighters surrounding him in the darkened room. He quickly killed two of them with his M-4 carbine before the third jumped him from behind, clawing at his eyes. Payle,* using combat *jiu-jitsu*, threw the enemy soldier over his shoulder, sharply snapping the man's head to one side. In the darkness, MSG Payle* felt the enemy fighter, even with a broken neck, still grasping at him. He drew his 9mm pistol and fired twice, finally finishing his opponent. As he started to move, Payle* realized that his opponent was still hanging on him, his hand having been caught in his body armor during their struggle. Not all fought as violently or so stubbornly. In the next room, a single enemy fighter dropped his rifle when assaulters charged in. He was quickly subdued and flex-cuffed.²⁰

In the courtyard, after killing several defenders, the BRIGID assault team came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from some enemy fighters hiding in a pile of rubble adjacent to the main building. Just as things were getting tense, the two heavily-armed HMMWVs wheeled into the compound firing their M-2 .50-caliber machine gun and MK-19 40mm grenade launcher.²¹ The heavy firepower quickly silenced the enemy behind the rubble heap.

But the fighting was not over, even after BRIGID was thought to have been secured. CW3 Ashford's* Pashtu-speaking interpreter, Marine Corps Corporal (CPL) Colin Bermann,* had come inside the main building to examine some documents. While Bermann* was reading the papers with his small penlight, an enemy fighter, who was thought to be dead, quietly got up from the dirt floor and attacked him with his bare hands. The surprised Bermann* managed to shove his assailant aside. He and an assaulter then killed the attacker with their M-4 carbines.²²

With the mission complete at Objective BRIGID, CW3 Ashford* sent a survey team to mark the nearby LZ before he radioed for the waiting helicopters to extract his force. The team reported back that the primary LZ was unusable and suggested the alternate site. However, the walled farmhouse next to that site had not yet been checked, cleared, and secured. Ashford* told ODA 516 to clear the building. The Special Forces team applied an explosive breaching charge to the wall and blew an entry way into the small yard. Inside the farmhouse, they found a family huddled together, frightened by the gunfire and explosions. The assaulters moved them into a windowless room for safety and continued to clear the area.²³



Picture taken by an ODA 511 Special Forces soldier of a chalkboard on the site of Objective BRIGID. As part of conducting a sensitive site exploitation (SSE) of the objective, digital photographs were taken of things which might be of value to intelligence personnel.

Photos taken of captured weapons and ammunition discovered in the seizures of Objectives KELLY and BRIGID by A/1/5.



ODA 516's actions reflected the professionalism and character of the Company A soldiers. Minutes before, the detachment was fighting close quarters with the enemy in the freezing darkness. Then, a helmeted and masked assaulter was patiently leading a little girl by her hand to her family. The unit's reputation had preceded it: the farmer's wife had been hysterical until the assaulters identified themselves as *Ameriki* (American). With that one word, the woman regained her composure and quietly guided her children to the safe area.²⁴

At Objective KELLY, MAJ West* knew the operation was a success, as defined by his orders. They had taken 27 detainees; confirmed 16 dead enemy fighters; seized radios and documents; and were about to demolish anti-aircraft cannons, mortars, and other weapons and munitions.²⁵ The AC-130 'Spectre' gunships overhead that had covered

their assault would soon cannonade materiel that could not be easily removed or destroyed. The entire operation had been completed in less than two hours, but MAJ West* had an inkling of trouble.

As the KELLY force consolidated on its objective, an assaulter brought West* a flag of the new Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) that he found during a search of the site. And, as the shooting died down at Objective BRIGID, CW3 Ashford* radioed West* that one of his assault force found an Afghan national flag inside the compound gate. MAJ West* immediately radioed CJSOTF-South, requesting that USCENTCOM again verify that there were no 'friendlies' at Hazar Qadam before he would order the destruction of the captured arms and munitions. The reply was, "No, there are no 'friendlies' at that site."²⁶ As it turned out, this was not quite correct.

The intelligence that indicated Hazar Qadam (AQ-048) was a Taliban or al Qaeda site proved to be dated. It seemed that the Afghan fighters at Hazar Qadam had crossed over to the new AIA government two weeks before the raid. Afghan officials had not reported this. Soon afterward, the *Washington Post* reported, "U.S. Was Misled in Deadly Raid."²⁷ BBC news quoted Afghan leader Hamid Karzai as saying the raid was, "a mistake of sorts," while simultaneously announcing his intent to rid the country of 'warlordism.'²⁸ Controversy was further exacerbated when the 24/7 news media published the unsubstantiated 'eyewitness accounts' of Afghans who claimed to have been present during the attacks. They accused the American soldiers of atrocities against 'unarmed farmers.' Anti-American elements had easily duped the 24/7 international news media who 'ran with the story' without proof. The fabricated stories were all eventually disproved, but while the official investigation was still under way the *New York Times* headlined the CENTCOM commander's remarks: "After January Raid, GEN Franks Promises to Do Better."²⁹

For MAJ West* and his men, no explanation was forthcoming as to why obsolete intelligence at CENTCOM

drove the requirement for SSE on AQ-048. The fact that the Afghan men at Hazar Qadam stood and fought, while during all other A/1/5 SSE missions the men simply surrendered or fled, was established. And the fact that the women in the compound at Hazar Qadam, without being told, instinctively held out their hands to be flex-cuffed demonstrated that this group knew well the American SSE procedure for Taliban and *al-Qaeda* prisoners. MAJ West* felt no regrets about his company's actions at AQ-048. While not addressing issues of flawed intelligence that led to the raid, USCENTCOM Commander General (GEN) Tommy R. Franks, noted: "American troops, dressed in American uniforms, had returned fire after first being fired upon." On closing the post-raid investigation, Franks declared: "I find no fault with very highly trained people who went in on the ground, and I find no fault that those very highly trained people killed people who fired at them."³⁰ The Secretary of Defense personally defended A/1/5 after the raid: "It is no mistake at all," argued Donald Rumsfeld, "if you're fired on, to fire back."³¹

Given the parameters of the mission assigned by higher headquarters, the soldiers of A/1/5 performed admirably. When faced with changes in the situation on the ground,

"I find no fault with very highly trained people who went in on the ground. — USCENTCOM Commander General (GEN) Tommy R. Franks



Members of the A/1/5 raid force exfiltrate with a detainee seized from one of the objectives.

they were able to fall back on the detailed planning and rehearsed actions. That enabled them to adapt their tactics to meet the threat. Their previous experiences also helped them recognize when circumstances had changed. All of these factors came together in the ‘heat of combat,’ forcing individuals to make ‘snap’ decisions to save American lives and accomplish the mission. 📌

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Endnotes

- 1 Major material extracted from Charles H. Briscoe, *et al*, *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Amended Edition; Washington, DC: GPO, 2016), 235-41. Some corrections, editing, and revisions have been made and new material introduced to bring the story up to date.
- 2 Major (MAJ) Jon West,* Chief Warrant Three (CW3) Dwight Ashford,* and ODA 516, interview by Kalev I. Sepp, 10-11 July 2002, Fort Campbell, KY, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC (hereafter referred to as “West* and Ashford* Interview”); Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048 (Hazar Qadam AQ Leadership Site),” 28 January 2002, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 According to Joint Pub 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 2017, (Joint Staff; Washington, DC: GPO), 213, on Internet at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf, accessed on 28 March 2017, “Sensitive Site” is defined as: “A geographically-limited area that contains, but is not limited to, adversary information systems, critical government facilities, and areas suspected of containing high-value targets.”
- 4 West* and Ashford* Interview.
- 5 West* and Ashford* Interview.
- 6 CFLCC is pronounced “SIFF-lick,” and CJSOTF as “SEE-juh-so-tiff.” For more information on the forming and organizing of CJSOTF-South, see Michael E. Krivdo, “CJSOTF-A (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan: A Short History, 2002-2014,” *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol. 12, Issue No. 2 (2016), 1-28.
- 7 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 8 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 9 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 10 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.” In the early part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), procedures were still being refined for how best to bring terrorists to justice. At that time, some consideration was still being given to charging captured Taliban or al Qaeda members with crimes and conducting trials within the U.S. court system. In the event of such an instance, Federal law officials sometimes accompanied assault units to provide legal advice and assistance.
- 11 These modified armored trucks bristled with five M240 7.62mm machine guns and either an MK-19 40mm grenade launcher or an M-2 12.65mm (.50-caliber) heavy machine gun and carried 15 soldiers. They were benignly called ground mobility vehicles (GMVs).
- 12 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 13 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 14 The company commander was not informed of the reason for the ‘mission abort’ until his return to Kandahar, because at the landing zone, as per his plan, his force had not set up the satellite antenna needed to communicate with CJSOTF-South at Kandahar. MAJ Jon West,* interview with Kalev I. Sepp, 10-11 July 2002, Fort Campbell, KY, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC (hereafter referred to as “West* interview”).
- 15 The two CH-53 ‘Sea Stallion’ helicopters came from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
- 16 This was the first and only mission where any element of A/1/5 flew in U.S. Army Special Operations MH-47 ‘Chinooks’ in Afghanistan.
- 17 West* and Ashford* Interview.
- 18 West* and Ashford* Interview.
- 19 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 20 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 21 West* and Ashford* Interview; One of the two drivers was U.S. Navy BMI Jackson Stirling,* one of four Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists attached to West*’s company. West,* Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 22 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 23 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 24 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 25 Two other enemy fighters died of their wounds shortly afterward. Four of the detainees were found shackled in leg irons. West* and Ashford* Interview.
- 26 West* and Ashford* Interview; Memorandum, “Narrative After-Action Report of Target AQ-048.”
- 27 John Fullerton, “U.S. Was Misled in Deadly Raid, Afghans Say,” *Washington Post*, 31 January 2002.
- 28 N. A., “Afghan Leader says US bombed civilians,” *BBC News*, 6 February 2002, on Internet at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1804203.stm, accessed on 5 April 2017.
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The Mayor of P'yongyang



The Three Wars of COL Charles R. Munske

by Troy J. Sacquety

A very tired Colonel (COL) Charles R. Munske sat dejected on a concrete step on the afternoon of 4 December 1950. Smoking a cigar, he brooded over recent events. During the past five weeks he had labored to mend a broken P'yongyang, North Korea, captured by United Nations forces on 19 October 1950. In a herculean effort, COL Munske and his small Civil Affairs team had restored basic services. However, with advancing Communist Chinese forces just four miles away, the booming of not-so-distant artillery told Munske that his efforts would not see fruition. Therefore, he had just ordered the destruction of the very facilities the team had so painfully worked to rebuild. After burning what papers he could not take with him, Munske "sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured the best thing was to leave . . . there was nothing between us and the Chinese excepting the British Tank Corps, so I decided there was no reason for us to stay."¹ This marked the end of the civil affairs/military government effort in the only Communist capital ever occupied by U.S. and allied forces. So, who was COL Munske?

The man in charge of that occupation was a veteran of both World Wars I and II. Involved with Civil Affairs and Military Government (CA/MG) in the Pacific Theater since 1944, Munske was one of the most experienced officers in that field in the Far East. As such, he merits status as a Civil Affairs icon. Furthermore, his determined efforts were an exemplar of the impact that a dedicated and innovative CA officer can make, even with limited resources. This biography details his life and his contributions to Civil Affairs. Unfortunately, the lack of records regarding the early years of Munske's life and career does not allow more details.

Birth — World War I

Charles Robert Henry Munske was born on 12 July 1897 in Brooklyn, New York, to immigrant parents. His father was born in Altoona, Germany, and his mother in Wurttemberg.² As the son of a former sailor and small business owner, Munske grew up with a close group of friends from youth groups sponsored by the Bushwick Avenue Congregational Church in Brooklyn.



SGT Munske in WWI, where he served as a 1st Class gunner in the Coast Artillery Corps (CAC).

Munske's long military career began just a few months after war broke out in Europe in August 1914. On 14 December, he enlisted as a private in the 11th Company, 13th Coast Defense Command, New York National Guard. This began nearly thirty years of service in the Coast Artillery Corps (CAC).³ On 6 April 1917, in response to Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare campaign and the sinking of several American ships, the United States declared war on the German Empire.⁴

National Guard Sergeant (SGT) Munske mustered into Federal Service on 16 July 1917. He served as a gun commander, first at Fort Hamilton and then at Iona Island, New York.⁵ A year later he deployed overseas with the 70th Artillery, CAC, arriving in France on 22 July 1918. Though assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), the 70th CAC spent the war training at Angers, France, and did not see combat before the Armistice on 11 November 1918.⁶

Munske's big contribution came after the Armistice. As a fluent German speaker, he became an interpreter for the 'Engineer Operations Division of War Damages in Allied Countries' section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. The section assessed reparation payments due the Allies for damages suffered during the German occupation of their territory. His efforts helped support claims made after the Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919). Service on the Commission was Munske's first exposure to CA/MG activities.

On 19 March 1919, SGT Munske then transferred to the 102nd Field Artillery Regiment, 26th Infantry Division (ID), the famed 'Yankee Division,' because the 70th CAC had already returned to the United States.⁷ Soon after, he sailed home with elements of the 26th ID on the converted troopship USS *Mongolia* (ID-1615), reaching Boston Harbor on 10 April 1919.⁸ Then, like many AEF veterans, he attempted to settle back into his pre-war life.



This 8-inch Mark 6 howitzer was used by U.S. Coast Artillery units in WWI and would have been familiar to SGT Munske. Because of its familiarity with heavy weapons, the Coast Artillery was tasked to provide artillerymen to the U.S. forces in France.



Munske received his commission to Second Lieutenant on 7 June 1920. He served in the New York National Guard Coast Artillery in the years prior to World War II.



On 15 September 1923 at the 13th Regiment National Guard Armory in Brooklyn, New York, First Lieutenant Munske married Anna Haderer. They remained together until his death sixty-two years later.

Between Wars — Depression Era

Once back home, the first thing Munske did was to take classes in finance, accounting, and law at the New York University and Pace Institute.⁹ This helped him secure a job in 1920 as an accountant with the U.S. Rubber Company (now known as Uniroyal).¹⁰ In addition, Munske applied for and received a commission on 7 June 1920 as a Second Lieutenant in the New York National Guard. He advanced to First Lieutenant in May 1921. As a National Guard officer, he devoted the next eighteen years to serving on weekends, primarily in the 245th Coast Artillery Regiment (Harbor Defense). But, he also found time for his personal life. On 15 September 1923 at the 13th Regiment National Guard Armory in Brooklyn, Munske married Anna Haderer, whom he had known most of his life. The couple had their first child, Phyllis A., in 1925. Munske made Captain (CPT) in February 1926, but would hold that rank for the next fifteen years, as was typical of service in the interwar years.¹¹

Munske's work provided his first experience with the Far East. In 1928, the U.S. Rubber Company sent him on a nearly year-long business trip to review plantation operations in Sumatra and Malaya. During the assignment, he learned to speak Malay and visited China, Japan, and the Philippines. When Munske returned to the U.S., he was promoted to comptroller.¹² Munske and his wife had two more children, Joyce (Judy) B., in 1929 and Richard E., in 1933. A skilled worker with a keen eye for detail, Munske was employed throughout the Great Depression. Then, world events once again intervened.



Battery G, 245th Coast Artillery in January 1930. CPT Munske is seated in the middle with the Sam Browne belt and sword between his legs.



The Japanese city of Osaka suffered greatly from the U.S. bombing campaign. One of LTC Munske's duties was to help restore services to the damaged city.



98th Infantry
Division SSI

World War II

In 1940, after twenty years with U.S. Rubber, Munske took a one-year leave of absence to join the active Army.¹³ An experienced Coast Artillery officer, CPT Munske quickly advanced in rank as the U.S. Army mobilized for WWII. On 21 February 1941, while assigned to Battery G, 245th Coast Artillery, he was promoted to major (MAJ). Two months after the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, MAJ Munske was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) on 1 February 1942. For the next two years, he served primarily in the 53rd CAC, Eastern Defense Command, at Camp Pendleton, Virginia; Tampa Bay, Florida; Fort Screven, Georgia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Moultrie, South Carolina; and Fort Monroe, Virginia. At this stage of his career, and with WWII drawing to a close, Munske was denied promotion due to an excess number of colonels in the Southern Sector, Eastern Defense Command. Despite that, CAC would not release him to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).¹⁴

Seemingly stuck in the States as a Coast Artillery officer, LTC Munske made a career shift in late 1944 "in order to get overseas."¹⁵ Munske volunteered for Military Government. He left Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina, to attend the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia (UVA) in Charlottesville, Virginia, from 6 November to 16 December 1944.¹⁶


Set up in May 1942, the UVA program was the U.S. Army's first professional CA training course. After a short leave, the senior LTC next attended Harvard's Civil Affairs Training School (CATS), oriented towards the Far East, from 1 January to 29 June 1945. Munske then reported to the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) at The Presidio, California, to command the 8th MG Group.¹⁷ A joint facility, CASA trained soldiers and sailors to conduct CA in areas formerly controlled by the Japanese Empire. When LTC Munske learned that the 8th MG Group was not going to be activated, he volunteered as an individual officer replacement and left for the Philippines at the end of August 1945.¹⁸

This decision opened the door for CA opportunities in Asia. After serving on the Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC) staff, he left for Japan in November 1945 to be the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 (Military Government), 98th ID, headquartered in Osaka. He and his staff formulated staff plans and policies as well as enacted them.¹⁹ Thus LTC Munske became the de facto "Military Governor of Osaka."²⁰



On his first tour of Japan in 1945-46, LTC Munske would have used this map of Sakai, a city in Osaka Prefecture, produced by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch. The R&A Branch of OSS provided extensive support to CA, including the production of area handbooks and study guides for U.S. occupation forces.

From 1945 to 1949 Munske served with Military Government in Japan. He served in four different positions, the locations of which are marked on the map.



In Japan, LTC Munske witnessed the devastation that allied air power wrought on the cities. He wrote home to his wife; “Osaka is in ruins, the bombing here was methodical. They got everything and went after more . . . they just leveled off about 80% of the city, and that means plenty of work for [Military Government].”²¹ The destruction meant that LTC Munske was constantly in motion. As he described it, his days were filled with “What can we do here, what is it we must have there, and so and so on, just one thing after another hour after hour.”²²

As befitting his job description, much of Munske’s time was spent working as an administrator, including the difficult task of jump-starting local industry. To do this most effectively, he learned the language and culture, and attended meetings and social events to interact with the local population. The pace was exhausting. He wrote home that “I have a couple hundred officers under me scattered all over and between visitors in the office and phone calls from the field my days are completely filled, without any time left over.” LTC Munske noted that “no one knows of the tremendous amount of work that a military government officer does, and if a private concern made them work this way they would all quit.”²³

“I attempted on many occasions to return to civilian life, but was continued on active duty at the request of the Secretary of War because of my success as a military government officer in the Orient.”²⁶ — from a letter to Roberta Munske, Japan 1945



The Munske family in Japan, 1947. From left to right, Charles, Judy, Richard, Phyllis, and Anna. Soon after this photograph was taken, Judy was stricken with polio and confined to a wheelchair for the rest of her life.



While serving in the 95th Military Government Group in 1950, LTC Munske participated in Exercise SWARMER. This tested the Army's ability to use an airborne operation and subsequent airlift to counter an invasion force.

responsible for the successful solution of the problems with which he was faced."²⁵

Clearly, Munske's efforts were appreciated. He received a promotion on 6 July 1946. At that time, he was considering a return to the U.S. Rubber Company, but his promotion and attendance at the School of Government of Occupied Areas at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, kept him on active duty.²⁶

When Munske returned to Fukuoka, Japan, with his family it was as a LTC due to the postwar reduction in force (RIF). His primary duty was to reestablish industry, primarily the steel and coal industries. He dealt with an 18 June 1948 coal mine explosion at Katsuta and increased rice production in his region 125% in excess of the established quota.²⁷

Unfortunately, Judy, his youngest daughter, contracted polio in college. Munske and his family returned to Fort Lewis, Washington, for her 'iron lung' ventilator treatment. At the end of 1948, LTC Munske returned to Japan without his family to temporarily serve as the Executive Officer and Deputy Commander for the Hokkaido Military Government District before being assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.²⁸

There, he commanded the 28th Civil Affairs Company (now the 82nd Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia).²⁹ He later joined the 95th Military Government Group as a CA plans officer. That unit is now the 95th CA Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In early 1950, while still assigned to the 95th, LTC Munske became the J-5 of Task Force 100, which was involved in Operation PORTREX (25 February to 11 March 1950), an amphibious assault exercise in Puerto Rico.³⁰ His rater, Colonel Adolphus Worrell Roffe, was impressed with Munske's performance on the exercise. COL Roffe reported that Munske "has an excellent knowledge of administrative details, and the ability to separate essentials from the non-essentials in getting a job done."³¹ Then, while still assigned to the 95th Military Government Group, he worked as the S-5 of V Corps on Fort Bragg. In this capacity, LTC Munske supported Exercise SWARMER. Based at Fort Bragg and running from 24 April to 8 May 1950, SWARMER used lessons learned from the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) to test the ability of an airborne operation and airlift to counter a mock invasion of the United States.³² It was then that North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, getting Munske into his third war and another CA phase.



82nd Civil Affairs DUI



95th Civil Affairs Brigade SSI

Pre-Korea

Munske's service with the 98th ID ended on 31 January 1946, when he became the Military Government Section Chief at I Corps.²⁴ For his work benefitting more than six million people in the Osaka Fu, Mie, Wakayama, and Nara prefectures, Munske was awarded the Legion of Merit and the Army Commendation Ribbon. This was for his "supervision of welfare activities, the reopening of banking institutions, the reconstruction of housing, the reconversion of industry, supervision of agriculture, fishing, commerce, [and] education." "His broad knowledge of Japanese customs and culture, his diligent research, conscientious effort, and long hours were to a large extent

Korea

The war restores his Colonelcy. COL Munske arrived in Korea in October 1950, soon after the Army's breakout of the Pusan Perimeter. As the South Koreans and UN forces raced towards the North Korean capital, Munske was assigned to the UN Public Health and Welfare Detachment as head of the Pyongan Namdo (P'yongyang) Civil Assistance Team.³³ Munske chased behind the victorious UN forces to P'yongyang, which fell to the UN forces on 19 October 1950.


His third war, COL Munske served in Korea from 1950 to 1952. After working first in P'yongyang and then Pusan, he was instrumental in helping to rebuild a devastated Seoul.

Munske organized the CA team for the captured city of Chinnamp'o, which was the port facility for P'yongyang. Then, he entered the capital city itself. One of his most immediate problems was to pay city workers, like the police, who had continued on the job. He collected money from looted banks to pay them. He wrote home that "I visited a couple of banks yesterday. I wish I could describe the havoc as I saw it . . . every vault was dynamited and blown up. Money scattered all over the floors. In one place the Russian manager set the money in the vaults on fire, and it is still burning."³⁴ Without facilities, fire prevention became a major problem.

Munske described his time as 'the mayor of P'yongyang,' "These are really hectic days trying to establish law and order in this city. Just this minute someone came into my room and said 'Look out of the window' and the whole sky is red with fire. A really big one is burning somewhere[sic] in the city. There is no way of stopping fires here since we have no fire engines. The Commies took them all north with them, and [even] if we had some we have no water in the city since the Commies destroyed the entire water system."³⁵ Over the course of the next month, COL Munske and his team created a small fire brigade and reestablished a rudimentary water system to extinguish fires.

COL Munske and his fourteen-man military/civilian team accomplished minor miracles. Working with the personnel of occupying commands, which included the soon-to-be 10th Special Forces Group commander, LTC Aaron Bank, G5, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, to get government running.³⁶ They collected trash, immunized 3,500 people against typhus and another 4,000 against smallpox, reorganized the police force, organized a primitive health care system and set up insecticidal dusting stations to control the spread of lice and flea-borne infectious diseases. They repaired two power plants, got the streetcars and telephones working, and began repairs on the railroad bridge over the Taedong River.³⁷ Unbeknownst to Munske and his personnel in P'yongyang and Chinnamp'o, all of this work was already undermined by events to the north.

By late October 1950, the UN forces had pushed the North Korean Army nearly to the banks of the Yalu River and the northern border with China. In the race for the borders, entire units of 'volunteer' Communist Chinese forces infiltrated behind the UN forces. The surrounded



UN forces were forced to escape south. By the beginning of December, Communist forces were on the outskirts of P'yongyang. Munske ordered the CA teams to withdraw. Looking back on the situation days later, he wrote, "It was enough excitement to last me for a while. I wish however, that we could have stayed in P'yongyang for we were really doing a swell job of getting things going. Now the whole city has been burnt down and it is going to be much harder to get things going if we ever go back."³⁸

Following the evacuations of P'yongyang, Munske became the Executive Officer of the Kyongsang-Namdo (Pusan) Provincial Civil Assistance Team where he supported the refugee population in and around Pusan. After allied forces again pushed the Communists north in March 1951, COL Munske was sent to rebuild Seoul with the Kyonggi-Do Province (Seoul) Civil Assistance Team. Based in Seoul, COL Munske expanded his efforts to Inchon and Suwon.³⁹ COL Munske entered the area with the advanced elements and, "while still endangered



When COL Munske and his team arrived, P'yongyang did not have a functioning water system or working fire department. Fires, set by North Korean saboteurs, raged unchecked throughout the city. COL Munske helped solve this problem by obtaining several U.S. motorcycle fire engines.



CA Teams in Korea dusted refugees with DDT to kill fleas and lice and to prevent the spread of diseases.



COL Charles Munske's CA team in P'yongyang.

by sniper fire and land mines, he successfully provided civil relief for 1,500,000 refugees and 500,000 displaced persons.⁴⁰ Brigadier General William E. Crist, commander of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) called Munske his “most outstanding Team Commander.”⁴¹ COL Munske’s final assignment in Korea (11 June to 10 July 1952) was as Assistant Deputy Commander, UNCACK.

Stateside Finish

COL Munske’s career ended in the States as Inspector General of the New York Military District. Concurrently, he was the Legal Assistance Officer and Senior Advisor for Military Government units. He inspected reserve Military Government units and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) programs. COL Robert P. Hamilton, commander of the 356th Military Government Area Headquarters, wrote that “Despite [Munske’s] inherent modesty it soon became apparent that his knowledge of the theory and practice of [Military Government] was second to none.”⁴²



Twice occupied by the Communists, Seoul’s citizens suffered greatly and families were torn apart. Naturally, COL Munske provided support to thousands of Korean orphans.

The high profile of COL Munske’s work meant that he only dealt with top level military and government leaders. Here you see him with South Korean President Syngman Rhee and his wife Franziska Donner (center front), and U.S. Eighth Army and UN forces Commander, General James Alward Van Fleet (L), on an inspection tour.



[COL Munske's] "outstanding characteristics are his sound judgment, loyalty, and strong sense of conscience."⁴⁶

— Brigadier General (BG) Edgar T. Conley

Despite his best effort, age caught up to him six months prior to reaching twenty years of active duty service. The Army granted COL Munske a six-month extension on duty, to enable him to retire on 28 February 1958 with a full 20 years of active service after 42 years in the military.⁴³ His reputation and distinguished overseas service warranted an exception. He retired in Falls Church, Virginia, and passed away on 14 November 1985 at 88.⁴⁴

Career Recognized

Munske was one of only a handful of WWII era soldiers to make Civil Affairs a career. From his first course at the School of Military Government at UVA, and for the next fourteen years he spent in CA, it was considered a secondary field for the Regular Army.⁴⁵ Officers serving on active duty did not remain in CA for long if they wanted to advance their careers. COL Munske found his calling, serving with distinction in the Philippines, Japan, Korea and the U.S. Because of his exemplary long-term service in CA, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade has chosen to name their new headquarters after COL Charles R. Munske, a suitable and well-deserved honor for the 'Mayor of P'yongyang.' †

**** Thank you to the staff at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), and the extended Munske family, particularly Robert and Erica Munske, and Rich and Ed Brown for their help with this article.**

Endnotes

TROY J. SACQUETY, PhD

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

- 1 Judy B. Munske, "Colonel Charles R. Munske: Letters: Korea, 1950," letter to Anne Haderer Munske, 7 December 1950, (Unpublished, copy provided by author and retained by the USASOC History Office).
- 2 Application for Appointment and Statement of Preferences for Reserve Officers," 14 January 1927, Charles R. Munske Service Record, National Archives and Records Administration, National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO. (hereafter Munske Service Record).
- 3 The Coast Artillery Branch, the 'other CA,' was created in 1901. Its mission was seacoast defense of the United States. It was disestablished in 1950.



COL Munske retired in 1958 after more than forty years of service. His final posting was as a Senior Advisor to reserve Military Government units in the U.S. Army Military District, New York.



Charles R. Munske and his wife Anna in retirement. They spent their remaining years in Falls Church, Virginia. Their daughter Judy, wheelchair bound from polio since 1948, also lived with them.

- 4 **The United States later declared war on Austria-Hungary, another member of the Central Powers, on 7 December 1917.**
- 5 "All Military Service of any Description Prior to December 31 1920 (Form 0761)," [May 1927], Munske Service Record.
- 6 "National Guard, State of New York, Officer's Personal History and Military Record," 23 June 1921, Munske Service Record.
- 7 Form No. 0761, A.G.O., "All Military Service of Any Description Prior to December 31, 1920," Munske Service Record.
- 8 **In France, Munske joined the American Legion during their inaugural meeting in Paris on 15-17 March 1919. SGT Munske was honored by being a representative to the first stateside meeting of the American Legion, held 8-10 May 1919, in Saint Louis, Missouri.** See George Seay Wheat, *The Story of the American Legion: The Birth of the Legion* (New York, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1919), 263, on internet at https://openlibrary.org/books/OL6618080M/The_story_of_the_American_Legion.
- 9 Munske does not appear to be a high school graduate or to have obtained a college degree.
- 10 Roberta Munske, "COL. Charles R. Munske (1897-1985): A Life Well Lived: Chapter 1: Charles and Anna Munske: An American Family," (Unpublished), copy provided by author, 17.
- 11 'DA Form 66,' 27 April 1955, Munske Service Record.
- 12 Roberta Munske, "COL. Charles R. Munske (1897-1985): A Life Well Lived," 23.
- 13 **According to his daughter-in law, "that 'one year' ended in 1958 after a long and highly successful Army career. He retired from the U.S. Army as a Colonel of Artillery at the age of 61, and never did return to the U.S. Rubber Company."** See Roberta Munske, "COL. Charles R. Munske (1897-1985): A Life Well Lived," 23.
- 14 Headquarters, 98th Infantry Division, Military Government Section, "Promotion," 15 December 1945, provided by Ms. Roberta Munske.
- 15 Charles R. Munske, "Missing Records, 201 File," 7 August 1950, Munske Service Record.
- 16 **Established in 1942, the School of Military Government at UVA was the first formalized Civil Affairs School.**
- 17 Arthur M. Harper, Headquarters, 98th Infantry Division, Office of the Commanding General, "Promotion of Commissioned Officer," 12 January 1946, original copy provided by Roberta Munske. **Munske's orders for command of the 8th Military Government Group were revoked at the end of hostilities.**
- 18 MG Arthur M. Harper, 98th Infantry Division to Commanding General, Eight Army, "Promotion of Commissioned Officer, 12 January 1946, provided by Ms. Roberta Munske.
- 19 Roscoe B. Woodruff, "Commendation," 20 May 1946, **Munske Service Record.**
- 20 Roberta Munske, "Lt Colonel Charles R. Munske: Letters: Japan and the Philippines 1945-1946," letter from Charles Munske to Anna Haderer Munske, Osaka, Japan, 27 September 1945, (Unpublished), copy provided by author.
- 21 Munske, "Letters: Japan and the Philippines," letter from Charles Munske to Anna Haderer Munske, Osaka, Japan, 27 September 1945.
- 22 Munske, "Letters: Japan and the Philippines," letter from Charles Munske to Anna Haderer Munske, Osaka, Japan, 30 September 1945.
- 23 Munske, "Letters: Japan and the Philippines," letter from Charles Munske to Anna Haderer Munske, Kyoto, Japan, 15 February 1946.
- 24 Roscoe B. Woodruff, "Commendation," 20 May 1946, Charles R. Munske Service Record. **I Corps included the 98th and 33rd Infantry Divisions.**
- 25 Arthur M. Harper, "Certificate of Commendation: 98th Infantry Division," 31 January 1946, Munske Service Record.
- 26 Charles R. Munske to Chief, U.S. Army Military District New York, "Personnel Action: AR 340-15," 15 April 1957, Munske Service Record. **The service documents list this as the School for Overseas Administration.** Charles R. Munske, "Missing Records, 201 File," 7 August 1950, Munske Service Record. **Carlisle was the successor to the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia.**
- 27 Robert L. Eichelberger to Charles R. Munske, "Appreciation," 17 July 1948, Munske Service Record; Jack Lubiner, Mr. Military Government," in the New York Chapter of the Military Government Association newsletter, Vol 2., No 2., May 1957, copy provided by Ms. Roberta Munske.
- 28 'DA Form 66,' 27 April 1955, Munske Service Record.
- 29 Harold P. Hennessy, "Recommendation on Promotion of Officer," 20 January 1950, Munske Service Record.
- 30 **Information on Operation PORTREX can be found in** Edwin L. Siebert, "Operation PORTREX," approved for release by the CIA Historical Review Program 22 September 1993 and found on internet at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no2/html/v04i2a06p_0001.htm, and Gilberto Villahermosa, "The 65th Infantry Regiment: Prelude to Inchon: The Puerto Rico Exercises of 1950," July 2004, found on internet at <http://www.valerosos.com/Preludetolnchon.html>, accessed 17 January 2017.
- 31 "Officer Efficiency Report," 23 May 1950, Munske Service Record.
- 32 **The Berlin Airlift was enacted by the Western Allies in response to the Soviet blockading of allied-occupied Berlin. The Airlift successfully used strategic airlift to supply Berlin when the Soviets cut land access.**
- 33 **For more on the Public Health and Welfare Detachment and UNCACK, see** Troy J. Sacquety, "Same Organization, Four Different Names: U.S. Army Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-1953," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 7 (1: 2011): 63-77.
- 34 Judy Munske, "Colonel Charles R. Munske: Letters: Korea, 1950," letter from Charles Munske to Anne Haderer Munske, P'yongyang, North Korea, 2 November 1950, 7, (Unpublished, copy provided by author).
- 35 Judy Munske, "Colonel Charles R. Munske: Letters: Korea, 1950," letter from Charles Munske to Anne Haderer Munske, P'yongyang, North Korea, 3 November 1950, (Unpublished, copy provided by author).
- 36 **Although not on the CA Team, LTC Aaron Bank, the future commander of the 10th Special Forces Group, who was then serving as the S-5 of the 187th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), coordinated with COL Munske.**
- 37 **For more on COL Munske's efforts in P'yongyang, see** Charles H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang" *Veritas Journal of Army Special Operations History* 6 (1: 2010): 63-82.
- 38 Judy B. Munske, "Colonel Charles R. Munske: Letters: Korea, 1950," letter from Charles Munske to Dick Munske, Taegu, South Korea, 14 December 1950, 19, (Unpublished, copy provided by author.)
- 39 **All of these cities had been twice occupied by the Communists and had suffered greatly in the fighting.**
- 40 Headquarters Far East Command, "Citation for the Legion of Merit (Oak-Leaf Cluster), [1952], Munske Service Record.
- 41 "Officer Efficiency Report," 1 July 1952, Munske Service Record.
- 42 Robert P. Hamilton to Chief, New York Military District, "Letter of Appreciation," 7 May 1955, Munske Service Record.
- 43 "Certification of Information for Retirement Pay," 25 February 1958, Munske Service Record.
- 44 **COL Munske is interred at Arlington National Cemetery.**
- 45 **CA did not become a basic branch in the Reserves until 17 August 1955 and did not achieve that status in the Regular Army until 16 October 2006.**
- 46 "Officer Efficiency Report," 14 August 1956, Charles R. Munske Service Record.

BUILDING GENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS



The Commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jason A. Clarke, presents a case containing memorabilia to retired Royal Thai Army Colonel (COL) Sri Tesana, at the Royal Thai Special Warfare Command, Lopburi, Thailand, on 4 May 2017. The case contains a graduation certificate and photo of Special Forces Officer Course 2-60, and a Yarrowood Knife and Scabbard, available only to graduates of the SF Qualification Course. From left to right: LTC Clarke, COL (Ret.) Tesana, LTG Sirichai Tesana.

In March 2017, while preparing for the visit of Lieutenant General (LTG) Sirichai Tesana, Commanding General of the Royal Thai Special Warfare Command in Lopburi, Thailand, staff members discovered that the general's father had graduated from the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) almost sixty years earlier. On notification of the visit, the USASOC History Office conducted some research into that class and located others who had gone through the course with then-First Lieutenant Sri Tesana. It became apparent that the class was a special one as a number of its students went on to exert great influence in SOF circles for years to come. One fellow graduate, Colonel (COL) (Retired) Jerry M. King, provided the Office with his personal class photo and shared stories of the course and its attendees.¹ That information was used to create a packet to give to LTG Tesana that commemorated his father's SFQC experience.

The History Office created a high-resolution photo of LTG Tesana's father's SF 'Q' Course photo and a reproduction

graduation certificate. The photo and certificate were presented to the general during his visit, adding a deeply appreciated personal touch to the occasion. In addition, Dr. Jared M. Tracy from the History Office provided a brief on the Memorial Plaza. The visit was a big success.

Separately, the leadership of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group was also keen to show its appreciation for COL Tesana's shared service and the close relationship between their unit and Thai Special Forces. They put together a display case and acquired a Yarrowood Knife for presentation to retired COL Tesana recognizing the more than sixty years of brotherhood with Thai Special Forces. That generational bond was symbolized by COL Tesana's attendance of SFQC early in his career, his son's command, and continues an SF tradition. Over those years, thousands of American and Thai Special Forces soldiers have worked side-by-side in the field and shared skills and experiences.



46th SF Company and the Royal Thai Army

U.S. Army Special Forces has a long history of close relations with the Royal Thai Army (RTA), and in particular, with the RTA Special Forces. These two elite military organizations share more than a half century of close and continuous training, education, and operations. Although TDY Military Training Teams (MTTs) and deployments for training (DFTs) to Thailand occurred as early as the late 1950s, a milestone in this relationship took place on 15 April 1966 when the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), the predecessor of today's Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), formed Company D, 1st Special Forces Group.¹

CONARC established Company D to provide a permanent SF presence in Thailand to train RTA units in counterinsurgency tactics and procedures. After a few months of mission preparation at Fort Bragg, NC, the majority of the 369-man company boarded C-141 aircraft and arrived in Thailand on 15 October 1966. By November, detachments had been dispersed to select RTA units throughout the country to teach five-week courses in basic counterinsurgency techniques. The program was very effective. Less than five days after one of the initial Thai companies finished its training, that unit successfully defeated an insurgent element in the field.² In addition, on 9 January 1967 the company began training select RTA soldiers to cadre the first Special Forces Proficiency Course, the start of a long tradition with Thai SF soldiers.

On 10 April 1967, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) deactivated Company D and activated an independent 46th SF Special Forces Company under U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.³ By

September 1967, soldiers of the 46th Company had trained over 7,000 RTA soldiers. In addition, the 46th Company prepared the first RTA contingent for service in Vietnam (Task Force SLICK).⁴

Training continued unabated for the next seven years. However, as part of the theater-wide Southeast Asia troop drawdown associated with Vietnamization, USARPAC inactivated the 46th SF Company on 31 March 1972. Concurrently, 46th Company personnel and equipment were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.⁵ The circle was complete: what began as a 1st SFG element in 1967 officially returned to the Group.⁶

Although it did not maintain a permanent presence in the Kingdom, RTA and American Special Forces soldiers continued their close relationship through MTTs and DFTs. By working side-by-side with the RTA, old friendships are preserved and new ones begun. The groundwork of mutual respect and cooperation established by the 46th SF Company a half century ago continues to flourish.

Endnotes

- 1 77th Special Forces Group, "Subject: TDY Orders," 18 May 1954, copy in Stephen Sherman, Editor, "46th Special Forces Company, Thailand" (Undated CD/ROM: Radix Press); U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), General Orders, Number 34, 15 April 1966.
- 2 See Stephen Sherman, Ed., "46th Special Forces Company, Thailand" (Undated CD/ROM: Radix Press); and n.a., "Beginnings of the 46th Special Forces Company in Thailand," *Special Forces: The First Fifty Years* (Faircourt, LLC: Special Forces Association, 2002), 154-61.
- 3 U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), General Orders, Number 67, 10 April 1967.
- 4 N.a., "Beginnings of the 46th Special Forces Company in Thailand," 158-61.
- 5 Department of the Army message 212154Z March 1972; USARPAC General Orders, Number 193, 27 March 1972; USARPAC General Orders, Number 212, 4 April 1972.
- 6 Document, Larry J. Redmon, "Lineage and Honors, Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), undated, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Interview, COL Larry J. Redmon by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 10 July 2017, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.



46th SF Company soldiers conduct medical training with Royal Thai Army.



Combined parachute jump during the 36th consecutive Operation COBRA GOLD. COL Guillaume Beurpere (1st SFG CO) is flanked by COL Janma (L), CO of RTA 5th SF Regt, and LTC Puwadoen (CO, 1/5 SF Bn).

This class photo was taken at a time in Special Forces training history when officer and enlisted trained separately. Despite this practice, the prevailing attitude was “you must be at least a three time volunteer to be a good Special Forces soldier: volunteer for the Army, volunteer for airborne, and volunteer for Special Forces.”² Much

to the dismay of many Regular Army commanders, Special Regulation (SR) 600-160-10, “Personnel, Volunteers for Special Forces Units,” published on 25 April 1952, prompted many of their best soldiers to volunteer for Special Forces training and duty. After graduation, these SF soldiers deployed overseas to assist U.S. allies. Those countries reciprocated by sending their



1LT JERRY N.
KING



CPT JAMIE R.
HENDRIX



COLOR SGT
R. H. COPELAND
22 SAS



CPT RAYMOND L.
CALL



CPT JAMES W.
JONES



CPT GEORGE E.
CARR



1LT SRI TESANA




MSG RICHARD J.
MEADOWS



CPT ELMER E.
MONGER

OFFICERS COURSE ♣

19 JANUARY — 1 MARCH 1960



best and brightest officers to the Special Forces course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Among those who attended was then-First Lieutenant (ILT) Sri Tesana who retired as a Colonel in the Royal Thai Army.

Noteworthy in this commissioned officer class were two non-commissioned officers (NCOs). They were Master Sergeant (MSG) Richard J. 'Dick' Meadows (77th Special Forces Group) and British Color Sergeant (C/Sgt) R. H. Copeman (22 SAS). MSG Meadows, like several of his officer classmates, would spend the majority of his career in Special Forces. After graduation in March 1960, MSG Meadows was an exchange NCO with the 22 SAS, one of the first SF soldiers to do so. When he completed his SAS training, Meadows became a troop leader for a year. In 1967, while serving as a Reconnaissance Team Leader (RT Ohio) in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Studies and Observations Group (SOG), MSG Meadows was awarded a direct commission to captain. In 1970, CPT Meadows participated in the Son Tay prison raid into North Vietnam, attempting to rescue American prisoners of war. Later, he helped form and train soldiers for the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment -Delta (1st SFOD-D). In addition, after retiring as a major, Meadows had a key role in the Iran rescue mission (Operation EAGLE CLAW) in 1980.³ MAJ 'Dick' Meadows is a true Army Special Operations icon.

The class also had several officers who went on to distinguished careers in Special Forces before SF became a separate branch. ILT Jerry M. King, served as the Detachment Commander for FTT-26 in Muong Falane, Laos, in 1961-1962 as part of Operation WHITE STAR. In 1964, while deployed to Vietnam with his SF detachment, CPT King and his men

helped to quell the Montagnard Rebellion, a major event in the Vietnam War. Much later in his career, COL King was the J-3 and acting Chief of Staff for the planning of Operation EAGLE CLAW led by Major General James B. Vaught. This was the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran.⁴

Five other officers in this class, assigned to the 77th SFG after graduation, influenced Special Forces. Captains (CPT) Elmer E. Monger, Jamie R. Hendrix, Raymond L. Call, James W. Jones, and George E. Carr were selected for the first mobile training team (MTT) sent to South Vietnam in late 1960 to organize and train Vietnamese Army Ranger units. The success of that MTT set a pattern for employing later SF officers and NCOs as trainer/advisors to the growing Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN).⁵ Several of these officers served multiple tours in Vietnam and commanded Special Forces companies during the rapid expansion of SF in the mid-1960s. Most returned to Fort Bragg to teach another generation of SF soldiers slated to serve in Vietnam. ♣

Endnotes

- 1 USASOC Protocol Office memo, "Official Military and Social Function," 241605MAR17, copy in USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 LTC (Ret) Ian D.W. Sutherland, 1952/1982 *SPECIAL FORCES of the United States Army* (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 1990), 120.
- 3 Alan Hoe, *The Quiet Professional: Major Richard J. Meadows of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011), *passim*.
- 4 Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment, Colonel Jerry M. King, 20 September 2012, on Internet at: www.soc.mil/SWCS/RegimentalHonors/pdf/sf_king_jerry.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2017; Steve Sherman, comp., *Who's Who from HOTFOOT/WHITE STAR* (Houston, TX: Radix Press,), 35
- 5 Eugene G. Piasecki, "The 77th SFG Mission to South Vietnam," *Veritas*, 5:3 (2009), 46-58.



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Future Veritas...

JFK Visits Ft. Bragg, A Photo Essay

by Charles H. Briscoe

Despite our prevailing folklore, President John F. Kennedy's visit to Fort Bragg, NC on 12 October 1961 was not a 'spur of the moment' affair to tell Brigadier General (BG) William P. Yarborough that he was authorizing Special Forces to wear the Green Beret. The presidential visit took place after months of planning, numerous briefings, and several dress rehearsals for Washington generals. Three months before 'D-Day,' General Earle G. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff, sent BG Yarborough 'back to the drawing board' following a full-blown rehearsal. The 35th President was coming to be assured that America had a strategic readiness force to support his 'Flexible Response' defense strategy. XVIII Airborne Corps had 'center stage.'

