

REPORT OF
ACTIVITIES

ARMY
GROUND
FORCES

WORLD WAR II

940
.541273
U56r

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY



940

.541.273

U567

Call Number -----

**Report of
Activities**

army ground forces


ASIA

W O R L D W A R II

(U.S. Army Field Forces)

26562

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY GROUND FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



10 January 1946


319.1(AGF)(10 Jan 46)GNDCG

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY:

SUBJECT: Report of Army Ground Forces Activities.

1. During the war, Army Ground Forces submitted biennial reports. The pressure of war, however, prevented their presentation in a manner which portrayed adequately the accomplishments in organizing and training the ground soldiers who fought the war on all fronts.

2. I submit herewith a brief report covering the world-wide activities of Army Ground Forces from its organization in March 1942 to the surrender of Japan, to supplement the reports submitted previously.


JACOB L. DEVERS
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl: Report.

Table of Contents

Chapter I	The American Ground Soldier
Chapter II	Building the Ground Army in the United States
Chapter III	Training
Chapter IV	Development and Supply of Equipment
Chapter V	Personnel
Chapter VI	Organization
Chapter VII	Movement of Units and Replacements Overseas
Chapter VIII	Conclusion

Chapter I

The American Ground Soldier



THE PRIME achievement of Army Ground Forces in World War II was the American ground soldier—created in greater numbers than ever before, and organized into fighting teams which carried the war across two oceans into the heart of the enemies' territory.

Army Ground Forces found him a civilian—a clerk, a mechanic, a student—and turned him out a better fighting man than the professional Nazi or the fanatical Japanese.

The American ground soldier was the most elemental of modern warriors. He fought, not from battleships or airplanes, but hand to hand. Where he was, there was battle; and where he was, there was modern battle. The ground soldier of this war needed not only personal courage, but also a high degree of skill to make him proficient in the use of complicated mechanisms and to fit himself into the interwoven ground-air-navy team. He took the ground and held it. He imposed his will upon the conquered. He was in the tradition of Bunker Hill and Yorktown, of the Alamo, of Shiloh and Gettysburg, of San Juan Hill, of Belleau Woods

and the Argonne. Most of the sweat and blood were his. His family shed most of the tears.

The Enemy Situation

In August, 1940, the Nazi Army of some 300 divisions stood ready along the Channel, enjoying a brief rest period before its planned attack on Britain. During the past year, it had crushed Poland, overrun Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. It had flattened France in little more than six weeks. Of all Western Europe, only England remained free and untrammled, and her defeat seemed certain. The Nazi military machine, never allowed to rust since World War I, and put into first gear in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-38, appeared almost invincible. Italy, which with some 70 divisions had declared war two months before, was readying herself to strike the British in Egypt. Also blooded in the Spanish struggle, the Italian Army had sharpened its weapons, including bombs and poison gas, on the Ethiopians during 1935.

On the other side of the world, the Japanese Army, approaching 120 divisions, was busily

entrenching itself on the Asiatic mainland and openly fortifying its outlying Pacific Islands.


American Forces Expand

At this time, ground fighting forces of the United States consisted of 28 poorly equipped and partially organized divisions (10 regular and 18 National Guard) scattered in small units throughout the country and on isolated overseas bases. We were not even a third-rate military power.

Yet, during the years 1941-43, a ground army grew to carry the fight to its enemies on the ten fronts of the world's first global war and, together with the Air Forces and Navy, to wrest

from them the unconditional surrender to which this nation dedicated itself. The atomic bomb, in the Pacific, was a "coup de grace" to an adversary who had been thrown back thousands of miles by combined sea, air, and land action.

The American ground soldier was rushed to a maturity for which he had not planned or even dreamed. Yet, so strong were his native hardihood, his resourcefulness, his competitive spirit—and so skillfully were these American traits fostered and fashioned by Ground Force leaders—that he conquered, on the ground, face to face and weapon to weapon, those Axis warriors whose military upbringing had been foreseen and unhurried.



Building the Ground Army in the United States

THE AXIS armies scored an unbroken string of victories in 1940. These were watched anxiously and fearfully by the American people, but it took the terrible disaster of the complete subjugation of the French nation to induce America to undertake active defensive measures. In September, 1940, the National Guard was federalized and drawn into active service as housing and equipment became available. In October, compulsory military service for a one year period was adopted (a unique phenomenon for peacetime America) and by the following month the first of the nation's awkward and bewildered selectees began filing through partially constructed reception centers.

Some of these new arrivals were used to set up machinery to receive thousands of their fellow citizens into the military service, others were used to bring already existing army units up to authorized strength. The bulk, however, went to replacement training centers which began functioning in March, 1941.

It was still largely an army of amateurs in which many of the officers were occupied chiefly in learning how to be officers, and the men were being trained with scant equipment, and without realization, on their part, of the dead seriousness of the task ahead. The vast majority had not completely buckled down to business; they did not conceive themselves as future fighters. Their eyes were still on an early return to civilian life rather than on the conflict steadily enveloping greater and greater portions of the globe.

Soon, however, the men in the company and battery streets began to feel the influence of a small but highly-trained group of professional officers who had set to work at the Army War College back in August 1940.

This was General Headquarters, United States Army, charged with "directing and supervising the training of the field forces of the army within the continental limits of the United States." GHQ was to function for 19 months, until reorganized and renamed Army Ground Forces in March 1942. During that period, GHQ formulated the basic policies under which the ground army was trained for the greatest of all wars.

In the early fall of 1941, these policies resulted in reorganization of the existing ground troops into armies and corps, and put them in the field for large-scale maneuvers which later saved lives in battle. Commanders and staffs on the higher levels gained experience in those maneuvers which, in African and European combat, provided staff work amazing to Nazi generals, who expected the confusion typical of officers leading great masses of troops for the first time.

The day before the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941, General Headquarters estimated we would need a ground army of four million if forced into the global struggle.

Events Following Pearl Harbor

When Army Ground Forces was formed early in the spring of 1942, two major factors had improved the country's military situation.

First was the repercussion from Pearl Harbor. The news of that sneak attack, reaching the army in its barracks or in the homes of its families—reading the Sunday papers or listening to the radio—had made a fundamental difference. Next morning, even close order drill had a significant meaning. In the service schools, which by this time had been expanded tremendously, Monday morning classes had an unprecedented seriousness and intensity. Moreover, in the universities and colleges, ROTC students took increased interest in the instruction. Non-military undergraduates suddenly decided that military science might be a good course to take. The army had gone into uniform; civilian clothes were out for the duration.

Second, both men and officers had improved by the Spring of '42. The first draftees, who reached the line units late in 1941, were the cream of the nation's youth. Intelligent, strong, and eager—capable of learning anything—they were the stuff from which a first-rate modern army could be made. And most of the officers of company grade had taken at least one course in a service school. They returned to their troops with an exact knowledge of military matters they could not have gained on their own initiative. American observers were returning from overseas duty with the British and a “feel of combat” began to permeate the ranks.

Yet, the future of the Allies looked bleak indeed. In Europe, the Nazi war machine had withstood the Soviet counter-offensive and the Russian winter along its main defense line, and once more menaced Moscow and the heart of the Soviet Union. To the south it had bottled up a huge Russian force in the Crimea and was moving in for the kill, destined to crumple Sevastopol, one of the world's greatest fortresses. In Africa, Rommel had the British backed up almost to the pyramids of Egypt and

was hammering at the gates to the Middle East—the lifeline of the British Empire.

In the Pacific, the situation was equally critical. We had been thrown off Guam and Wake Island. The Philippines were lost, although a handful of gallant American and Filipino troops still held out in the foxholes of Bataan. The Japanese had chopped up the British in Malaya and had overwhelmed the Singapore bastion—in the words of Winston Churchill, “the greatest disaster to British arms which history records.” Burma and the Netherlands East Indies had fallen to the veteran and well-equipped jungle fighters. India itself was threatened. The Japanese were nearing the high tide of their conquests in the Southwest Pacific.

Birth of Army Ground Forces

Faced with these facts, the American high command effected a reorganization to better enable the Army to carry the war to the Axis. Out of this reorganization came Army Ground Forces, as such, on March 9, 1942. This combined, under one head, the Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry, Tank Destroyers, Coast Artillery (including Antiaircraft Artillery), and Armored Force. Its assigned mission was “to provide ground force units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat conditions.” Or, in the laconic words of the Army Ground Forces Commander, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, his command was “to create ground force units and train them so that they are fit to fight.”

Army Ground Forces inherited from its predecessor, General Headquarters, a force of some 35,000 officers and 740,000 men. In addition, there existed, in March 1942, an aggregate of almost exactly the same number of officers and men stationed outside the continental limits of the United States. Thus, at the stated date, there was a ground army of about 75,000 officers and 1,500,000 men; and already the

overseas forces were being supplemented by small shipments of troops to our outlying posts in the Aleutians and in the North and South Atlantic. So far it had engaged the enemy only in the Philippines—it was an untried army—but it was being trained on the theory, “we want every man, insofar as it is humanly possible, to experience in training the things he will experience in battle.”

Factors Affecting Ground Forces

The troop basis of early 1942, following closely the pre-Pearl Harbor estimate, allowed for

a ground army of 3,600,000 men, the largest force it was then estimated we could train and equip. However, in midsummer of 1942 when we began building up forces for a planned 1943 invasion of Europe, it became apparent that we would need a greater proportion of service troops to transport and supply the fighting troops than had been anticipated, and a large portion of the nation’s slowly developing manpower was swung that way.

Next it appeared that the first phase of our assault against the Axis would be conducted through the air. Planes based in England could



Lt. Gen. Ben Lear and reviewing party, left, observe infantry division activation ceremony, above.



hammer German industry and communications long before ground forces could be employed against them. Likewise, in the Pacific, a strong air force would be needed to help the Navy blunt the blows of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arms, as well as to assist the operations of our ground forces.

The next trend, therefore, was an expansion of the Air Forces. It was decided that a relatively small ground force would be sufficient at the moment because the Soviet Army was already engaging the bulk of German land power, as well as neutralizing huge Japanese elements on the Manchurian border; because of the Allied naval strength which would allow our ground troops to be committed at the most strategic places at the most advantageous times; and because of an Allied air power which would enable ground troops to attack an enemy already softened by blows from above.

Building Fighting Units

During the year 1942 the Army Ground Forces raised thirty-seven divisions, which, added to the thirty-six already in existence, made a total of seventy-three divisions. This year marked its greatest rate of expansion. The ground army, in World War II, never exceeded a strength of eighty-nine divisions.

Since about one year was needed to organize and train a combat division, while the supporting troops required a shorter period, the latter were activated on a slower schedule.

Into the infantry division of 15,000 men went as many varied skills as might be found in a civilian community of the same size. Transportation, equipment, and supply demanded the services of more than 1,500 men; communications, nearly an equal number; administration, 700; repair and maintenance of equipment, 450; preparation of food, 650; medical care, 600; and a variety of minor duties occu-

ried some 1,600 men. All of them were trained for combat as well.

The Cadre System

In order to pick some 15,000 American civilians out of the Selective Service hat and have them ready for combat within one year, a precision-designed activation system was set up, building each division around a cadre of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, all drawn from an already active unit. This cadre was selected two to three months prior to the division activation date and then given special training.

The prospective division commander and his two principal subordinates, designated by the War Department 98 days prior to the activation date, and other key infantry and artillery officers of the division-to-be, selected by Army Ground Forces, were brought to headquarters for a week of orientation. The commander and his staff then spent a month at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The assistant division commander went to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the artillery commander went to the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. All other officers of the cadre simultaneously attended appropriate service schools.

The commander and the principal officers of his staff arrived at the division camp 37 days before the activation date. They were joined a week later by the remainder of the officer cadre and the entire enlisted cadre. During the next few days the complement of 452 officers arrived from officer candidate schools, service schools, and officer replacement pools. On "D-day," the division was formally activated, with flags and music, and, during the next 15 days, the enlisted "filler" of 13,425 rookies came in from the reception centers. In the meantime, about 50 percent of the division's equipment had arrived and the stage was set for training.

INFANTRY DIVISION

CADRE STRENGTH VS. TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH


LEGEND



ENLISTED CADRE STRENGTH



TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH



The organization of the cadre, its pre-activation training, the concentration of equipment, and the actual welding of the division constituted a tremendous task. Only by the closest centralization of control and by complete cooperation of thousands of military persons was it possible to have the right things at the right place at the right time. Yet activation orders were accomplished without exception, and in August, 1943, the last division of World War II was formed.

This great system, producing simultaneously the soldier and the team on which he was to fight, set up in 1942, ran smoothly through the next year, but in 1944 an unforeseen crisis developed. The Japanese and the German, the jungle and the beachhead, had taken a far greater toll of our overseas strength than anticipated. The call from the battlefronts for more ground soldiers was insistent. In answer, the production line was speeded up. The California-Arizona Desert Maneuver Area was closed and units scheduled for this post-gradu-

ate training were sent overseas. The 1944 spring maneuvers in Tennessee and Louisiana were first postponed and then abandoned.


Furnishing Replacements

In the latter part of 1944, the stalemate before the Siegfried Line, with its atrocious winter conditions, wore out men much more rapidly than the inadequate European port facilities had been supplying them. In some sectors our battle lines were thin. It was just at this moment that the Nazis threw their final punch in the Ardennes.


This temporary setback was a climax to an already strained reinforcement problem. Seven divisions had been alerted back in the United States at least six months ahead of schedule, and tens of thousands of men had been drawn as overseas infantry replacements from their parent divisions in this country. One staff actually trained the equivalent of three divisions before it was finally sent overseas with its own men.

NUMBER OF BATTLE CASUALTY HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS

FIELD FORCES ON CONTINENT, 6 JUNE 1944 — 29 JANUARY 1945



CASUAL REPLACEMENT OVERSEAS SHIPMENT BY MONTH FROM SEPTEMBER 1943



The Nazi's last blow in the Ardennes created such a crisis in the need for replacements, particularly enlisted men and junior officers of the infantry, that the Air Forces were called upon to help assemble men on the East Coast for shipment to Europe.

And, to meet the insatiable demands from abroad, it was necessary to call on the Air Forces for some of the men previously given them in the days of their great expansion. In addition, men were transferred from the Service Forces into the hard-pressed units of the ground troops.

In the First World War this country activated a total of 58 infantry divisions but only 42 got overseas, and, of those that did go abroad, 12 did not function as combat units. Of the 16 divisions forming at home in November, 1918,

nine were at less than half strength and one newly-activated division had an actual strength of one enlisted man. The war ended before mobilization was complete and the War Department was not able to maintain the army projected.

Losses in Ground Soldiers

In World War II Army Ground Forces raised 89 divisions and supporting troops, sent every one overseas and 88 into combat, and maintained them there at or near their stipulated strength—this, despite the fact that by January, 1945, 47 infantry regiments in 19 divisions had lost from 100% to 200% of their strength in battle casualties alone. By May of 1945, the five hardest hit divisions had suffered 176% battle casualties in all components. Yet substantially all losses were replaced.

CASUALTIES IN DIVISIONS

BY TYPE OF CASUALTY

7 DEC. 1941 THRU 31 AUG. 1945

PRELIMINARY FIGURES. TO BE REVISED
WHEN FINAL RETURNS ARE COMPLETED.

AIRBORNE DIVISIONS

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF AN AIRBORNE DIVISION
8,558

	KILLED IN ACTION	WOUNDED IN ACTION	MISSING IN ACTION	TOTAL CASUALTIES
11th Airborne	1,011	4,073	40	5,124
13th Airborne	9	3	1	13
17th Airborne	1,119	4,214	87	5,420
82nd Airborne	1,581	5,544	552	7,677
101st Airborne	1,731	5,584	273	7,588
TOTAL	5,451	19,418	953	25,822

ARMORED DIVISIONS

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF AN ARMORED DIVISION — 10,752

1st Armored	1,671	6,158	1,609	9,438
2nd Armored	1,447	5,550	122	7,119
3rd Armored	2,235	7,206	179	9,620
4th Armored	1,448	4,669	90	6,207
5th Armored	735	2,498	46	3,279
6th Armored	1,222	4,263	45	5,530
7th Armored	1,109	3,886	283	5,278
8th Armored	333	1,137	24	1,494
9th Armored	702	2,292	205	3,199
10th Armored	901	3,300	80	4,281
11th Armored	617	2,559	21	3,197
12th Armored	636	2,289	117	3,042
13th Armored	115	370	11	496
14th Armored	538	2,097	108	2,743
16th Armored	0	14	0	14
20th Armored	43	130	0	173
TOTAL	13,752	48,418	2,940	65,110

CAVALRY DIVISION

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF A CAVALRY DIVISION — 13,747

1st Cavalry	1,612	7,236	35	8,883
-------------	-------	-------	----	-------

MOUNTAIN DIVISION

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF A MOUNTAIN DIVISION — 14,108

10th Mountain	783	3,128	219	4,130
---------------	-----	-------	-----	-------

**TOTAL CASUALTIES OF
AIRBORNE, ARMORED, CAVALRY
AND MOUNTAIN DIVISIONS**

21,598	78,200	4,147	103,945
---------------	---------------	--------------	----------------

INFANTRY DIVISIONS

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION — 14,037

1st Infantry	4,195	15,457	1,241	20,893
2nd Infantry	3,239	11,757	212	15,208
3rd Infantry	6,571	24,650	2,326	33,547
4th Infantry	4,581	16,311	313	21,205
5th Infantry	2,479	8,997	178	11,654
6th Infantry	1,542	7,272	37	8,851
7th Infantry	3,237	11,887	55	15,179
8th Infantry	2,617	9,748	277	12,642
9th Infantry	4,474	16,961	750	22,185
24th Infantry	2,275	9,145	98	11,518
25th Infantry	2,159	7,680	26	9,865
26th Infantry	1,978	7,611	236	9,825
27th Infantry	2,273	6,753	370	9,396
28th Infantry	2,323	9,324	943	12,590
29th Infantry	4,612	14,475	279	19,366
30th Infantry	3,464	12,888	286	16,638
31st Infantry	502	1,853	62	2,417
32nd Infantry	3,235	10,711	178	14,124
33rd Infantry	699	3,493	136	4,328
34th Infantry	3,281	14,165	3,460	20,906
35th Infantry	2,843	11,032	304	14,179
36th Infantry	4,265	18,874	3,579	26,718
37th Infantry	1,834	8,218	18	10,070
38th Infantry	1,251	5,562	92	6,905
40th Infantry	1,245	4,833	68	6,146
41st Infantry	968	4,632	24	5,624
42nd Infantry	516	2,165	273	2,954
43rd Infantry	1,966	8,637	47	10,650
44th Infantry	1,079	3,697	123	4,899
45th Infantry	4,030	19,415	3,762	27,207
63rd Infantry	911	3,239	80	4,230
65th Infantry	229	917	36	1,182
66th Infantry	800	636	15	1,451
69th Infantry	375	1,110	9	1,494
70th Infantry	781	2,656	106	3,543
71st Infantry	157	506	13	676
75th Infantry	922	3,159	37	4,118
76th Infantry	726	2,143	55	2,924
77th Infantry	3,037	10,531	133	13,701
78th Infantry	1,565	5,918	125	7,608
79th Infantry	2,306	11,253	331	13,890
80th Infantry	3,116	11,486	344	14,946
81st Infantry	500	1,992	251	2,743
83rd Infantry	3,276	10,857	210	14,343
84th Infantry	1,394	4,974	138	6,506
85th Infantry	1,390	6,583	1,440	9,413
86th Infantry	123	594	36	753
87th Infantry	1,171	4,170	144	5,485
88th Infantry	1,810	10,173	3,118	15,101
89th Infantry	266	662	50	978
90th Infantry	3,883	13,914	302	18,099
91st Infantry	1,216	6,795	1,016	9,027
92nd Infantry	338	2,242	620	3,200
93rd Infantry	43	133	18	194
94th Infantry	894	4,709	292	5,895
95th Infantry	1,307	4,788	126	6,221
96th Infantry	3,135	13,246	453	16,834
97th Infantry	199	701	33	933
98th Infantry	0	0	0	0
99th Infantry	1,010	4,080	254	5,344
100th Infantry	916	3,656	180	4,752
102nd Infantry	1,027	3,527	75	4,629
103rd Infantry	706	3,256	182	4,144
104th Infantry	1,445	4,801	111	6,357
106th Infantry	326	1,299	1,023	2,648
Americal	1,529	5,190	99	6,818
TOTAL	122,562	474,099	31,208	627,869

**KILLED
IN ACTION**

**WOUNDED
IN ACTION**

**MISSING
IN ACTION**

**TOTAL
CASUALTIES**

TOTAL ALL DIVISIONS 144,160 552,299 35,355 731,814

All the ground forces mobilized in World War II were needed. In 1918, we had fought only in France. In 1945, we were fighting on ten fronts in every quarter of the globe. This meant that special task forces had to be organized for each theater.


All our ground forces were committed when Germany surrendered. At that time, more than 96% of the tactical troops of Army Ground Forces were overseas, with the last divisions dispatched three months earlier. Four percent

of the units, all preparing to go overseas, and the training overhead—men largely returned from or disqualified for overseas service—remained in the United States to operate a training establishment for the production of replacements.


The story of organizing, training, equipping, and moving these men is the story of the accomplishments of Army Ground Forces. Their performance on the battlefields of the world stands as the test of that accomplishment.

DISPOSITION OF GROUND FORCE TYPE TROOPS VE-DAY

OUTLINE MAP OF THE WORLD




LOCATION OF U. S. DIVISIONS JUNE 1945





Trainees crawl under barbed wire and machine gun fire at Fort Bragg, N.C.



A cutaway gun is used as a training aid in a class at The Armored School.

Chapter III

Training

THE AMERICAN ground soldier could not have been successful in battle without superlative training. This was accomplished despite a lack of time normally considered necessary to train competent combat troops. In an average training cycle of 12 months, men were fitted to fight Axis troops who had trained for more than a decade and fought for years.

In the Garand rifle and the flame thrower, the American ground soldier possessed superior arms. But balanced against these the Germans had the 88-millimeter gun and the Japs the “knee” mortar, both effective weapons.

He possessed certain physical and mental advantages—heritages of the American past—but these very advantages complicated the training problems. To maintain his interest in training, and to keep him mentally and physically absorbed, his leaders had to invent new

and improved training methods and bring the physical training aids to a stage of refinement never before approached. Obstacle courses were made to resemble the battlefield rather than the gymnasium. Entire villages were constructed, similar to those they would face in enemy theaters, to teach the troops house-to-house fighting. On infiltration courses trainees crawled under actual machine gun fire, and were jarred by exploding blocks of TNT to accustom them to “every sight, sound, and sensation of battle” so that they would “act calmly, with sound judgment, regardless of noise, confusion, and surprise.”

Training Methods

American ground army training was controlled in three ways by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. First, its training directives were circulated throughout the command.



Mock Japanese village used for training in street fighting, Camp Blanding, Fla.

Second, the actual conduct of training was constantly inspected, all over the country, by the Commanding General and his staff. Third, a system of training tests, made up by Army Ground Forces, was administered to all units before their training phase was completed. Army Ground Forces thus exercised control and supervision through all phases of the training cycle.

This supervisory control was guided by certain basic principles, established early and held throughout the war, although altered constantly to meet changing conditions.

1. That a unit should be trained as a unit rather than as a group of separate individuals. This for teamwork.
2. That the troop commander himself was responsible for training rather than the specialist who might actually conduct it. This to foster the idea of personal leadership.
3. Emphasis on general military proficiency. This to make the soldier first, the technician later.



Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, commanding General, Army Ground Forces, 9 Mar 42 - 26 July 44, discusses a training problem with an officer during one of his frequent inspections.

4. Rigid performance tests on successive training phases. These to insure uniformity, early adjustment to exacting standards, and the earliest efficient completion of the training mission.
5. Free maneuvers of large units of the combined arms, with realistic umpiring, and under conditions as closely as possible approaching battle.
6. Realism. The use of more than 687,365 tons of live ammunition, and life-sized maneuver areas were concrete expressions of this fundamental requirement.

In the matter of training, Army Ground Forces sought to set an example to its commanders. Following the theory that "reports of training are of doubtful value" and that "higher commanders should know the state of training sufficiently by inspections on the ground," Army Ground Forces staff officers minimized paper work and were in constant movement. They discouraged "spit and polish" policies aimed to impress the commander rather than get the actual work done. They believed that "vehicles are maintained properly by tools, elbow grease and dirty hands, not by pencils and forms," and pointed out that "too many cases of motor stables consist principally of ceremonial flourishing of dust rags."

While American military doctrine was sound at the beginning of the war, it was necessary that it be kept constantly up-to-date. This was accomplished by maintaining a group of observers in every theater. They furnished written reports and returned to this country periodically to make personal reports to specific operating agencies. Frequently they visited the training schools to bring a breath of combat to domestic soldiers. As the war continued, a limited number of combat-experienced officers were brought back to occupy positions on the staff of Army Ground Forces and its subordinate elements. Some were assigned to the teaching staffs of the various service schools to pass on their combat know-how to troops in training.


Maximum Use of Equipment

As the ground army began to move overseas to occupy and hold our far-flung bases, many difficulties arose for the vast bulk of troops in training here at home. One was an acute shortage and obsolescence of equipment. This was partly because American industry was, as yet, unable to meet military demands; partly because we were currently shipping arms and general equipment to our allies; and partly because units about to go overseas on special missions were fully equipped to the detriment of those in training. Army Ground Forces said, "Rotate equipment." This was done to the extent that one battalion would have a few bona fide implements of war for only an hour or so before passing them on to another battalion. The unit to which the items really belonged had to maintain a staff of enlisted men to keep

books on the transactions. Army Ground Forces said, "Prevent deterioration of that equipment on hand," and GIs throughout the land spent long hours in "maintenance of materiel," sweating with oil, grease, paints, and crocus cloth. Army Ground Forces said, "Preserve strict economy in expenditure of ammunition," and several battalions of field artillery would assemble to watch the firing of a few rounds from a heavy gun, each round to be subsequently "critiqued" as if it had been a volley. Improvisations were encouraged to the extent that the word "simulate" became a part of the average soldier's vocabulary. Sometimes machine gun sections never saw a machine gun; antitank gunners worked with plumbing pipe and wooden models.

The personnel situation during 1942-43 was almost as critical. Divisions in advanced train-

The Army Ground Forces conducted 27 army or corps maneuvers in the five areas shown on the map below. Experience gained in these extensive problems saved lives in combat.



ing were required to furnish cadre after cadre to newly organized outfits and were continually "stripped" to fill units suddenly alerted for overseas duty. This constant retraining program, a shortage of competent officer instructors, and a feeling that the division was being held back from combat tended to lower unit morale.

Programs and Tests

The training of units was conducted under programs prescribed by Army Ground Forces. These documents did much more than outline the subjects to be taught and the time to be allotted. They took into consideration such factors as availability of ranges, training aids, weapons and other facilities. They enabled inexperienced staff officers to make correct utilization of time and equipment in order to cover the entire field and yet stress subjects of particular importance.

The practical tests, conceived and conducted by Army Ground Forces, were rigid and realistic, most of them involving the firing of live

ammunition. In many respects, they were more demanding than combat itself and troops who passed them had no qualms about their technical excellence.


Information and Education

In the training of the individual soldier, the psychological aspect was not neglected. An extensive program of orientation of the individual as to the causes of the war and the objectives for which America was fighting was conducted. This instruction was stressed particularly by Lieutenant General Ben Lear who was in command late in 1944. It was of special importance at that time as the majority of men were being shipped overseas as replacements and lacked the stabilizing influence of being a part of an organized fighting team.

Replacement Training

The War Department and Army Ground Forces, confronted by the lessons of World War I, early made plans to furnish sufficient trained replacements to enable the ground

PERCENT EQUIPPED STATUS OF EQUIPMENT IN UNITS ASSIGNED TO HQ AGF IN TRAINING IN U. S. EXPRESSED BY PERCENTAGE BASED ON 100 REPRESENTATIVE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT





High velocity 120 mm anti-aircraft guns fire in target practice, Camp Davis, N.C.

troops to continue effectively in battle. In no previous war had any nation furnished its combat units the daily flow of trained men that Army Ground Forces sent to its front-line foxholes in this war. To accomplish this vital and gigantic task, over 2,453,000 men were processed through Replacement Training Centers from March 9, 1942 to July 31, 1945. On V-E

day there were twenty-one such centers in existence having a total capacity of more than 378,000 men.

Their training period was first set at 13 weeks, later increased to 17. The most expert instructors and the most fully-developed training aids were used. Thorough grounding in the use of weapons was the primary aim. The last



Tank-infantry teams advance during training at The Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky.




Medium tank crews engage in sub-caliber firing on range at Fort Knox, Ky.

two weeks were spent in the field under conditions as near combat as could be produced. Many of the men, having then been granted final furloughs, were given the personal respon-

sibility to proceed to overseas depots at stated times. And almost without exception they did exactly that, providing eloquent testimony to America's will to defeat her enemies.

**ARMY GROUND FORCES
REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS MONTHLY INPUT
FROM 9 MARCH 1942 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945**



Schools Are Praised

The Army Ground Forces schools, Infantry, Field Artillery, Antiaircraft, Armored, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Parachute, and Tank Destroyer, trained or produced most of the officers who led the World War II ground soldier to his ten-front victory. The contributions of these schools, both in war and peace, were summarized by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower when he said, "The stamp of Benning, Sill, Riley, and Leavenworth is on every American battle in Europe and Africa." The wartime expansion of these institutions—some of them built for the crisis, others going back nearly as far as U. S. military history—was almost incredible. The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, had an enrollment of 3,656 at the time of Pearl Harbor and less than one year later its student body had grown to 16,925. Other schools expanded similarly.



Training Literature Expanded

The preparation and revision of training literature was a continuous task. The complexity of equipment used in modern war and the great number of different type troop units made the initial program of training literature tremendous. When our experiences in training or in combat uncovered faults or indicated improvements, training guides were promptly revised or amended.

Pre-Pearl Harbor training literature, written generally in a somewhat stilted, military style, had been largely uninteresting or incomprehensible to the new citizen army. In addition, owing to peacetime economy measures, illustrations had been few. Army Ground Forces instituted a new style of field manual writing—aimed particularly at the expanding army of recent civilians—and began to use illustrations, photographs, and drawings as profusely as possible to lighten the text.


Gradually most of the non-War Department publications which had come into use at the beginning of the war were suspended, and steadily-increasing distribution was made of authentic doctrine. Two or more former manuals were frequently combined into one better document. Large quantity production of some urgently needed manuals was accomplished at Army Ground Forces field printing plants.

Training Films Improved

It is not surprising that the ground army's training effort—complicated as it was made by the great increase of knowledge and skills demanded of the individual soldier by modern warfare, by the constant changes in materiel and technique, and by a shortage of highly-skilled instructors—should have created an almost insatiable demand for every kind of aid

An officer receives his second lieutenant's bar at Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga.

PRODUCTION AND CUMULATIVE TOTALS OF FIELD MANUALS AND VISUAL AIDS PREPARED BY AGF



that would assist and speed the training cycle. Army Ground Forces accomplishments in this field were most notable in motion picture films and film strips. In 1941 there were available only some 60 training films, and these were so lengthy and of such poor quality that they failed to hold the interest of trainees long accustomed to viewing the finest Hollywood productions. Again, the availability of film libraries and projection equipment was far from adequate. By the end of the war, in conjunction with the service schools who prepared and the Signal Corps who produced them, Army Ground Forces had completed 286 films and 545 film strips.

Many of the new training films were highly personalized and dramatic. Presented in the soldier's own idiom, they, for the most part, dealt with the physical aspects of combat but, for the first time in the history of military training aids, some of them took up the psychological aspects of battle.

When the bulk of the ground troops went overseas, a comprehensive survey by Army Ground Forces showed that further decentralization of films and film equipment was necessary to meet the needs of ground units in the theater of operations. Projectors and standard libraries of films were therefore allotted to all infantry divisions.

The training of the ground soldier was based on official War Department training literature and visual aids. Much of the literature was made memorable through motion pictures. Together, field manuals and films worked for the ultimate purpose of military training—victory in battle.

Specialized Training

Specialized training was carried on as the necessity arose. When the Afrika Korps rumbled to the doors of Cairo, a training center was established in the California desert to teach American units that kind of warfare. When victory was won in Africa, the center was continued as the California-Arizona Maneuver Area, since it was ideal for the physical and mental conditioning of troops for combat and it was the only area in the United States where live ammunition could be used almost at will on large scale maneuvers.


Viewing the Alps and remembering Hannibal, Army Ground Forces established a mountain warfare training center at Camp Carson, Colorado. Noting the successful use of ski-shod soldiers on the northern Soviet front, ground army leaders set up a skiing center at Camp Hale, Colorado. With operations in Alaska a certainty and with the possibility of combat in the Arctic, it was thought advisable to create a cold weather training center at Camp McCoy,


Wisconsin. Correctly foreseeing an amphibious war in the Pacific, Army Ground Forces first conducted training in landing operations at Carabelle, Florida, as its own activity. Later, this type of training was taken over by the Navy

and a large, continuous program of amphibious instruction was conducted in the vicinity of San Diego, California. The mutual development of doctrine and understanding at this Amphibious Training Center contributed great-



Ground forces pound through the surf in amphibious landings at Wadke Island, Dutch New Guinea, above, and off Angaur Island in the Palau Group, below.





A full-equipped paratrooper, above, climbs aboard plane for the invasion of France.

ly to later Army-Navy successes in both theaters.

The importance of airborne fighters was recognized early. Formal training was begun at the Parachute School, Fort Benning, Georgia in the Spring of 1941. Though organized originally to train a small number of officers and men in the technique of jumping from an airplane in flight, the expansion of the school was rapid and enormous. At the height of the airborne effort the parachute school graduated 1,250 students per week in jumping courses, in addition to graduating troops from the demolition, riggers, communications, and jump-masters courses. As of September 1, 1945, 90,992 students graduated from the parachute jumping courses. During their course of instruction they made 509,842 jumps.

Conversion Training

When the toll of battle began to hit our troops, it became apparent that the losses of


Tank crews, below, receive orders at start of problem at the Desert Training Center.




the infantry were much greater than those of the other arms. Also, when the enemy had control of the air early in the war, many anti-aircraft units were formed which were found to be surplus as our Air Forces destroyed enemy air power. Conversion training was instituted to turn the surplus men, not only of the Ground Forces but also of the Air and Service Forces, into infantrymen. This training usually consisted of six weeks of intensive instruction. A

portion was conducted in Infantry Advanced Replacement Training Centers, especially set up for this purpose. A total of 213,893 men were converted to infantry within the United States. Similar training was conducted in Europe. In this training particular attention was given to making the soldier feel he was honored in becoming a "dough boy." Only men of the best physical capacity were eligible for "conversion."

DISTRIBUTION OF STRENGTH
(ALL THEATERS)
AS OF 31 JULY 1945




DISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES
(ALL THEATERS)
AS OF 31 JULY 1945




DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES
AS OF 31 AUGUST 1945

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CASUALTIES



AIRBORNE DIVISIONS	25,882
INFANTRY, MOUNTAIN, AND CAVALRY DIVISIONS	640,882
ARMORED DIVISIONS	65,110
ALL OTHERS	214,090
TOTAL CASUALTIES	945,904

DISTRIBUTION OF CASUALTIES IN INFANTRY DIVISIONS



BREAKDOWN OF OTHER THAN INFANTRY CASUALTIES IN DIVISIONS

